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REDEFINING THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT
JoHN B. MrrcHELL*
INTRODUCTION
This Article centers upon one partner to a wild dance, the lower
court public defender who, unlike the superior court public defender,
has received almost no attention.' In doing so, I recognize that it
takes two to tango, but will leave the prosecutor's story to another
day. Moreover, in many ways, this Article is as much about the dance
floor, the lower criminal courts,2 as about the institutional advocates
who move across it. Similar to the attorneys who work there, almost
nothing has been written about the lower courts themselves.' Perhaps
their staggering load of misdemeanors seems too small-time to merit
*" Clinical Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. J.D. 1970, Stanford Law
School. The author wishes to thank Paul Tremblay and Alan Kirfley for their generous sugges-
tions and insights, Faye Jones and Mary Schoenmakers for locating and duplicating materials
from half the libraries in America, and Liz Dorsett for all her typing, retyping, and excellent
editorial suggestions. The author also wishes to express appreciation to the School of Law for
providing a grant to develop the research for this Article.
1. Most written-about public defenders deal with those in the felony system. See, e.g.,
JONATHAN D. CASPER, CRIMINAL CourTs: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECrIVE (1978) [hereinafter
CASPER, CRIMINAL COURTS]; JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JusTICE: THE
DEFENDANT'S PERSPECrVE (1972) [hereinafter CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE];
Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 CoNFLiCr REsOL 52 (1967);
David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender's
Office, 12 Soc. PROBS. 255 (1965).
2. The jurisdiction of lower criminal courts generally involves misdemeanors and gross
misdemeanors, punishable by up to a one-year sentence in county jail.
3. See Malcolm M. Feeley, Pleading Guilty in Lower Courts, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 461,
465 (1979) ("[T]hose who generalize about plea bargaining have only a small, if important, set of
criminal cases in mind - usually felonies, rather than the great masses of petty offenses."); Mau-
reen Mileski, Courtroom Encounters: An Observation Study of a Lower Criminal Court, 5 LAW
& Soc'y Rav. 473,477 (1971) ("The great bulk of criminal cases start and end at the lower court
level. Our understanding of courts does not reflect court volumes since our accumulated knowl-
edge disproportionately pertains to the higher courts.").
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serious attention.4 Yet these lower courts handle a significant major-
ity of the cases in our criminal justice system.5 That means that most
citizens' encounters with the criminal courts (as defendant, witness, or
juror) will be in these lower tribunals,6 and most criminals who gradu-
ate to the superior courts will likely have made their first few appear-
ances here.
As for the public defender, it is common wisdom that throughout
its existence it has not been well thought of by either clients or the
public, and those working for it occupy a status of second-class attor-
ney or not-really-a-real lawyer at all.7 Public defenders in the lower
courts, being young,8 inexperienced, and frequently in transition to
4. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE COURTS, THE 1992 REPORT OF THE
COURTS OF WASHINGTON 7-8 (1993) [hereinafter WASHINGTON COURTS] (courts of limited juris-
diction disposed of 391,135 cases in Washington state in 1991); Harry I. Subin, The New York
City Criminal Court The Case for Abolition, OCCASIONAL PAPERS FROM THE CENTER FOR
RESEARCH IN CRIME AND JUSTICE, NEW YORK UNvansrrv SCHOOL OF LAW 1 (1992) ("What
the Court's caseload may lack in relative seriousness, is made up in volume: about 213,000 cases
were disposed of in the Criminal Court in 1990."); Mileski, supra note 3, at 477. ,
5. "The misdemeanant is in various ways the forgotten man of the criminal legal system,
even though offenders like himself comprise the great bulk of the police and court workload."
Mileski, supra note 3, at 488.
6. "Often, the average citizen's only contact with the judicial system is through district
and municipal courts." OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE COURT, THE 1991 REPORT
OF THE COURTS OF WASHINGTON 6-7 (1992).
7. The negative articles are legion. E.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE IN CRISIS: A REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN BAR ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: SOME MYTHS, SOME REALITIES, AND SOME QUESTIONS FOR
THE FUTURE 37 (1988) [hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS] ("[lit is clear that those who
represent the poor are not generally held in high esteem, either within the legal profession or
outside it."); CASPER, CRIMINAL COURTS, supra note 1; CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
supra note 1; ROGER A. HANSON ET AL., INDIGENT DEFENDERS GET THE JOB DONE AND DONE
WELL 3-4, 103 n.66 (1992) (submitted to State Justice Institute by National Center for State
Courts); Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game, 1 LAW & Soc'y REv.
15 (1967); Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had a
Public Defender, 1 YALE REv. L. & Soc. ACT. 4 (1971) [hereinafter Casper, Did You Have a
Lawyer?]; Dean J. Champion, Private Counsels and Public Defenders: A Look at Weak Cases,
Prior Records, and Leniency in Plea Bargaining, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 253 (1989); Michael McCon-
ville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 581 (1986-87); Sudnow, supra note 1. This sentiment towards public defenders
appears to be the same even in England. See Judges Will Be Told to Get Tough With Bad
Defence Lawyers, THE INDEPENDENT, July 5, 1993, at 1 (Eng.).
8. See LISA J. MCINTYRE, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER: THE PRACIICE OF LAW IN THE
SHADOWS OF REPUTE 46,80 (1989); Champion, supra note 7, at 259; Dennis R. Eckart & Robert
V. Stover, Public Defenders and Routinized Criminal Defense Processes, 51 J. URBAN L. 665,
673-74 (1974); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Effective Assistance on the Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 137, 147 (1986). Although, with a tightening job market fewer attorneys
appear to be leaving the felony divisions. That means fewer slots for attorneys to move from
misdemeanors to felonies and thus more experienced attorneys remaining in the lower courts.
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somewhere else,9 carry this burden to even a greater degree. I do not
share this negative view of public defenders. In the lower courts,
which are the focus of this Article, most defenders are good, dedi-
cated, and brutally overworked attorneys who do their best for their
clients. This Article seeks to elaborate upon the role of these public
defenders in the lower courts in a way that will both provide a fair
description of their work and workplace, and hopefully improve their
functioning in the system. It would be nice if this would also change
the public perception, but that is not guaranteed to follow.10
In fact, almost all the attorneys working in the lower courts in one defender's office I inter-
viewed were very experienced.
We're getting a high number of applicants for entry level positions. Many appli-
cants will have 4, 5 or 6 years of experience. We're just not in general getting green
attorneys at the entry level position for assigned counsel anymore. The Public
Defender used to be here for a year and go out and do something else. Now we're
having a lot of those people come back. And, we're having very little turnover.
And other than [ ], most of the other attorneys we have in District Court right now
have at least 5 years if not more of experience.
Interview with Deputy Public Defenders, Pierce County Public Defender (misdemeanors), in
Tacoma, Wash. (Aug. 12-13, 1993) [hereinafter Public Defender Interview] (the author inter-
viewed six defenders, and the interviews were granted on condition their identities be kept
confidential).
9. See McTYRE, supra note 8, at 80 ("[Mlany public defenders said that at the time that
they joined the office, they expected to remain no more than a year or two."); DEBRA S.
EMMELMAN, DEFENDING INDIGENTs: A STUDY OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE WoRK 47 (1990); James
M. Doyle, It's the Third World Down There! The Colonialist Vocation and American Criminal
Justice, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 71, 93 (1992) (noting that one can experience the stresses of
defending indigent criminals and then move on to another way of life); see also Charles J. Ogle-
tree, Jr., Beyond Justification: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARv. L.
REV. 1239, 1245 (1993) ("The problem in indigent defense is that the conventional justifications
for doing the work often do not correspond with effective or sustaining motivations.").
10. TWo factors limit the ability of the public defender to alter this perception. First, we
have all grown up within the culture of a market economy: you get what you pay for, and public
defenders are free. In fact, in interviews with criminal defendants, they consistently correlate
their lack of confidence in the public defender with the fact that they do not pay the defender.
This lack of payment both symbolizes the attorney's low value and the fact that the defender is
not "theirs" but the system's. See, eg., CASPER, CRIMINAL COURTS, supra note 1, at 18; CASPER,
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 113. Second, the defender has an interest in not
changing the public perception, and in not appearing too successful. Put simply, the public does
not like the idea that they are paying taxes for someone to put criminals back on the street. See
generally McINTYR, supra note 8, at 72 (explaining the precariousness of the public defender's
role in the system); H.L. Richardson, Abolishing the Public Defender's Office, 95 L.A. DAILY J.,
Nov. 19, 1982, at 4:
More and more people are contending that justice is not being served by the public
defender's office and that it is one of the contributing factors in our nation's rising
crime rate. It is becoming more evident that the public defender's office, instead of
serving to bring justice, is now little more than the legal arm of the criminal element in
our society ....
... [I]s it the responsibility of the public to... provide the criminals with attorneys
who are masters of delay and dilatory tactics?
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More money would of course do much to improve the effective-
ness of the public defender system. The system is terribly under-
funded," as is the entire criminal justice system. 2 It is, however,
unlikely that this will change appreciably.' 3 On the macro-allocation
level,' 4 criminal justice is not likely to take many scarce dollars from
health care, education, jobs, or defense, 5 although concern about
11. It is widely acknowledged that the entire public defender system is terribly
underfunded: "[T]he problem is not that the defense representation is too aggressive but that it
is too often inadequate because of underfunded and overburdened public defender offices."
CRIMINAL JuSTIcE IN CmsIs, supra note 7, at 9; see id. at 41 ("The pressure to negotiate pleas
cannot be substantially reduced without a dramatic increase in resources."); Melvin M. Belli,
Public Defenders: There Just Aren't Enough?, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 12, 1991, at 16; Stacey Colino,
When Justice Goes Begging-The Crisis in Indigent Defense, STUiNrr LAW., Oct. 1988, at 14
("The nation's public defense system is in the midst of a financial crisis that threatens to under-
mine its effectiveness."); Mark Curriden, Indigent Defense in the South-Begging for Justice, 77
A.B.A. J. 64, 67 (1991); A Plea From Public Defenders, 122 NJ. LJ. 1 (1988); Defending the
Public Defender, 96 L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 24, 1983, at 4 (Open Forum) (from Sacramento Bar);
Laura Fremont, Defenders Cite Need for More Funds for Poor Defendants, 93 L.A. DAILY J.,
Dec. 17, 1980, at 2; Lack of Public Funding Affecting Counse" Are Indigents Hurt?, 93 L.A.
DAILY J., Dec. 10, 1980, at 1; State's Attorney, Public Defender Seek Budget Hikes, 137 CHI.
DAILY L. BULL, Nov. 8, 1991, at 1.
To put this in some perspective, the average cost of an entire criminal case-including both
felony and misdemeanor cases together in coming to the average-in 1986 was $223.00, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL DEFENSE FOR THE POOR,
1986 (1988). That's less than the hourly fee for most partners in large commercial law firms. In
fact, the combination of serious underfunding and crushing caseloads recently led the Minnesota
Supreme Court to give public defenders immunity from malpractice suits. Dziubak v. Mott, 53
Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1466 (Minn. 1993).
12. "The entire criminal justice system is starved for resources.... Less than 3% of all
government spending in the United States went to support all civil and criminal justice activities
in fiscal 1985. This compares with 20.8% for social insurance payments, 18.3% for national
defense and international relations, and 10.9% for interest on debt." CRIMINAL JusTICE IN CRI-
sis, supra note 7, at 5 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 39-40 (discussing the major problems of
the criminal justice system); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargain-
ing, 84 YALE LJ. 1179, 1314 (1975) (describing the problem of providing adequate resources for
criminal courts as difficult).
13. I do not condone this. In a better world, in which our constitutional promises under the
Sixth Amendment were backed with sufficient resources to carry them out, there would be no
need to even write this Article. But I am an optimistic realist. I hope for a better world while
planning how to make the best of the one we have. And it is this present world that this Article
addresses.
14. "Macro-allocation" decisions are ones that take place on a programmatic level, for
example, health versus defense versus education. See Paul R. RTemblay, Rebellious Lawyering,
Regnant Lawyering, and Street Level Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGs LJ. 947, 962 (1992); see also
ROBERT H. BLANK, RATIONING MEDICINE 78, 80 (1988) (defining "rationing" of healthcare);
GERALD R. WINSLOw, TRIAGE AND JUSTICE 19 (1987) (discussing triage in modem medicine).
15. As already noted, criminal justice comes out on the short end of this macro-allocation
decision. See supra note 14. This distribution is unlikely to change over the foreseeable future.
The sheer lack of financial resources is also implicated in the poor operation of the
[criminal justice] system, but it is hard to see how substantial new money will be found
to address the problem.
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crime may garner a few more dollars for police. Given that the public
does not even allocate money to many of its deserving poor,16 the
public is unlikely to rally behind the protection of those it perceives
are preying upon it.'7  (The more affluent, on the other hand, will
hedge against any risk of accusation, false or otherwise, by retaining a
private attorney if needed.) On a meso-allocation level,' 8 public
defense in the lower courts will not compete well with courts, police,
prosecutors, or felony (including death penalty) public defense in the
superior courts. 9
It is also politically improbable. Most trends are in the other direction, as shown
by new mechanisms for medical cost containment. And the political consensus for pro-
viding medical care in the U.S., while weak, is a lot stronger than the public consensus
for providing counsel to indigent criminal defendants. We are in a period when the
national administration, because of budget pressures, is successfully reducing nutri-
tional aid to mothers and newborn infants. If these expenses can be reduced, the pros-
pects for increased public dollars for the criminal defense of the indigent seem remote
indeed.
Richard McGahey, Response, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 259, 260-62 (1986); see also
BLANK, supra note 14, at 126 (noting that "whether or not one approves, there is little possibility
that national defense funds soon will be transferred to social programs"); Richard L. Abel, What
Is the Assistance of Counsel Effective For?, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 165, 169 (1986)
(noting "the unwillingness of our society to spend enough money on justice"); William H. Simon,
Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083, 1092 (1988) ("[H]ardly anyone in the
society would want to devote the resources needed to bring us even close to a state in which
rights could be generally enforced.").
Moreover, even if our society was willing to put out more money for justice and defense, it
would never be enough. The demand for legal services is elastic and "the elasticity of legal
demand prevents full funding that would eliminate scarcity." Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Com-
munity-Based Ethic for Legal Service Practice, 37 UCLA L. REv. 1101, 1103 n.7 (1990). The
same has been said of health care. BLANK, supra note 14, at 126.
16. See, e.g., McGahey, supra note 15; cf Norman Lefstein, Keynote Address, 14 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 5, 10 (1986) ("From the standpoint of legislatures and county govern-
ments, criminal defense services are just another social service for the poor and, by and large,
much less worthwhile than other poverty programs.").
17. It is hardly news that the public is concerned about crime. See John B. Mitchell, The
Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney-New Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REv. 293,
294 nn.6-7 (1980). In response to a poll in 1989, 84% answered that there was more crime in the
United States than the year before. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OnCE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
BUREAU OF STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE STArisncs-1990 172 (Timothy
Flanagan & Kathleen Maguire eds., 1991). See also DEPARTMENT OF JusTICE, OFFICE OF JuS-
TICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF STATISTICS, BJS DATA REPORT, 1989 17, 55 (1989) [hereinafter
BJS DATA REPORT] (analyzing the increasing crime trends); Law Polk Crime Problem? It's
Extremely Serious, Lawyers Say, 68 A.B.A. J. 146, 147 (1982) ("[L]awyers perceive crime to be
an extremely serious problem in the United States.").
18. "Meso-allocation" refers to the allocation of resources to competing "programs, appli-
cants, and uses" within a particular budget (for example, the Legal Services Corporation
budget). Tremblay, supra note 14, at 962 n.63.
19. The public defender does not fare well compared to other players in the justice system
at a meso-allocation level. "In pursuing cases, prosecutors generally have three times the budget
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This leaves the micro-allocation level; the choice of resources
among clients.20 Herein lies the practical reality upon which this Arti-
cle's notion of redefining the Sixth Amendment is grounded. In that
of public defenders, as well as the use of police, forensic laboratories, and state-employed psychi-
atrists. Public defenders must pay for these services out of their limited budgets." Colino, supra
note 11, at 14.
Specifically, "[i]ndigent defense services receive the smallest allocation of criminal justice
funds .... Public defense receives 1.5 percent of state and local government criminal justice
funds, whereas prosecution services [not including police] receive 5.9 percent." Defenders
Underpaid, ABA Report Says, 67 A.B.A. J. 1107,1107 (1981). Thus, in Orange County, Califor-
nia, when the costs of police, sheriffs, coroners, and jails were factored in, the government spent
"$16 for prosecution-related functions for each $1 spent on indigent defense." William Vogeler,
Defense Cost Study Data May Be Flawed, 104 L.A. DAILY 3., June 6,1991, at Bll; cf. Blumberg,
supra note 7, at 18 n.6 ("Even under optimal circumstances a criminal case is a very much one-
sided affair, the parties to the 'contest' being decidedly unequal in strength and resources.").
This skewed distribution between defense on the one hand and the prosecution and police
on the other is hardly surprising. To begin with, "[plublic defenders are social anomalies. They
are paid by the state to befriend those whom the state believes are its enemies." MCINrTYRE,
supra note 8, at 1.
Like welfare or public housing, the criminal process deals almost exclusively with poor
people. But whereas other social services are seen by the public as directed toward the
"deserving" poor, at least in part, the criminal process handles a deeply stigmatized
population. Therefore, although the public may endorse expenditures that expand the
repressive apparatus, for instance, by increasing the police force or prison capacity,
they are extremely reluctant to spend money on humanizing the criminal process.
Abel, supra note 15, at 169; see also Robert MaeCrale et al., Legal Education and Professional
Development-An Educational Continuum, Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the
Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992 A.B.A. SEer. OF LEG. EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS To BAR 56
("In various jurisdictions, any semblance of balance has been destroyed between resources
made available for police and prosecution and for defense."); John F. Rooney, Remove Public
Defender From Court Control, 136 C. DAILY L. BuLL, Nov. 19,1990, at 1 ("Providing more
funds for prosecutors is more politically popular than providing more money for an office that
represents criminal defendants.").
Public defenders have at times adopted strategies, other than resignation, to meet the
problems of inadequate resources: Law suits (see NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER Asso-
CIATION, INDIGENT DEFENSE CASELOADS AND COMMON SENSE: AN UPDATE 46-57 (1992) [here-
inafter INDIGENT DEFENSE]); strikes (see Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1249 n.203, 1251); refusal
to take further cases under statutory, ethical, or constitutional authority (see INDIGENT DEFENSE,
supra, at 8-9, 17; Proposed Minimum Standards for Court-Appointed Criminal Trial Counsel, 65
MicH. BAR J. 868, 868 (1986) ("Declining Appointment. Counsel shall decline an appointment
to represent an indigent client if the nature or extent of counsel's existing caseload is likely to
prevent effective representation of that client.")); motions to withdraw (see Order on Motion to
Withdraw Filed by Tenth Circuit Public Defender, Fla. Dist. Ct. App. (2d Dist. Apr. 22,1993) (en
banc), 53 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1157 (May 19,1993); Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1255); motion
declaring that counsel can't competently handle existing caseloads (see Ligda v. Superior Court,
85 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1st Dist. 1970)); and unions (see Colino, supra note 11, at 19; Public Defenders
Criticize Report, 134 CH. DAILY L. BuLt., July 21, 1988, at 1).
20. "Micro-allocation" problems center upon the division of resources among clients, or
patients, to the same program. See WINSLOW, supra note 14, at 19; Maxwell J. Mehlman, Ration-
ing Expensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985 Wisc. L. REv. 239,244; Tremblay, supra note
14, at 962-63.
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reality, the guarantee given to the Sixth Amendment's indigent crimi-
nal defendants in the lower courts21 finds meaning not in this constitu-
tional provision nor even in professional standards and norms.22
Rather, the meaning of the Sixth Amendment becomes a direct func-
tion of how the institutional defense advocates choose to allocate their
scarce resources among an overwhelming number of clients23-some
whom they will fight for, some whom they won't.24 This is no slight
decision, because a significant percentage of cases can be successfully
defended with adequate effort. Those defendants who get the effort
are thus likely to fare better than those who do not.'
21. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel in misdemeanor cases);
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (right to counsel comes into play when defendant will do
actual jail time); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel is made
obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment).
22. While ethical standards and rules circumscribe the role of the public prosecutor-see,
e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.8 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL REsPoNsmiLIY DR 7-103, EC 7-13 (1981); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSE-
CUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION Part I1 (1980) [hereinafter PROSECUTION
FUNcION]-very little is similarly directed at guiding the public defender through the reality of
day to day practice.
There are, however, a few guideposts. For example, there exists a single paragraph in the
explanatory text of the ABA Standards that specifically concerns public defenders entitled
"trading the interests of one client for that of another." PROSECUTION FUNCrION, supra, § 6.2
cmt. c. Also both STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES (1967) and
NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION ON DEFENSE SERVICES, NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFEND-
ERs ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS (1976) [hereinafter NLADA], do
provide standards for public defense. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 7, at 658 n.453. On
the other hand, these standards are predominantly concerned with institutional structure (for
example, facilities, eligibility, discouragement of horizontal representation, caseload standards),
rather than responsibility of the individual defender. The NLADA guidelines, however, do per-
mit an overworked defender "to decline any additional cases" when additional cases might result
in inadequate representation. NLADA, supra, Guideline 5.3, at 517. Other than these few
guideposts, the body of ethical standards and rules available to guide the conduct of the
defender responsible for 400-600 cases does not differ from those guiding private defense attor-
neys with a handful of files.
23. Overall, we have paid little attention as a profession to the reality of the practice faced
by public defense attorneys with their overwhelming caseloads. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note
8, at 137-38.
24. "[T]he notion of providing an adequate defense.., becomes defined in terms of what is
possible given limited time and resources .... " Eckart & Stover, supra note 8, at 670; cf. Simon,
supra note 15, at 1093 ("[T]he prevailing approaches to legal ethics should be faulted, not for
failing to guarantee full access to the legal system, but for failing to contribute to an appropriate
distribution of this necessarily scarce resource.").
25. A good defense can make a difference in a particular case. See MILTON HEUMANN,
PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
40 (1978) ("the comments of one of Arborville's elite private practitioners suggest the ease with
which a minor fine for a possession of marijuana charge can be obtained in the circuit court, and
the more vigorous advocacy he relies on to secure a nolle or dismissal"); Alschuler, supra note
12, at 1187 (" 'A lawyer always gets more by fighting... but most attorneys don't know how ...
A lawyer who scares the D.A.'s office gets better fees and better pleas. My philosophy is always
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Currently, these resource allocation decisions are made randomly
and haphazardly, if at all. In place of the current practice, this Article
offers a coherent, ethical approach for choosing where to allocate
resources among clients that is workable and will, I believe, improve
the overall quality of representation in the lower courts. My percep-
tions are based upon twelve years of experience as an attorney in the
criminal courts and another ten as a law professor and clinical supervi-
sor, as well as many conversations with,26 and observations of, count-
less public defenders over the past twenty-two years.
Thus, the primary concern of this Article will be to develop an
ethical approach for making scarce allocation choices within a Sixth
Amendment regime, and thereby to provide a practical definition of
the Sixth Amendment in the lower courts.27 Yet this is only one piece
of a larger enterprise. The lower criminal court system does not work.
give the prosecutors the long-form treatment and the full-court press."' (quoting Boston attor-
ney Paul T. Smith)); Floyd Feeney & Patrick G. Jackson, Public Defenders, Assigned Counsel,
Retained Counse. Does the Type of Criminal Defense Counsel Matter?, 22 RUTroERs L.. 361,409
(1991) ("The best lawyers do make a difference."); Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System,
Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 59, 90 (1986):
[The attorney] would use every legal means at her disposal to help her clients. Such a
defense counsel imposes great costs on the prosecution. She may change the quality
and character of the prosecution's evidence and thus weaken its case. She may cause
the prosecution to make a misstep. The time, effort, and money expenses which she
imposes on the prosecution may force it to reassess the case and perhaps become will-
ing to downgrade charges or to bargain.
This is as much a function of effort as talent, because most cases, if you dig deeply enough,
yield some seed of a potentially successful defense. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSnCE,
supra note 1, at 35 ("Examining the stories of men interviewed, we find that a majority of them
had some potential legal defense that might have been raised-although it might well not have
succeeded."); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. IL L. REv. 37,40 ("In a significant number of cases, defend-
ants may plead guilty even when there is a significant possibility of being acquitted at trial."). Or
at least the belief that there is always a way to win a case is part of the belief structure of the
competent criminal defense attorney. See McINrTan, supra note 8, at 160:
Lawyers hate to lose because, although reason tells them a case is a loser, senti-
ment says that justice favors not the stronger case but the better lawyer. What makes
losing any case, even a loser, so bad is their belief that, in the hands of a good attorney,
there is really no such thing as a dead-bang loser case.
26. As part of my research I interviewed a number of defenders in the Seattle area who
practiced in the lower courts. See supra note 8 (interviews on file with author).
27. My desire is to develop an ethics of reality, what has been termed in the bioethical field
as "applied ethics." See Daniel Callahan, Shattuck Lecture-Contemporary Biomedical Ethics,
302 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1228, 1233 (1980).
It is simply not enough for those in ethics to roll up to the bedside the ghost of Imman-
uel Kant, John Stuart Mill, or G.E. Moore and provide instant moral diagnoses. It is
hardly better to do the same with the writings of John Rawls. If the ultimate strength
of ethics lies in its capacity to develop coherent modes of ethical analysis and compre-
hensive moral systems, it needs at the moment far greater skill in penetrating the often
confused dynamic of the clinical setting. Only after a detailed analysis of the actual
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This holds true regardless of an individual's perspective or jurispru-
dential ideology, unless it is anarchy. The lower criminal court system
does not work as a due process model, a crime control model,29 or
an administrative model.30  Dangerous people slip through the
cracks.3' Innocent and de minimis offenders get crushed. 2 And the
experience of the clinician (or a patient trying to work out a moral choice) can it be in
any position either to invoke traditional theories or develop new ones.
Id. In attempting to ground an ethical system in the day-to-day conduct of a work group, like
defenders, there is a tension that at all times must be kept on the surface. On the one hand, one
seeks an ethics that is workable. On the other hand, the enterprise bears the risk that day-to-day
practice will become the standard, bereft of any aspirational elements, or worse, that the daily
norm will eventually define aspirations and, therefore, the acceptable standards for actual prac-
tice will be systematically lowered.
28. In his book, Herbert Packer posits two models that compete as antagonistic value
descriptions within the criminal justice system: the "due process" and "crime control" models.
HERBERT PACKER, THE Lnmrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968). The due process model
"emphasizes 'due process,' strict adherence to legal rules, and a full-fledged adversary relation-
ship." Malcolm M. Feeley, Two Models of the Criminal Justice System: An Organizational Per-
spective, 7 LAW & Soc. Rv. 407, 414-15 (1973). A similar description is found in Subin, supra
note 4, at 3. The due process model also includes a set of attitudes towards the criminal justice
system (for example, desirability that process has visibility; maximum opportunity for scrutiny
and social challenge). See Roger W. Benjamin & Theodore B. Pedeliski, The Minnesota Public
Defender System and the Criminal Law Process: A Comparative Study of Behavior at the Judicial
District Level, 4 LAw & Soc. REv. 279, 285 (1969).
29. The crime control model "emphasizes effective 'crime control' for the community, and
tends to minimize the concern for formality and individual rights." Feeley, supra note 28, at 415;
see also Subin, supra note 4, at 3 (explaining the crime control model). This model also possesses
its own set of attitudes towards the criminal justice system (for example, favoring the disposition
of as large a proportion of cases as possible without trial, at the earliest stage; a reduction in
redundancy and technicality in procedure). See Benjamin & Pedeliski, supra note 28, at 285.
30. The administrative model is based on the "paradigm of rational management," that is,
how well those responsible are meeting their budgets. James F. Gilsinan & James R. Valentine,
Bending Granite" Attempts to Change the Management Perspective of American Criminologists
and Police Reformers, 15 J. POL. Sc. & ADMUN. 196, 202-03 (1987).
31. Although, admittedly, it is not always easy to predict dangerousness. As one defender
put it,
I've seen people that I would recognize as being dangerous slipping through the cracks.
I've seen people who I haven't yet perceived as dangerous slipping through the cracks
also, and read about them later in the paper. It's difficult to correctly characterize
somebody as being dangerous or not being dangerous, and I don't know that I would
trust my judgment to make that decision. It's not easy to predict.
Public Defender Interview, supra note 8; see also John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal
Defense Attorney-New Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REv. 293,332 n.152, 333 nn.153-
54 (1980) (discussing the inability of scientific studies to predict future dangerousness).
32. The defenders I interviewed believed that the system ground up the poor, particularly
in trapping them in an endless series of violation hearings resulting principally from their failure
to meet conditions of probation or a deferred sentence.
[The lower court system] punishes the poor. It's the fines that cause the repeated
review hearings, the repeated court appearances, puts in jeopardy all these folks' jobs,
even though they may only be earning minimum wage, this job is important to their
survival. They're having to bounce in and out of court like a yo-yo, and they don't have
money.
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system costs a fortune.3 Eloquent and plausible arguments have been
put forth for the total elimination of these lower courts. 4 Yet this is
not likely to happen in the near future. We are not ready to
decriminalize, or increase to felonies, all the misdemeanors on the
books.35 The two institutional advocates, the prosecutor and the
Money will solve every problem that District Court places upon these people at
least 95% of the time. If they had money, they wouldn't have the problem, they could
afford the counseling, they'd go get the counseling, they could afford the evaluation,
they'd go get an evaluation, they could afford to pay their fines, they'd pay all their
fines, clean up their record, and they wouldn't have the problems.
And that's the difference between private and public process. Our clients are
treated differently, just because the courts know we don't walk them over to probation.
We don't make sure that they do their alcohol evaluation and they go to the victim's
panel. So our client on a DWI, typically would be referred to probation for them to
monitor it, and that's where they get into trouble a lot of times, because they go to
probation, they fill out the forms, probation sends them a letter with an appointment,
who knows how much later, and in the meantime, they're, like, "out there," and the
judges are reluctant to accept our word that, yes, he has an appointment for the alcohol
evaluation for Monday, and it will be filed with the court, and he will do the victim
panel. So a lot of times we will set pre-trial conferences over long enough for them to
have done what they need to do, just so that we can avoid probation. Because a lot of
times, that is where they get into trouble, is being monitored by probation.
And once the probation services send a letter to the judge saying that they are in
violation of some term of their sentence, the probation service will then not see them,
because they will say, well it's now in the hands of the judge. So if your original offense
was not seeing your probation officer, you get a copy of the nasty letter to the judge
saying you won't see the probation officer and you take that letter to probation, they
will say, "Don't come and see us, because we've already written to the judge that you
won't come and see us."
In "private practice, I would tell my client, obviously before going to court, what
was going to happen, and go over it with them. I would go to court and before the case
was called, I would tell them again, then the judge [would] have a shot at it and tell him
what he needed to do, and then I'd tell him what the judge told him to do, and then I'd
send a follow-up letter, so by then the person would have it drummed into him 5 times,
and by the way, if I don't get the documents within a certain period of time, I send yet
another letter saying, "What the heck, ya know, what's happening here," and then pro-
bation would say, "Hey! you know, your client isn't showing up .... Your client missed
such and such meeting;" I'll send a letter then you know, "What the hell you doing?
Get down there and make your meeting. Get in contact with your agency." We can't
baby-sit like that. A private attorney is paid to baby-sit and they charge for baby-
sitting. We don't have the ability to baby-sit in that fashion, we don't have the staffing,
our caseload is way too high.
Public Defender Interview, supra note 8; see also BJ. Palermo, Under the Influence: Treatment
Programs for Drunk Drivers May Benefit Providers More Than Offenders, 12 CALiF. LAW. 17
(1992) (exploring subsidiary "treatment" industry which feeds off criminal defendants).
33. For example, Professor Subin has found that the lower courts in New York spent
$37,000,000 processing cases in 1980, but "collected only $2,000,000 for its efforts." Subin, supra
note 4, at 17.
34. "[We should abolish the Criminal Court, and transfer all of its functions and personnel
to the Supreme Court." Subin, supra note 4, at 15.
35. There have certainly been suggestions (and experiments) that these minor crimes be
dealt with in a diversion system. Se4 eg., Edward J. Borkowski, Prosecutorial Discretion and the
Current Status and Applicability of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition Under the Pennsylvania
Criminal Justice System, 24 Duo. L. REv. 253 (1985); Steven W. Feldman, The Tennessee Pretrial
Diversion Act: A Practitioner's Guide, 13 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 285 (1983); Diane Reynolds, The
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defender, must instead use their limited resources in the most mean-
ingful way possible; they must each choose to fight36 when it makes
the most sense. Developing a system for the defender to make such
choices takes us halfway to this goal. This Article begins with the
defender because of the Sixth Amendment overlay, and because one
must begin somewhere.37
Part I of this Article reviews the various theories of the
defender's role, from our cultural images and ABA standards to the
views of social science and organizational theorists. Though all
describe some aspects of the defender, each is incomplete and mis-
leading. Instead, this Article suggests the defender's work is better
described by the medical/disaster theory of allocation in chaos-
triage.38
Use of Pretrial Diversion in Spouse Abuse Cases: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 3 J. Disp.
RESOL 415 (1988). Even if that were done, however, I do not believe it would eliminate the
criminal system for minor crimes. A diversion system will be just that, a system. And it will be a
system that must have some enforcement mechanism for those who fail to carry out the terms of
the diversion. That enforcement mechanism can either be incorporated into the new system (in
which case it will be like a criminal system) or be one that transfers cases back to the criminal
system. Also, a diversion system is not likely to give offenders unlimited bites from the apple.
Thus recidivists are likely to be dealt with in some type of criminal system. All this does not
mean that a well-conceived diversion program would not benefit defendants, victims, the com-
munity, and the lower court system. It's just not likely to eliminate that system.
36. While the author uses the metaphors of war ("fight," "battlefield") throughout this
Article, the concept of concentrated effort, "focus," embodies the full range of creative solutions,
including those embodied in Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR"). Thus, some of our law
student teams in the clinic have channeled client and complaining witness into mediation, and
developed creative sentencing packages.
37. Unquestionably, the prosecutor had much to commend as a starting point for my analy-
sis. It is the prosecutor who makes the decision to charge and who is the central figure in the
lower court criminal system. CAsPER, AMErICAN CRMiNAL Jus-rIcE, supra note 1, at 126; Jack
Kress, Progress and Prosecution, 423 ANNALS 99 (1976). In charging, the prosecution's exercise
of discretion is all but unreviewable. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). In court,
the prosecutor has significant "administrative concerns" such as keeping "the calendar moving,"
Skolnick, supra note 1, at 55, and "one can argue that the adversary component of the prosecu-
tor's job is shifted from establishing guilt or innocence to determining the seriousness of the
defendant's guilt and whether he should receive time." HEJMANN, supra note 25, at 103. As
such, bad screening and charging decisions can clog the system, stretching both adversaries'
resources.
38. A medical dictionary defines triage as:
The medical screening of patients to determine their priority for treatment; the separa-
tion of a large number of casualties, in military or civilian disaster medical care, into
three groups: those who cannot be expected to survive even with treatment, those who
will recover without treatment, and the priority group of those who need treatment in
order to survive.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICrIONARY 1322 (22nd ed., 1972); accord Scarce Resources in Health
Care, 57 HEALTH & Soc'y 265,273 (1979). In fact, when discussing resource allocation and the
political process in health care, in 1984, Governor Richard Lamm of Colorado referred to being
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Part II of this Article discusses the lower criminal courts from this
chaos perspective, articulating the ways in which the criminal courts
are similar to, and different from, a field hospital at the edge of a
battlefield. Part II then sets up the two basic triage categories that
will be used throughout the remainder of the Article: those cases for
whom the defender will fight (expressed in, terms of the allocation of
the scarce resource that I term "focus") and all those other cases
which, though not receiving focus, will be given representation satisfy-
ing the Sixth Amendment (what I term "pattern representation").
Part III of this Article utilizes various theories of moral philoso-
phy underlying triage and rationing, which have principally evolved in
medical contexts, to develop a specific, workable approach to triage in
the lower courts.
Part IV of this Article explores the concepts of focus and pattern
representation in detail. In the course of this analysis it explains why
even pattern representation comports with the Sixth Amendment, and
attempts to provide both a deeper and more concrete understanding
of what these choices really mean for the nature and quality of
defense representation,
I. UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER IN THE LOWER COURTS
The image of the criminal defense attorney is deeply embedded
in our cultural psyche. Perry Mason, Atticus Finch in To Kill a Mock-
ingbird,39 television's Ben Matlock, Rumpole of the Bailey,40 and Ale-
jandro "Sandy" Stern in Presumed Innocent4 are of one piece. A sole
attorney, generally with seemingly endless resources, defends a single
client for an entire movie, novel, or program with unrelenting vigor
and intensity. The American Bar Association standards basically pre-
suppose this lone, private attorney.42 The United States Supreme
governor in a time of cutbacks as conducting "public policy triage." The Coming Era of Hard
Choices, 59 HosPrrALS 96 (April 16, 1985).
Note that in the world of the public defender, this triage function does not involve any real
"gatekeeper" role, that is, the decision whether to initially take the client's case; the 6th Amend-
ment requires initial representation to all who meet the indigency requirements.
39. HARPER LEE, To KiLL A MOCKMNGBIRD (1960).
40. Rumpole, so perfectly played by Leo McKern in the PBS series, first appeared in JoHN
MORTIMER'S RuMioLE OF THE BAILEY (1978).
41. ScoTr TuRow, PREsumED INNocENT (1987).
42. See supra note 22.
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Court, in its recent treatment of competence under the Sixth Amend-
ment,43 makes no reference to even the existence of institutional
advocates, let alone the possible unique problems they face.
While public defenders in the lower criminal courts do at times
appear to function like the mythical defense advocate, this single role
image does not accurately describe their world. This observation is
obvious to all writers in the social sciences and organizational theory
who have studied public defenders.' For that matter it would be
obvious to anyone who has watched public defenders for an hour or
so in court. In truth, however, as this Article will demonstrate, the
descriptions and metaphors used by these theorists to describe institu-
tional defense advocates-double agent, player in a marketplace,
bureaucrat-do not more adequately capture the essence of their
work than those offered by Hollywood.
A. THE ATTORNEY As "DOUBLE AGENT"
In this popular sociological vision defenders are "con men"45 and
"double agents"'  or, more kindly, "insiders"'47 who are "co-opted by
the system" 48 to act in the interest of administrative efficiency. As
such, their role is to communicate deals and to persuade their clients
to plead guilty, thus avoiding a trial and its attendant use of
resources, 49 and, by their participation in the process, to give
43. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
44. See, eg., CASPER, CRIMINAL CouiTs, supra note 1; Blumberg, supra note 7; George F.
Cole, The Decision to Prosecute, 4 LAW & Soc'y REv. 331 (1970); Skolnick, supra note 1;
Sudnow, supra note 1.
45. Blumberg ascribes participation in the "client confidence game" to both private and
public criminal attorneys. See Blumberg, supra note 7, at 25.
46. See CASPER, AmERiCAN CIMINAL JUSnCE, supra note 1, at 69; Blumberg, supra note
7, at 28.
47. See Sudnow, supra note 1, at 264.
48. See McITrYrgE, supra note 8; Blumberg, supra note 7, at 20; Feeney & Jackson, supra
note 25, at 402.
49. "[I]t is a major job of the Public Defender, who mediates between the district attorney
and the defendant, to convince his 'client' that the chances of acquittal are too slight to warrant
this risk." Sudnow, supra note 1, at 258; cf. Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer?, supra note 7, at 6-
7 ("The brief conversations usually did not involve much discussion of the details surrounding
the alleged crime, mitigating circumstances or the defendant's motives or background. Instead,
they focused on the deal, the offer the prosecution was likely to make or had made in return for
a cop-out.").
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legitimacy to this administrative assembly line masquerading as a jus-
tice system.50
Unquestionably, aspects of this vision are correct. Defenders are
part of the day-to-day workings of an institutional system. They have
their most significant on-going relationships with prosecutors and
judges, and only transitory ones with their clients.5" While some cli-
ents may be recidivists, the defender does not depend on repeat busi-
ness to make a living. Further, it is true that most of the defender's
clients will plead guilty,52 often at an early phase of the process.
Nonetheless, this view is flawed in a number of respects.
First, as indicated, at times defenders fight very hard for their cli-
ents.53 Many are excellent attorneys,54 even in the lower courts where
they are generally less experienced. They file motions, take cases to
50. "In the most immediate sense, the function of the public defender is merely to repre-
sent indigent defendants; but more important, I suggest, these lawyers have helped to preserve
the legitimacy of the courts." McfRE, supra note 8, at 29.
51. "His [the defender's] relationship to any one client is transient; his relationship to pros-
ecutors, judges, and other court personnel is 'permanent.'" CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUS-
-ICE, supra note 1, at 103; see also Blumberg, supra note 7, at 20 ("[L]awyers... have close and
continuing relations with the prosecuting office and the court itself .... "); Temblay, supra note
15, at 1107 ("The clients themselves are not a critical focus group since they are fungible, not
scarce, and have no exit capability."). Questions concerning the locus of the defender's loyalty
have naturally been raised as a result of this observation. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 7.
More interesting is the possibility that these relationships may bring historical "baggage" to a
defendant's case that would be absent without representation by the particular institutional
advocate. "When a defendant obtains a lawyer to fight his case, he not only obtains a legal
buffer between himself and the judge, he also-even if unwittingly-wedges his fate into a series
- of organizational battles irrelevant to the legal status of his case." Mileski, supra note 3, at 488.
52. Plea bargaining is nothing new. Professor Heumann's research disclosed that since
1880, only 10% of all criminal cases in the jurisdiction he studied went to trial. HEUMANN, supra
note 25, at 28; see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRIsIs, supra note 7, at 38 (roughly 80% or more);
PROSECUtrION FUNCoN, supra note 22, § 5.3 (on the order of 90%); Blumberg, supra note 7, at
18 (over 90% plead guilty). This is all the more so in the lower criminal court since "[t]he lower
court is largely a sentencing court, rarely a trial court-more a sanctioning than a truth-seeking
system." Mileski, supra note 3, at 491.
53. See MclNTran, supra note 8, at 88, 153, 169; Michael J. Lichtenstein, Public Defenders-
Dimensions of Cooperation, 9 JUsT. Sys. J. 102, 103 (1984) ("In a study focusing on whether a
case resulted in a plea bargain or a trial, Mather noted that public defenders recommend trials
when the risks were low and the possible gains were high."); Skolnick, supra note 1, at 64; Alissa
Pollitz Worden, Privatizing Due Process: Issues in the Comparison of Assigned Counsel, Public
Defender, and Contracted Indigent Defense Systems, 14 JuSTCE Sys. J. 390, 395-96 (1991)
("some public defender offices are characterized by strong advocacy cultures").
54. See generally McIN'nin, supra note 8 (discussing dilemma of public defenders who
cannot let the public'know how sucessful they are in their cases); Feeney & Jackson, supra note
25, at 377 ("federal district court judges, however, found public defenders to be better rated than
either retained or assigned counsel"); Philip Hager, High Court Opposes Defender Fund Cuts,
L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 4, 1983, at 1-3 ("The letter [from the California Supreme Court] went on to
praise the public defender's office for its handling of complex and time-consuming cases.").
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jury trials, and gain dismissals and acquittals. Paradoxically, they can-
not make too much of their successes. 55 The public does not like the
idea that they are paying taxes for someone to get accused criminals
off, and such victories are an embarrassment to the public defender's
institutional adversary, the prosecutor. After all, an acquittal gener-
ally means only one of two things to the public, neither good for the
government: Either the prosecution tried an innocent person or they
messed up the trial and let a guilty one get away.56
Second, public defenders represent their clients quite well. In
fact, contrary to accepted myth, the results they achieve for their cli-
ents are as favorable as or better than those achieved by most private
The author's own observations over the past 23 years are consistent with these authorities.
There are numerous excellent, dedicated counsel at all levels of public defense practice.
In contrast, many of the private attorneys involved in criminal representation practice at the
margin. "In fact, many private lawyers are neither like Perry Mason nor do they behave as the
defendants believe, for many are somewhat marginal practitioners depending upon turning over
large numbers of cases paying rather small fees." CASPER, CRIMINAL COURTS, supra note 1, at
17; see also CASPER, AmERiCAN CRMI1NAL JUSnCE, supra note 1, at 115 n.* ("In some states
low-level 'courthouse' criminal lawyers hang around courthouses offering their services to poor
defendants for relatively low fees. These attorneys are generally highly exploitative-turning
over cases quickly to generate their fees."); Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1262 (arguing that the
plea bargaining system is necessarily destructive of sound attorney-client relationships); Feeney
& Jackson, supra note 25, at 409 (discussing why the "type of defense counsel seems to have no
effect on criminal case outcomes"). More broadly, there is a widespread belief that regardless of
their public or private status, a substantial portion of trial lawyers, both criminal and civil, are
inadequate in some way. Id. at 396.
55. See supra note 10.
56. See McINTYmR, supra note 8, at 72.
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attorneys.5 7 They know the system and its players intimately.5 8 Fur-
thermore, they quickly come to learn three pieces of information that
rationally justify their overall approach to representation: (1) most
defendants are factually guilty,5 9 (2) the deals being offered are very
good and the sentences extremely lenient, and (3) defendants to a
large extent want to take the deal and get it over with.6
Third, the intense emphasis in the literature on the defender's
cooperation with the prosecution61 is misguided. Cooperation is not
equivalent to being nonadversarial.62 The best attorneys get along
57. When studies are controlled for "client factors" (for example, previous record, bail sta-
tus), there is no difference between the results obtained by public and private defense attorneys.
See, e.g., HANSON, supra note 7, at 103-04; Feeney .& Jackson, supra note 25, at 407; Pauline
Holden & Steven Balkin, Quality and Cost Comparisons of Private Bar Indigent Defense Sys-
tems: Contract vs. Ordered Assigned Counsel, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 176, 177, 199
(1985); Pauline Holden & Steven Balkin, Performance Evaluation for Systems of Assigned Ser-
vice Providers: A Demonstration Assessing Systems of Indigent Defense, 9 EVALUATION REV.
547, 569 (1985) ("In all respects then, the part-time public defender appears superior to ad hoc
assigned counsel."); Gerald R. Wheeler & Carol L. Wheeler, Reflections on Legal Representation
of the Economically Disadvantaged. Beyond Assembly Line Justice, 26 CRIME & DEUNO. J. 328-
30 (1980) (pretrial detention key variable in case outcome); cf. Skolnick, supra note 1, at 63
("Not only does the public defender tend to follow a theory of his role similar to that of most
private defense attorneys, but he is, in some respects, better equipped to carry it out."). One
study even found that defendants were more satisfied with the results of representation by the
defender than private counsel. See Burton M. Atkins & Emily W. Boyle, Prisoner Satisfaction
With Defense Counsel, 12 CRIM. L. Bun.. 427 (1976).
Many defendants in the lower courts represent themselves, see Mileski, supra note 3, at 487,
532, and there is some indication that these "unrepresented" defendants fare as well or better
than those represented by counsel. See PAUL ROBERTSHAW, REMINKING LEGAL NEED: THE
CASE OF CRUMINAL JUSTICE 137, 138-39 (1991); Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1274; Feeney &
Jackson, supra note 25, at 409. But see Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1276 (noting that several
courts have ruled such bargaining with defendants violates their constitutional rights).
58. See Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1229-50.
59. See, eg., ALAN M. DERSHOWrrz, THE BEsr DEFENSE, at xiv (1982) ("Any criminal
lawyer who tells you that most of his clients are not guilty is either bluffing or deliberately
limiting his practice to a few innocent clients."); Ogletree, supra note 9, at 1269 & n.121.
60. See I umAN, supra note 25, at 90; cf. Stanley Penn, How Public Defenders Cope With
System, 131 Cm. DAILY L. Bun.., July 5, 1985, at 2 ("Most prosecutors are eager to dispose of
misdemeanors with plea bargains in order to concentrate on felonies .... ").
61. See literature discussed in Feeney & Jackson, supra note 25, at 402-03.
62. The old adage that you can catch more flies with honey than vinegar has been articu-
lated in the context of law practice as: "Cooperation is reconceptualized here to include the
dimension of a tactical approach. When viewed in this context, it may be seen that cooperation
may actually benefit rather than harm a client." Lichtenstein, supra note 53, at 102 (article
summary); see also Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1225 (describing "rapport" as an important
determinant of a prosecutor's willingness to disclose information); Feeney & Jackson, supra note
25, at 403-04 (reviewing studies that attempt to determine the empirical effects of combative-
ness); Skolnick, supra note 1, at 61 ("Every leading white defense attorney interviewed insisted
that the layman's notion of adversariness was not in the interests of their clients, and that their
clients did better as a result of a 'cooperative' posture."); Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes to
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with, and are reasonable to, the other side. It is easier to call someone
with whom you have a good relationship and informally arrange to
pick up a copy of the police report than to have to schedule a written
motion to compel its production. In fact, one of the most powerful
current bench-bar movements is to restore the lost civility and cooper-
ation of the past among attorneys.63
Fourth, it is a mistake to equate cooperation with plea bargaining,
and advocacy with trial. One can have an adversary plea bargaining/
sentencing and a pro forma trial.' 4 For example, a team of students in
our law school clinic represented a man accused of Driving with a
Revoked License. There are two elements to this crime: 1) driving,
and 2) suspended license (as evidenced by a certified copy of the driv-
ing record).65 As a predicate showing, the prosecutor must establish
that the defendant received constructive notice of the initial adminis-
trative license suspension hearing66 by presenting a copy of a certified
letter. Actual notice is not required. 67 If the prosecution can make all
these usually easy showings, it is generally believed that there is no
defense.
In this case, the prosecution asked for fifteen days in jail on a
plea. This was a first-time offense and the prosecution's position
appeared outrageous.
Law Schook The Clinical Education of the Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 1, 59 (1993) ("The 'can we talk' approach-to the extent it is about creating options
for the client and avoiding a criminal conviction-is an essential part of being a good trial
lawyer.").
63. See, e.g., Professionalism and Civility, 69 MicH. BAR J. 882 (1990) (entire issue of jour-
nal devoted to this subject); Fred R. Butterworth, Professional Courtesy Guidelines: Why Now?,
8 SEArE-KiNo CoUTrY B. Buu. (May 1989); Timothy Clifford & Joan Lukasik, Professional
Courtesy, or, Kindness Amidst Conflict, 8 SEArrLE-KING COUNTY B. BULL. 311 (May 1989). But
see Steven Lubet, Civility: A Tale of Deconstruction and Constraint, 1992 Wisc. L. REv. 157
(1992) (author's humorous parody of judicial decisionmaking in the context of assessing
breaches of civility by an attorney carries a serious warning about the risks of incorporating
notions of civility into the disciplinary arena).
64. See Malcolm M. Feeley, Bench Trials, Adversariness, and Plea Bargaining: A Comment
on Schulhofer's Plan, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 173, 178 (1986). For a description of a
nonadversary trial, see Sudnow supra note 1, at 272-73, and for a sense of the intense "game"
that can be involved in plea bargaining, see Douglas W. Maynard, The Structure of Discourse in
Misdemeanor Plea Bargaining, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 75 (1984).
65. The elements for driving with a license suspended are articulated in WASH. REV. CODE
§ 46.20.342 (1988).
66. Before a driver's license can be legally revoked, due process requires hearing and
notice. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
67. The notice does not have to be actual, but may be constructive, for example, a certified
letter sent to the last address on file with the Department of Licensing. See Seattle v. Foley, 784
P.2d 176 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
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The students began with a motion to dismiss because the initial
notice had been sent to the wrong address. This was a good argument,
but it turned out the defendant had given a nonexistent address to the
police. A second motion followed, asserting that the Department of
Licensing still had to take further reasonable steps to find the defend-
ant once the letter was returned. The motion was denied. The
defendant waived a jury trial and a bench trial was set. The students
filed a memorandum arguing that, although the prosecution did not
need to prove actual notice as part of its case-in-chief, the defendant
should be able to argue the affirmative mens rea defense that, by a
preponderance of the evidence, he honestly and reasonably did not
know his license was suspended at the time he drove.68 This was a
novel defense, and one that few expected the court to accept. Rather,
this "trial" was really a sentencing hearing where the students' objec-
tive was a narrow one: to change the judge's image of the defendant
from someone who had deliberately given the police false information
in an attempt to obviate responsibility, to one about a decent young
man with a serious learning disability that caused him to mix up num-
bers (like his address). At the end of the "trial," the judge deferred
findings for six months, at which point the case was to be dismissed on
the condition of no further criminal conduct. This was obviously an
intensely adversarial plea/sentencing.
On the other hand, a pro forma jury trial on this same case could
go as follows:
* Prosecution puts officer on the stand to identify defendant as
driving on the relevant date. Cross-examination, aimed at ques-
tioning how it is possible that the officer can now identify the
defendant four months later with so many intervening cases.
Officer says that he does remember defendant because of some
68. The defense was grounded in Justice Jackson's pronouncement in Morisette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952) (footnote omitted):
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by inten-
tion is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature
systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty
of the normal individual to choose between good and evil. A relation between some
mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's
familiar exculpatory "But I didn't mean to," and has afforded the rational basis for a
tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation
and vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution.
The students found support for their position in a line of Washington state cases providing a true
affirmative defense of honest and reasonable unwitting possession of a controlled substance. See
State v. Cleppe, 635 P.2d 435,439-40 (Wash. 1981); State v. Knapp, 773 P.2d 134, 138 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1989), rev. den., 781 P.2d 1323 (1989). Further support was found in California cases
allowing an analogous defense to rape, People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975), and statu-
tory rape, People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964).
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peculiar conversation they had. Also, took defendant's license
at time of arrest with his picture on it. On redirect, prosecution
lays foundation for admission of license officer seized. Defense
attorney also explores the seemingly inconsistent theory of
defendant's cooperativeness at the time of arrest.
" Prosecution offers certified copy of driver's record including
copy of certified letter giving notice of license revocation hear-
ing into evidence.
69
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: I object, your Honor. The docu-
ment has to be certified. This is a faxed copy, not an original
certification.
PROSECUTION: As your Honor knows, the Smith case
allows admission of just such certified documents that are
faxed.70
COURT: Denied.
" Prosecution rests.
" Defense puts defendant on the stand.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: And did you know your license was
suspended when the officer stopped you?
PROSECUTION: Objection. Irrelevant. Actual notice is not
an issue. We've shown constructive notice and that's all the law
requires of us.
COURT: Sustained.
* Jury convicts. Defendant has misdemeanor conviction on record
and is sentenced to one weekend in county jail.
The point is clear; while describing the defender as an "insider" has
some basis, when more carefully examined in the full context of the
defender's work, this metaphor and its more pejorative cousin,
"double agent," is both unfair and inaccurate.
69. A certified copy of a public record in Washington state meets both authentication and
hearsay concerns. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.44.040 (certified copies of public records shall be
admitted into evidence); State v. Monson, 784 P.2d 485, 787 (Wash. 1988).
70. The certification on a faxed public record qualifies the document for treatment as a
certified public record. See State v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1366 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
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B. THE ATroRNEY As A PLAYER IN A "MARKETPLACE"
This sociological/economic theory analyzes the defender as part
of an interlocking series of "exchange relationships" with other insti-
tutional players. 7' In this view, the defender, the prosecutor, and the
court all have things of value to offer each other. Their roles are
defined by a trading relationship in which each is dependent on the
other. Like the previous metaphor, it would be difficult to dismiss this
as a totally unfitting description. The players do, to a large extent,
depend on each other and, as such, have "commodities" of value to
give and receive from each other.72 Yet, at the same time, this image
of a marketplace, even if we conjure up one as hysterical as the stock
or futures market, paints a far too rationalistic picture of the interac-
tion. It does not capture the routine nature of a large percentage of
interactions,73 and overplays the role of individual attorney interests
in what is an ongoing social activity.74 Over time, the defenders do try
to get along with other players in the system, but they also look at the
specific individual cases and frequently alter their interactions
accordingly.
71. "The legal system may be viewed as a set of interorganizational exchange relation-
ships.... Exchanges do not simply 'sail' from one system to another, but take place in an
institutionalized setting which may be compared to a market." Cole, supra note 44, at 332; see
also Feeley, supra note 28, at 415 (relating Skolnick's study on the administration of criminal
justice).
72. Defense attorneys "trade" the commodity of cooperating in case resolution. This then
allows the prosecutor to speedily resolve a large caseload. Furthermore, "[t]he exchange rela-
tionship between the defense attorney and the prosecutor is based on their need for cooperation
in the discharge of their responsibilities. Most criminal attorneys are interested primarily in the
speedy solution of cases because of their precarious financial situation." Cole, supra note 44, at
340. Public defenders have no such financial interest, but certainly are trying to stay afloat in
light of their staggering caseloads.
73. Maynard, supra note 64, at 76 (citations omitted):
Exchange theory, from which this perspective on plea bargaining derives, has been
criticized along two interrelated lines relevant to this study. One is that it tends to
reduce social activity to the behavior and expectations of individuals. Thus, in plea
bargaining, decisions are "dictated" by participants' "interests"-their "personal or
professional gain." The other is that exchange theory is overrationalistic and so under-
states the importance of routine in everyday interactions.
74. Plea bargaining involves less concessions than it does consensus from shared norms.
See John Paul Ryan, Criminal Courts Revisited, 23 LAW & Soc'y REv. 933, 934 (1989); see also
supra note 73 (plea bargaining decisions are dictated by partial participant's interests).
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C. THE ATroRNEY As "BuREAucRAT"
Under this organizational description of the defender's role,75 the
defender acts to carry out the routine functions of the judicial system,
which is characterized as a bureaucracy.76 Here the defender is a cog
in a machine that efficiently processes, grinds up, and spews out crimi-
nal defendants.77 And truly, there is much routine about the lower
courts, routine that administratively allows the judges to deal with
massive caseloads on inadequate budgets. Public defenders play an
important role in maintaining this routine. By helping their clients fill
out speedy trial waivers and plea forms, reciting the various litanies,
and carrying out the numerous encoded rituals, they help keep the
cases moving. So what is the problem with using the metaphor of
bureaucrat to conceptualize the defender's role? The problem is one
of imagery. "Bureaucrat" connotes one who is indifferent to the
unique needs of the individuals with whom she interacts, and one who
is slavishly devoted to efficiently following the rules and procedures of
the institution, thus absolving her from any personal or moral respon-
sibility for her actions. This image plainly does not do justice to an
75. Numerous articles analyze the work of public defenders as that of bureaucrats within
an institutional bureaucracy. See, e.g., McrryicE, supra note 8, at 46; Blumberg, supra note 7, at
19, 31; Mileski, supra note 3, at 488-89, 533; cf Tremblay, supra note 15, at 1105 (describing
legal-services lawyers as functioning like "street-level bureaucrats").
76. Max Weber, when applying his concept of "bureaucracy" to the Western criminal jus-
tice system stated:
Above all, bureaucratization offers the optimal possibility for the realization of the
principle of division of labor in administration [sic] according to purely technical con-
siderations, allocating individual tasks to functionaries who are trained as specialists
and who continuously add to their experience by constant practice. "Professional" exe-
cution in this case means primarily execution "without regard to person" in accordance
with calculable rules. The consistent carrying through of bureaucratic authority pro-
duces a leveling of differences in social "honor" or status, and, consequently, unless the
principle of freedom in the market is simultaneously restricted, the universal sway of
economic "class position." The fact that this result of bureaucratic authority has not
always appeared concurrently with bureaucratization is based on the diversity of the
possible principles by which political communities have fulfilled their tasks. But for
modem bureaucracy, the element of "calculability of its rules" has really been of deci-
sive significance.... Bureaucracy provides the administration of justice with a founda-
tion for the realization of a conceptually systematized rational body of law on the basis
of "laws" as it was achieved for the first time to a high degree of technical perfection in
the late Roman Empire.
Max Weber, Rational and Irrational Administration of Justice, in MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECON-
OMY AND SoCIETY 350 (Max Rhenstein ed., 1954). But see Feeley, supra note 28, at 422 (ques-
tioning Weber's description of the criminal system and noting that in reality the system is "highly
decentralized" and decidedly "non-hierarchical"); Worden, supra note 53, at 395 (defenders do
not comport with classic bureaucracy); infra note 84 (explaining that attorneys, prosecutors and
judges do not function like a classic Weberian bureaucracy).
77. It has been suggested that all lawyers are "freelance bureaucrats." See Edward A.
Dauer & Arthur Allen Leff, The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE LJ. 573, 581 (1977).
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increasingly large number of those who work in bureaucratic institu-
tions.7Z It does, however, correspond to the cultural image of a
bureaucrat-an image antithetical to that of the archetypal defense
attorney.
Moreover, defenders do not see themselves as bureaucrats. 79
This is strongly borne out in interviews with public defenders.
I see our job as to defend the rights of people. I mean, I see
that as my job to make sure that someone who is poor gets at least
the same sentence as someone with money. Not to be a cog in the
wheel.
A significant portion of the job is to be an obstructionist, abso-
lutely. And that's the most fun portion of our job. There is a signif-
icant portion where I am working within and working to process the
caseload, the paperwork, etc., but I love being an obstructionist and
I think that's why I like being a public defender as much as I do.
I'm more of a paper pusher than anybody, and I'm the supervi-
sor, and that's what I do. But, I love to go to trial and force the
State to do things right, and I won't force somebody to plead guilty.
If they want to go to trial, they're going to trial.8
Perhaps their views are partially attributable to cognitive disso-
nance, but public defenders can also support their beliefs with some
78. Like each worker in a bureaucracy, each defender is a separate human individual.
Each has his or her own personal history, private goals, emotional makeup, personal values, and
reaction to symbolic ideations such as professional norms and mythology. As McIntyre found,
the quality of public defense "ultimately depends on the individual lawyer's desire to do a good
job." McINTYRvE, supra note 8, at 172. While public defenders are influenced by the institutional
setting in which they are situated, they are individuals:
Permanent role occupancy by the defense counsel position is a critical factor that may
affect defense counsel behavior. The individual public defender is also bound to an
institution. While the public defender maintains his professional independence when
fulfilling his role, the institutional relationship indicates the pursuit of organizational
maintenance goals (objectives directly related to the stability and prestige of the orga-
nizational unit with which he identifies) in addition to personal goals (satisfying clients,
gaining an advantage over the prosecutor, winning a case).
Benjamin & Pedeliski, supra note 28, at 283 (emphasis added); see also WILLIAM GORE, ADMIN.
ImRATnE DECaSION-MAKING: A HEuRSTc MODEL 21 (1964) ("In very general terms, any
form of organizational behavior ... is a means of realizing multiple sets of collective objectives,
the different sets of objectives being held by distinct aggregations of people.").
79. See McINTYRE, supra note 8, at 50.
80. Public Defender Interview, supra note 8. Similarly, Professor Ogletree finds motiva-
tion, as opposed to justification, for public defenders keeping up the fight over time in the "hero-
ism" of taking on the system. Ogletree, supra note 9, at 1242-43.
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pretty good arguments. Defenders are professionals."' As such, they
have a great deal of autonomy and discretion 2 and, in fact, are gov-
erned by professional norms that demand such autonomy.83 While
the administrative functions and personnel of the court may increas-
ingly resemble a bureaucracy,14 defenders in a sense float loosely
within this structure.8 5
The truth is that defenders resemble bureaucrats to various
degrees. A public defender organization is far too complex to define
each attorney within it by such circumscribing labels. Such an organi-
zation is not a machine.86 It reflects a complex interaction of struc-
ture, value pronouncements from leadership, and emerging value
81. Contrary to prior belief, professionals and bureaucracy can mix. "While definite hier-
archical and impersonal bureaucratic structure exists within such organizations [i.e., "profes-
sional bureaucracies"], it performs a facilitating role and works around professionals .... "
McINTYRE, supra note 8, at 95. The professionals "play the central role in the achievement of
the primary organizational objectives." W. Richard Scott, Reactions to Supervision in a Heteron-
omous Professional Organization, 10 ADmir. ScQ. 65,65 (1965); see also Tremblay, supra note
15, at 1105 n.13 (discussing the appropriateness of the street-level bureaucrat model for legal
services); cf. Wolf Heydebrand, The Context of Public Bureaucracies: An Organizational Analy-
sis of Federal District Courts, 11 LAW & Soc'y REv. 759,762-63 (1977) (applying a similar model
to the interaction of administrative and judicial decisionmaking).
82. As professionals, lawyers in the public defender's office exercise autonomy and discre-
tion. See generally McITNrvnE, supra note 8, at 95 (discussing the public defender's approach to
organizing professionals).
83. See, eg., MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 5.4 (1983) ("Professional
Independence of a Lawyer"); Rule 1.7 ("Conffict of Interest: General Rule").
84. While the clerk's office does function a great deal like the classic Weberian bureau-
cracy, Heydebrand, supra note 81, at 766, the other players do not. "[T]he collegial-professional
network of lawyers, which includes attorneys, prosecutors, and judges ... may dominate the
respective chains of decision-making which, though not without conflicts, are nevertheless highly
interdependenL" Id. In fact, Heydebrand articulates a variety of ways in which the "organiza-
tional characteristics" of courts, as organizational units, stray from the classic bureaucratic
model:
1. Courts are networks of organized activities rather than bureaucratically integrated
formal organizations.
2. Courts are legally and politically heteronomous (i.e., resources, structure, jurisdic-
tion externally defined by executive and legislature) rather than autonomous
organizations.
3. Courts are labor-intensive professional service organizations.
4. Courts are an arm of the government.
5. Courts are, for the most part, non-specialized or "generalist" organizations.
6. Courts are relatively passive organizations within a demanding environment.
7. Although they have strict boundaries, courts are also highly enmeshed in a vertical
and horizontal interorganizational network.
Id at 765-70.
85. See supra note 78.
86. Gilsinan & Valentine attribute the "organization as machine" metaphor to the func-
tionalist paradigm that "has generated most modern management and organizational theory."
Gilsinan & Valentine, supra note 30, at 200. Noting that this functionalist approach has been
"rapidly losing ground" in organizational theory, the authors embrace the interpretive approach.
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positions within the organization vying for dominance:' "Who are
we?" "What are we about?" "Why is it worth it?""8 It is an organiza-
tion, moreover, that constantly interacts with and is shaped by other
organizations such as the judiciary, court personnel, prosecution,
police, probation, and citizen's groups.89 Individual defenders like-
wise interact with and are shaped by these other organizations qua
organizations. Their attitudes and perceptions are further shaped by
their constant personal contacts (formal, informal, and social) with
other individuals and groups of individuals within their own and other
organizations. 9
ld. This "perspective views organizations as systems of meaning. People actively structure their
organizational reality. Thus, organizations act primarily as interpretive lenses through which
people assign meaning both to their own activity and to the activity of others." Id.
87. Organizations are complex playing fields where organizational structure and organiza-
tional values interact, with competing and emerging values vying for dominance. GoRE, supra
note 78, at 119:
Perhaps this function of structure can be characterized as one of rationalizing individ-
ual belief and maintaining faith in the efficiency and worth of the organization. The
result of continuous changes in structure is a continuing reinterpretation of the organi-
zation and its environment and hence recurrent reinforcement of individual commit-
ments to the numerous symbols of organization. Major changes in structure seem to
come about when a sudden buildup of anxiety manifests itself in a hurricane of feeling
which topples an organization over its threshold of change into a precipitate act.
Change may also come about through a more casual continuing process of adjustment,
with several issues in revision at any given time, each being shepherded along at a rate
consistent with tolerably comfortable levels of anxiety.
Id. at 122. A similar view is expressed in Gilsinan & Valentine regarding the "interpretive per-
spective" of organizational theory. Gilsinan & Valentine, supra note 30, at 200-201.
88. See GoRE, supra note 78, at 122 ("[T]his function of structure can be characterized as
one.., maintaining faith in the efficiency and worth of the organization.").
89. All organizations, to a greater or lesser extent, interact with, and are influenced by,
other organizations. For a careful analysis of the factors that affect the nature of this influence,
see William Evan, Toward a Theory of Inter-organizational Relations, 11 Morr. Sci. J. B-217
(1965). For the public defender, external organizations in the "legal system" include the trial
court, the appellate court, the prosecutor, the police, jails, probation, citizen action groups like
Mothers Against Drunk Driving, funding agencies, and the like. More broadly, the legal system
itself is "a subsystem of a larger political system." James R. Klonoski & Robert I. Mendelsohn,
The Allocation of Justice: A Political Approach, 14 J. PUn. L. 323, 323 (1965).
90. Anyone who has worked in a law office, or any other office, knows how much their
approach to their work is influenced by the various individuals and groups of individuals with
whom they come in regular contact:
Rather the "rules" the organization members are likely to follow are the "folk-
ways" or informal "rules of the game" within the organization; the goals they pursue
are likely to be personal or sub-group goals; and the roles they assume are likely to be
defined by the functional adaptation of these two factors. These three features of the
organization then are the objects to be accounted for, and the functional-systems
approach is likely to begin to identify and examine the adaptation of the actors to the
environment, the workload and the interests of the persons placed within the system,
Le., other goals of the actors within the organization.
Feeley, supra note 28, at 413; cf GoRE, supra note 78, at 156 ("But whereas the systemic compo-
nents of the body are physically integrated into the human physiology by connecting tissue, even
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D. IN THE FiELD HosPITAL
None of the previous descriptions of the public defender are
totally inaccurate. Sometimes Perry Mason, sometimes a player
greasing the administrative wheels, sometimes a bureaucrat with a
"Form D-17," the defender equally generates and eludes easy defini-
tion. The goal of this Article is not description for its sociological
sake, although the description this Article proposes is a far more fit-
ting one for how defenders really function in the lower courts than the
traditional ones. Rather, this Article seeks to develop a role descrip-
tion that can then lead to practical, workable ways for defenders to do
their jobs better in the lower courts (and then have prosecutors do the
same, bringing the system to some semblance of a workable order).
Transcending all these various cultural, sociological, economic,
and organizational descriptions (generally based on defenders in fel-
ony court, not the lower courts) is a simple reality: Defenders in the
lower courts work in a world of virtual chaos9' in which they are con-
stantly making almost instantaneous decisions about how to allocate
scarce fixed resources. As such, defenders in the lower courts are
most accurately described as carrying out a role analogous to those in
field hospitals practicing triage, the art first developed by Napoleon's
surgeon, Baron Dominique Jean Larrey, of choosing among the
wounded who will get priority to scarce medical resources. 92 The
challenge is to develop a coherent, ethical approach for conducting
this task.
II. PERFORMING TRIAGE IN THE LOWER COURTS
Those who have never seen the lower criminal courts (particu-
larly in urban areas) in operation would likely be shocked at what
they saw. Of course there is a judge, a jury box, and attorneys. But in -
most respects it does not comport with any image one might have of
this country's court system, unless one is a devotee of Dickens' novels
the human cells in the corpus of organization are connected by nothing more than invisible
relationships.").
91. One commentator specifically characterized the New York criminal system as existing
in "all the chaos." Steven Brill, Fighting Crime in a Crumbling System, Am. LAw., July/Aug.
1989, at 124. In the next section, I will focus upon the general chaos that characterizes our lower
criminal courts.
92. See WnsLow, supra note 14, at 1.
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or television's Night Court.93 In the first place, these courts are gener-
ally teeming with people. Filled courtrooms, people standing in the
hallways, and a constant stream of people walking in, and out and
back in, over and over again is typical. Nearly twenty cases are dis-
posed of for every one that progresses to Superior Court.94 Attorneys
blithely walk up to the clerk to discuss some matter while a case is
being heard, and bargain with the prosecutor on their own case while
a defense attorney is addressing the court on another.95 And for the
93. My description of the lower courts is consistent with the one given by HEUMANN, supra
note 25, at 35-36.
While this brief drama is enacted, the spectators in the courtroom engage in a
number of activities which create an atmosphere of bustle, as well as an often intolera-
ble noise level. Defendants confer with attorneys; bail bondsmen discuss rates and col-
lateral with defendants; defendants greet old acquaintances; prosecutors and defense
attorneys negotiate cases; clerks and bailiffs wander about, bringing files, various forms,
incarcerated defendants, and coffee. Occasionally a prosecutor from another court-
room pops in and reads off a list of defendants' names. These defendants are instructed
to move to another courtroom for their cases. In one of the circuit courts, the public
defender also reads off lists of names while court is in session. These are the names of
his clients, defendants who failed to consult with him that morning about their cases.
The public defender corners them (quite literally) in the courtroom and discusses dis-
position for the first, and probably only, time.
The turmoil in the courtroom is matched only by the confusion in the adjoining
corridor. Prosecutors, bondsmen, defense attorneys, defendants, police officers, family
members, victims, witnesses, and clerks meander about passing the time, arranging
deals, looking for someone-or simply because they are confused. No neat boundary
separates courtroom and corridor, activities flow back and forth between the two.
Id at 36 (footnote omitted).
Most matters that come before the court for resolution are disposed of quickly. "In this
city, it usually takes one or two hours to obtain auto license plates, but it takes a matter of
minutes to dispose of accused auto thieves in court." Mileski, supra note 3, at 480. This likely
explains how one defenders' office processed misdemeanor cases for less than $100. Gail D.
Cox, Public Defender Challenged Over Costs, Productivity, L.A. DAILY J., July 22, 1985, at 1. In
fact, most court time is spent in administrative "churning activity." As Subin found in his study
of the lower courts in New York City:
The Table [statistical compilation] assumes that judges spend seven hours a day on
the bench, and work a little over 200 days a year. It also estimates, based on [Office of
Court Administration] statements, that an average of five minutes is taken on each case
called on the calendar.
The Table reveals that only 21% of the judge's time is spent at hearings or trials,
on determining facts. Only another 19% is spent taking action on cases, either dis-
missing them or taking pleas of guilty. All the rest of the judge's time (nearly 60%) is
spent in futile presiding over the churning activity, adjourning cases either because
some necessary party is not there, or because they are there but are not ready.
Hopelessly awash in a sea of cases, the Court is unable to administer justice. Rec-
ognizing that, it has redefined its mission. The measurement of success is the disposi-
tion rate, how many cases can be moved in and out of the court, without regard to how
they are moved.
Subin, supra note 4, at 8; cf. supra notes 11-24 (describing the problem of inadequate resources).
94. See, e.g., WASmNOoN Coums, supra note 4, at 6-9 (indicating 391,135 dispositions in
the lower court, while only 26,270 in the superior court). It is little wonder, given these statistics,
that the lower courts are principally sentencing courts. See Mileski, supra note 3, at 491.
95. See, eg., IInEumAN, supra note 25, at 36; Sudnow, supra note 1, at 265 ("If, during the
course of a proceeding, the P.D. has some minor matter to tend to with the D.A., he uses the
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defender, the flow of cases is endless;96 a limitless stream of ifies. A
dozen or so clean, raw files appear on their desks in the morning, at
most containing a police report and the defendant's application for
indigent defense. Into court they come, stack of files in hand, yelling
to determine if their clients have even shown up. "Is there a Mr.
Firmen here? Is Ms. Nonce in court?" On some days, half of the
defendants do not respond to their calls, and bench warrants are sub-
sequently issued. This is not uncommon. These are the lower courts.
Defendants often neglect to come to court.97 The same is true of
time when a private attorney is addressing the bench to walk over to the prosecutor's table and
whisper his requests, suggestions or questions.").
96. The horror stories of staggering public defender caseloads are legion. See, eg.,
Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1248 (a single defender "handled more than 400 cases in a single
month"); Suzanne E. Mounts, The Right to Counsel and Indigent Defense Systems, 14 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 221 (an attorney collapses in court while carrying caseload of 2000
cases per year); Alan Ashby, Lack of Funding of Public Defenders Affecting Counsel, L.A.
DAILY J., Dec. 10, 1980, at 1, 15 ("[A]bout half the deputy public defenders in the state are
carrying caseloads as much as 40 percent in excess of what the American Bar Association recom-
mends as the maximum that can be carried and still maintain competent standards of representa-
tion."); Richard Shumate, I Will Not Accept Any More Cases, 18 BARRISTER'S MAG. (Young
Lawyer's Division) 10, 11 (Winter 1991-92) (an attorney who had closed three times as many
cases in ten months as prevailing standards recommended for a year refuses to take any more
cases). Professor Ogletree recognizes the "staggering caseloads" and "[t]he loss of public
defenders to burnout [which] threatens the ability of the system to fulfill its commitment[s]."
Ogletree, supra note 9, at 1240-41.
Various standards purport to guide the maximum misdemeanor caseload that a public
defender will handle. These include standards from: national advisory commissions, see, e.g.,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CaRISIS, supra note 7, at 43 (300 misdemeanors per attorney per year);
INDImr DEFENSE, supra note 19, at 6 (400 misdemeanors per attorney per year (citing
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL., JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS)); state stat-
utory limitations, id at 15,19, 22 (Minnesota, 250-300 gross misdemeanors per attorney per year,
400 misdemeanors per attorney per year, Florida, 400 misdemeanors per attorney per year); and
contract limitations, id. at 22 (Yakima County, Washington, 600 misdemeanors or gross misde-
meanors per attorney per year).
In reality, a National Legal Aid and Defender Association ("NLADA") survey determined
that the average yearly misdemeanor caseload nationally is 613 cases per attorney. Id. at B-1.
Of those responding to the survey, 33% were handling 370-480 cases, 33% were handling 598-
636 cases, and 33% were handling 700-1000 cases. Id. In contrast to this reality, the number of
cases recommended by 36% of the defender offices was 400 (the standard recommended id. at
6), while 21% recommended 250-300 cases, 57% recommended 350-450 cases, and 21% recom-
mended 500-750 cases. Id. at B-1. When one thinks of the effort a team of students in a clinical
program will put into a single case in order to provide quality representation, these figures are
truly staggering.
In response to "[t]he crushing caseloads and workloads in indigent defense," NLADA has
attempted to begin careful exploration and development of a variety of methods for measuring
caseload/workload as a necessary predicate to begin management of this overwhelming system.
See id. at 1, 25 (unit base method), 28 (time base method), 40 (case weighing method).
97. My own observations correspond with that of Feeley: "The primary question for many
defendants in lower courts is not whether to go to trial but whether to show up in court at all."
Feeley, supra note 3, at 462. To give some sense of the magnitude of this possibility, in the New
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civilian witnesses and police officers.98  Those defendants that do
respond will likely be meeting with their defender for the first time, a
meeting unlikely to last more than a few minutes, and then all too
often only to discuss the prosecutor's offer. In the swirl of all the bod-
ies, movement, and bargaining, the defender must quickly assess the
course a case will likely take. He or she must practice triage.
For the public defender, district courts .have much in common
with the field hospitals on the edge of battlefields where triage was
first developed:
" chaos
" limited resources
" great numbers
" a constant stream of new clients
" the inability to give each client the care that the professional
has been trained to provide
York City lower courts, "[o]ver the past five years [since 1987] another 165,000 outstanding
bench warrants have accumulated." Subin, supra note 4, at 18. Interviews with public defenders
indicate that this may be at least as much a function of social and economic factors as
recalcitrance.
I would estimate that about one-third of our cases, the client doesn't show on any
given day. However, [there is functionally] no mailing of notices to appear. So you get
this little scrap of paper with about 20 various things checked, handwritten, and so on,
and you are supposed to be smart enough to know exactly which line to look for and
it's part of the form that gets worn out if you put it in your wallet.... Then they issue
bench warrants every time someone doesn't appear, whether or not he has moved,
whether or not he is in another jail, whether or not he has done anything right or
wrong, the bench warrant is issued.... Now they aren't going to let him out; then we
run into the situation [where] we gotta plead him, right or wrong, because he can't
make bail, because the bail is ridiculously high on a FTA [failure to appear], and so you
end up trying to process him without regard to guilt, innocence or the constitution....
I would say the highest single percentage is when the year is up and you are sup-
posed to come back to court on your little flim.rsy [case]. Come on, these are people
who don't even live in the same house for a whole year. They don't have a calendar by
their telephone, it's just ridiculous....
The difference between a private attorney and a public defender with respect to
FFA's is that [when I was] a private attorney... I would get a notice that my client
needed to come back in, [because] they would send it to ... me, as well as to the client.
I would, of course, follow that up immediately with a letter to my client. I'd tell him to
get in contact with me and that we would need to be there at this time and.., talk
about this, and if I don't get contact then I would try to catch him by phone, and I am
more familiar with that particular person's circumstances. I don't think, in better than
ten years of private practice, that I had more than 2 or 3 matters where my clients
didn't show up for their court appearances. It has just virtually never occurred, where
here it is just an extremely high percentage. We just do not have the ability to follow
up, to send out [a letter] every time the court sends out something... and then follow it
up with phone calls in an attempt to assist our client in getting into court. In private
practice, I often times, if my client didn't have transportation ... would drive by, pick
him up and bring him to court.
Public Defender Interview, supra note 8.
98. See infra note 136.
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This of course is only an analogy. Obviously the courtrooms of the
lower courts differ in many significant ways from a field hospital:
" There is a consxtitutional provision, the Sixth Amendment,
which guarantees care to all.
" There is an advocate on the other side still trying, from the
client's perspective, to "hurt" the client even while the triage
process is taking place.
* Most clients are not victims of accident or misfortune (except
perhaps in a larger societal frame).
" It is generally more difficult to divide up or quantify scarce
lawyering resources than doses of medication or medical
procedures.
These differences, however, make developing a coherent and practical
theory of triage in the lower courts even more complex, as will be seen
in later sections of this Article.
Initially, it is important to recognize that, even if public defenders
are not functioning as if in a field hospital, rationing of scarce
resources is a natural part of their world. As Professor Tremblay rec-
ognized when writing about the civil, legal-aid context,99 all lawyering
involves some rationing.'0° Time, and human and material resources
are limited.' l ' What one client gets will often limit what is available to
others, even for a price. In public practice where the attorneys repre-
sent indigents, this natural rationing is exacerbated.1 0° Public defense
99. See remblay, supra note 15, at 1104. Professor Tremblay further develops a theory of
rationing in the legal-aid context based on a community-values oriented approach. See id at
1129-55.
100. See, eg., Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1201, 1203; Tremblay, supra note 15, at 1116; cf.
Simon, supra note 15, at 1093 ("In deciding whether to commit herself to a client's claims and
goals, a lawyer should assess their merits in relation to the merits of the claims and goals of
others she might serve.").
101. See Tremblay, supra note 15, at 1116.
102. See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 9, at 1278:
Another potential danger of empathy is that it can lead to problematic allocation
of resources. The empathic role I have described demands that the public defender
devote substantial time and effort to every client. In a situation of extremely limited
attorney resources, hours spent in the service of one client necessarily come at the
expense of another equally needy criminal defendant. The motivation of empathy does
not tell the defense lawyer toward whom she should direct her empathy. The time that
I spend getting to know my clients, listening to their stories, helping them find jobs, is
time that I could spend representing others.
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representation operates out of a fixed pie and holds a virtual monop-
oly position. After all, where else can their clients go?1"3 Unlike pri-
vate practice where clients can, in theory, bid further resources to
expand the pie, public defense is truly a zero-sum game. Resources
expended on one client are not there for someone else. Public prac-
tice also includes implicit rationing. Waiting lists for initial appoint-
ments, levels of procedures to be followed, and forms to be filled out,
all discourage some from seeking access to the public defense
service.1 4
Public criminal defense, in addition, has its own inherent ration-
ing. Short of some fantasy where each defender only has one client at
a time (or, at least, the reasonable caseload of a good private attor-
ney), defenders always need to ration one of their most significant
limited resources among clients, their credibility.105 The need to parse
103. "Scarcity is inherent in legal services work.... [T]he presence of any fixed budget
inevitably creates allocation choices, and without the usual market or price mechanisms some
allocation methodology must be used." 'Temblay, supra note 15, at 1103 n.7.
Additionally, while the nature of legal practice is quite elastic, the reality of legal
services' existence is that its resources are not at all elastic. Time, energy, personnel,
support services, supplies, and, of course, money, are all finite resources. A private law
firm, by contrast, retains some options to increase the supply of resources if the
demand increases; the individuals making the demands will pay for the increase. While
this facile generalization may fail to capture the tensions of work in a very strained and
busy private firm, the elasticity and option to expand in the private sphere still does
exist, and contrasts fundamentally with the experience of the fixed budget legal services
office.
Id. at 1116 (footnote omitted); see also Simon, supra note 15, at 1092 ("[L]egal services are
necessarily a scarce resource."); Tremblay, supra note 14, at 961 n.61 (discussing how poverty
lawyers must work with fixed budgets); cf. JON ELsTER, LOCAL JusTIcE 247 (1992) ("With
respect to the allocation of scarce medical resources, for instance, I have largely limited myself to
the issue of whether a patient should receive a certain treatment. Often, however, the more
important question is how much he should receive.").
104. The concept of implicit rationing is explored in David Mechanic, The Growth of Medi-
cal Technology and Bureaucracy: Implications for Medical Care, 55 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND
Q. 61, 65-66 (1977).
105. Aischuler makes this point:
Chicago's Sam Adam, for example, insisted that as a private attorney he could secure
better plea agreements than could a public defender
A particular Assistant State's Attorney is unlikely to handle more than a half-
dozen of my cases during a single year. If I am on good terms with this Assistant, I can
go to him with every one of these cases, make my pitch, ask for a favor, and probably
persuade him to give every last one of my clients a break. A public defender may be on
equally good terms with the prosecutor. He may even have been the prosecutor's law
school roommate. But he just cannot do that with fifteen cases a day.
Supra note 12, at 1223 (emphasis added); cf. id, at 1222 ("An advantage to one client arises
because the defender does not make the same effort for the others."); Martin Guggenheim,
Divided Loyalties: Musings on Some Ethical Dilemmas for the Institutional Criminal Defense
Attorney, 14 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 13, 19 (1986) (Conflicting responsibilities exist
when representing large numbers of clients because how the defender behaves toward one client
affects how judges will treat present, and even future, clients.).
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credibility is the inevitable outcome of representing a substantial
number of clients before the same judges on a regular basis. A private
attorney can stand beside a client at sentencing and say, "This is one
of the most decent young men I have known in my years of practice.
It is true that his actions here showed bad judgment, but only that, and
he has learned his lesson." A public defender can occasionally do the
same, but cannot do so for ten clients in a row.
Furthermore, it is important to realize that the need for rationing
is not just a limitation on representation but, like a good physician, an
important part of being a good attorney. In medicine, this is repre-
sented by two principles. The principle of "diagnostic elegance"
requires just the right degree of economy in diagnosis.106 That of
"therapeutic parsimony" requires just those treatments which are
demonstrably beneficial and efficacious.1 "7 In the context of the work
of the defender in the lower criminal courts, this means that the attor-
ney must do no more than is necessary and good for the client. This
ethic of beneficial rationing raises a number of concrete concerns for
the defender. Many cases in the lower courts tend to be relatively
minor, even for the defendants. If the defendant has to keep coming
into court for hearings on some cutting-edge motion dealing with a
somewhat peripheral issue in the case, the defendant (who by defini-
tion is indigent) may lose pay, or even a job.10 8 Also, being in court
can be an unpleasant, pressure-filled experience for many. Prolonging
106. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D., Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical
Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & Poi'Y 23, 27 (1986).
107. Id
108. In fact, in one study, clients sometimes refuse representation because having an attor-
ney prolongs the process, costing them wages and such. See PAUL ROBERTSHAW, RETHIKING
LEGAL NEED: THE CASE OF CRIMINAL JUsncE 29 (1991). Similarly, Malcolm Feeley reported,
Defendants whose applications for a PD have just been approved often approach a PD
asking for and expecting an instant opinion, something that the PDs are loathe to
express. Invariably the PDs firmly and politely tell them to make an appointment so
that they can review the case in detail. While most defendants accede to these sugges-
tions, many of them continue to press the PD, emphasizing that they want to get their
case "over with today," and become irritated when the PDs refuse. This results in ten-
sion between PDs and many of their clients, a tension that contradicts popular opinion.
For it is the defendant, anxious to get his case over with, who wants the quick advice,
and it is the PD, anxious to preserve a sense of professionalism, who wants to extend
the case and review it more carefully.
MALCOLm M. FEELEY, Tim PRocEss Is THE PUNISHmENr. HANDLING CAsEs IN A LOWER CRIM-
INAL COURT 222 (1979) (emphasis added). Denying further representation is, of course, a
defendant's right and part and parcel of informed consent. My point, however, is that this com-
mon reaction by defendants is evidence of the fact that, in some circumstances, allocating scarce
resources will not benefit the client.
Of course, if the defendant can't make bail and is just sitting in jail awaiting trial, pleading
guilty is even more rational. "For if he insists on trial he often must wait months in jail just for
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a case with legal maneuvering that is unlikely to produce any benefi-
cial result may therefore unnecessarily maximize the torment.
Finally, sometimes it is better not to draw too much attention to a
particular case or client. The initial offer may be far better than the
defendant will get if the prosecution looks carefully at the police
report or the client's criminal history. Putting resources into fighting
such a case may only force such careful scrutiny by the prosecution. 10 9
Against the backdrop of inherent, and even at times beneficial,
rationing the defender in the lower criminal courts conducts triage,
albeit haphazardly and intuitively. Repeatedly, the defender must
decide whether to fight for a client, what I call bringing to bear the
scarce resource of "focus," or to provide only what I term "pattern
representation." Thus, there are times when public defenders fight
and fight well, just like Perry Mason, Matlock and their ilk, by using
the scarce resource of focus. Most times, however, they rely upon
"patterns" and their understanding, as members of the legal commu-
nity, of "worth."
To avoid misunderstanding, one should recognize that this latter
approach (pattern representation) is one which, as will be explained
later, fulfills the Sixth Amendment and frequently leads to favorable
results for the client. On the other hand, focus carries a greater likeli-
hood of such a result and, therefore, the initial triage decision may
well determine the defendant's fate.110
the trial to be scheduled." Stanley Penn, How Public Defenders Cope With System, 131 Cm.
DAILY L. BuL., July 5, 1985, at 2. As one defender I interviewed put it,
Part of our representation is we're representing poor people who are in jail, they have
triable issues, [but] they can't bail out. They, themselves, will want to plead guilty to
get out of jail, so they don't [have] to sit there another sixty days [the speedy trial
period] waiting for their trial. And very often these are the cases we would give our
eyeteeth to go to trial on, the really good cases. What does that person do [when
offered to stipulate to facts on condition of a 60-day suspended sentence] ... and there
won't be any jail time?
Public Defender Interview, supra note 8.
109. There are a number of situations in which early resolution will be in the client's best
interest. The client may have a far worse criminal record than the prosecution realizes, or the
actual facts of the case are more unsympathetic towards the client than they initially appear.
Also, the defendant may be charged with a lesser included offense, though the prosecutor could
charge the greater, and a quick plea to the lesser will bar subsequent prosecution for the greater
under principles of double jeopardy. But see State v. Fitzgerald, 622 A.2d 1245 (N.H. 1993)
(conviction for failing to stop at red light does not bar subsequent negligent homicide prosecu-
tion because, under the test of U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), the traffic infraction was "civil"
in nature).
110. See supra note 25. The nature of pattern representation and focus is discussed in detail
in Part IV.
1246
REDEFINING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
Currently, no systematic ethic or approach for guiding this triage
exists, even though, again, the decision whether or not to bring focus
will frequently be the difference between a guilty plea (admittedly to a
minor charge with a minimal penalty) and acquittal or dismissal. At
this point one might recognize that having an articulated system is not
always best. Randomness is better than a bad system. Informal sys-
tems possess flexibility and can sustain consensus that would be
impossible if the system had to be publicly articulated. Also, even
what appears random may not actually be so. Rather, unarticulated,
yet well-grounded, schemata may guide the choosing process.
Nonetheless, it is important to articulate and justify an approach
to triage in the lower criminal courts for a variety of reasons. First,
criminal defense is constitutionally and ethically circumscribed. A
process which may be determinative of the nature and outcome of
representation should likewise have .an ethical basis. Focus, more-
over, is a scarce resource. It should be allocated to its best use. Fur-
thermore, articulating an approach is a necessary first step for a clear
system to guide the prosecution and defense in choosing where to
fight. This, in turn, is a predicate for our lower criminal court system
to even begin to function as a marginally workable system. Finally, it
has been my experience that although defenders do fight at times, it is
easy for them to stop altogether under the numbing weight of their
ceaseless caseload.'1 ' Thus, they tend to stop using focus altogether,
even though the resource is available, because in the blur of their
caseload they can no longer distinguish one case from any one of the
other dozen cases that have come in the door that morning.
On trial days, you can... have seven trials set for each of the
trial days. You can have up to twenty set for violation of hearing
days. Right?
At least.
And in between we may have to cover all these things like
arraignments . . . so that the days off aren't necessarily totally
devoted to trial preparation." 2
As a result, all defendants receive pattern representation. An
ethical, practical, and workable approach to triage can cut through
111. Brill describes the system as a "numbing grinding bureaucracy where cases are
processed" and in which "almost everyone, except the victims and an oddball judge or two and
some unhardened defense attorneys and prosecutors like Karas, seem numb to it all." Brill,
supra note 91, at 50.
112. Public Defender Interview, supra note 8.
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this mind-numbing blur and quickly target those cases appropriate for
focused representation, leaving the others to pattern defense.
III. AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CHOOSING
Certainly, the defender's task of conducting triage is not
without ethical guidance. Triage and its less chaotic counterpart,
rationing of scarce resources, have a large body of ethical literature 1 3
(particularly, though not exclusively, 114 in the healthcare field). On
the surface the literature is cast as a debate between utilitarianism and
egalitarianism, efficiency and equity." 5
113. The advent of organ transplants, artificial organs, treatments such as kidney dialysis,
and the general concern about cost containment in health care, see, e.g., Lester C. Thurow,
Sounding Board. Learning to Say "No", 311 NEW ENG. J. MED., Dec. 13, 1984, at 1569, has
spawned a corresponding body of literature exploring the ethics of rationing and triage. See, e.g.,
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 265 (3d ed.
1989); MICHAEL COOPER, RATIONING HEALTH CARE (1977); WINSLOW, supra note 14; George
J. Annas, J.D., MPH, The Prostitut the Playboy, and the Poet Rationing Schemes for Organ
Transplantation, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 187 (1985); E. Level Becker, M.D., Finite Resources
and Medical Triage, 66 AM. J. MED. 549 (1979); Nora K. Bell, The Scarcity of Medical Resources:
Are There Rights to Health Care?, 4 J. MED. & PHIL 158 (1979); Daniel Callahan, Allocating
Health Resources, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 14 (1988); James Childress, Rationing of Medical
Treatment, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BioEIrmCs 1414 (W.T. Reich ed., 1979) [hereinafter Childress,
Rationing of Medical Treatment]; James Childress, Who Shall Live When Not All Can Live?, in
READINGS ON ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IssuEs IN BIOMEDICINE 143 (Richard Wertz ed., 1973)
[hereinafter Childress, Who Shall Live?]; Mehman, supra note 20; Gene Outka, Social Justice
and EqualAccess to Health Care, 2 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 11 (1974); V. Parsons & P. Lock, Triage
and the Patient With Renal Failure, 6 J. MED. ETmICS 173 (1980); William B. Stason & Milton C.
Weinstein, Allocation of Resources to Manage Hypertension, 296 NEw ENG. J. MED., Mar. 31,
1977, at 732.
114. For example, Jon Elster's analysis deals with rationing decisions in access to higher
education, allocation of prison space, selection of workers for layoffs, demobilization from the
army, as well as kidney transplantation. ELSTER, supra note 103, at 28-61.
115. The distribution of scarce resources has been the subject of the moral realm known as
distributive justice.
It is helpful to begin by noting the broadest definition of justice: Justice is render-
ing to each his due. Distributive justice is the form of justice concerned with distribut-
ing among persons the benefits and burdens that are due to them. Abstractly stated,
distributive justice requires persons to be treated alike unless there are relevant differ-
ences among them.
Roy Branson, Theories of Justice and Health Care, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BloETHrcs 630-31
(Warren T. Reich ed., 1978).
As Professor Tremblay noted, these questions of distributive justice, though regularly
receiving "substantial attention within medicine," receive far less interest in law. Tremblay,
supra note 14, at 960.
All ethical theories for justifying and guiding ethical choices of distribution can be seen as
falling under this single rubric of distributive justice. See, e.g., Branson, supra, at 631 (noting that
persons have been described as "relevantly similar or different" depending on their social utility,
deserts, or equal humanity). Some, however, have excluded utilitarianism from the concept of
distributive justice. Of these, some have done so because "it depends on computing the sum of
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good produced, rather than the justice of how the total is distributed to individuals." Id. at 631
(footnote omitted). Others have excluded utilitarianism because they believe that, while utilita-
rianism does consider issues of distributive justice, "[tihese [utilitarian] theories view distributive
justice as one among several problems about maximizing value." BEAuCHAW & CtILDREss,
supra note 113, at 265.
Regardless how one comes out on the debate whether distributive justice ought to encom-
pass utilitarianism, at a general level the moral debate over the ethical distribution of scarce
resources pits utilitarianism against egalitarianism. See WiNsow, supra note 14, at 110;
Beauchamp & Childress, supra note 113, at 265; Branson, supra, at 631; Paul E. Kalb & David H.
Miller, Utilitarian Strategies for Intensive Care Units, 261 JAMA 2389, 2392 (1989); Mehhman,
supra note 20, at 268.
Utilitarianism, of course, seeks to promote the most good for the most number. In its most
simplistic form, it would justify slavery or the burning of babies if, in total, more good than harm
would be produced. But it has far more sophisticated incarnations that would preclude such
intuitive moral outrages. "Rule utilitarianism," as contrasted with simple "act utilitarianism,"
focuses upon the overall social good of replicating the principle embodied in a particular act. See
Branson, supra, at 631. Thus one author notes that "it is difficult to believe that such arrange-
ments [i.e., slavery] ever would have served the general welfare better than any social alterna-
tive." David Lyons, Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments, in
READING RAWLS: CRIICAL STUDIES ON RAwLS' A THEORY OF JUSTICE 141,148 (Norman Dan-
iels ed., 1974) [hereinafter READING RAWLS]; see also Joel Feinberg, Rawls and Intuitionism, in
READING RAWLS 108, 121-23 (rule utilitarianism permits civil disobedience; that is, though one
cannot violate the law simply to obtain a small gain, they may do so to avoid a disastrous loss).
Advanced theories of utilitarianism, in fact, posit "ideal observers" or "universal proscribers,"
entities imbued with impartiality and a bent towards benevolence in all decisionmaking, to con-
duct the utility calculus. See, R. M. Hare, Rawls' Theory of Justice, in READING RAWLS 81, 93.
In fact, Rawls, while viewing utilitarianism as perhaps the chief rival to his own theory, does not
attack simplistic utilitarianism, but rather recognizes that justice and the protection of liberty
and rights can be accounted for under a utilitarian theory. JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
107 (1971).
Egalitarianism focuses on individuals, their equal human value and equal right to a share of
scarce goods. Like utilitarianism, this theory has simpler and more sophisticated versions. The
latter is reflected in Rawls' A Theory of Justice. This book has been characterized as "a work
that anyone in [the] future who proposes to deal with any of the topics it touches must first come
to terms with if he expects the scholarly community to take him seriously." BRIAN BARRY, THE
LIBERAL THEORY OF Jus-ICE ix (1973). Desiring to be taken seriously, I will therefore briefly
address Rawls. I do so even though Rawls likely has little to do with the types of problems I
address, those of micro-allocation. Rather, Rawls is concerned with developing just institutions
distributing liberty and other primary goods, that is, macro-allocation. See ELSTER, supra note
103, at 229; WNsLow, supra note 14, at 121. As Robert Wolff put it: "[The principles of justice
as fairness are to] apply to the broad, basic organization or institutional arrangement of a soci-
ety, not to every baseball team, stamp club, and mom-and-pop grocery store." ROBERT PAUL
WOLFIF, UNDERSTANDING RAwLS: A RECONSTRUCTION AND CRITIQUE OF A THEORY OF Jus-
TICE 77 (1977).
Rawls' vast and complex work really contains three elements: 1) a vision of individuals and
society as they should be, 2) a conception of moral theory, 3) a construction that attempts to
derive principles expressive of the vision, in accordance with methods that reflect the conception
of moral theory. See Thomas Nagel, Rawls on Justice, in READING RAwLs 1.
Politically, Rawls' work is a theoretical justification for liberal democracy. In it, his substan-
tive doctrine has been characterized as "pure egalitarianism," where the justice of society's insti-
tutions is measured, not by their tendency to promote the good [utilitarianism], but from their
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ability to counteract inequality from the "natural" and "social lotteries" [hereditary and environ-
mental disadvantage]. See Nagel, supra, at 3; see also RAWLS, supra, at 136-42. But see Benja-
min R. Barber, Justifying Justice" Problems of Psychology, Politics and Measurement in Rawls, in
READING RAWL.S 292,299 (seeing Rawls' primary concern as security, making him conservative,
not liberal: "The egalitarianism in which they [Raws' tendency towards a risk-free "maximin"
strategy] issue is purely prudential, a device to ensure that the self-interested man will not be
worse off than anyone else."); T.M. Scanlon, Rawls' Theory of Justice, in READING RAWLS 169,
194 (Rawls' principle of equalization-the Difference Principle-provides less than full
egalitarianism).
The construction that Rawls employs, which is of principal interest in my search for method-
ology, is a social contract theory, like the contract for a civil society in Locke, Hobbes, and
Rousseau. See Norman Daniels, Introduction, in READING RAWLS xviii. Raws' contractors
begin in the "Original Position," see RAWLs, supra, ch. III, a situation analogous to the "state of
nature" in previous liberal contract theories. See Barber, supra, at 294. Key to this original
position is the "veil of ignorance." See RAWLS, supra, at 136-42. Under this veil, the contractors
do not know their or anyone's position in the natural and social lotteries. Thus, for all they
know, when the veil is lifted, they will be at the bottom rung. Because this prospect is so awful,
Rawls believes that these self-interested contractors will be extremely risk-averse, see id. at 154,
and choose that everyone be guaranteed the maximum minimum ("maximin") of every primary
social good. Cf Ronald Dworkin, The Original Position, in READING RAWLS 16,51 (the right to
"equal respect" is not only a primary social good, it is a condition of entry into the original
position); Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Welfare Rights and A Theory of Justice, in READ.
ING RAWLS 319, 346 (espousing the same view as Dworkin).
Winslow articulates the three principles that Rawls' contractors would develop under the
veil of ignorance as follows:
I. Each person has an equal right to the most extensive liberties compatible with
similar liberties for all.
Ila. Social and economic inequalities are attached to offices and positions open to all
under fair equality of opportunity.
Ilb. Social and economic inequalities are arranged so that they achieve the greatest
benefit for the least advantaged.
WINSLOW, supra note 14, at 116.
Rawls' focus on society's "worse-off" is embodied in hIb on Winslow's list, the so-called
"difference principle." Citizens may take advantage of their fortune in the social and natural
lotteries so long as they use their advantages for the "greatest benefit to the least advantaged."
Inequality is only justified if there are compensating benefits for all, especially the worse-off.
RAwLS, supra, at 14-15, 60-64, 303. Thus, like previous liberal theoreticians, Rawls attempts to
construct a society in which political equality exists simultaneously with economic and social
inequality. See Norman Daniels, Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty, in READING
RAWLS 253, 253. But see id. at 254 (finding the notion that people can have equal liberty even if
economically unequal unrealistic).
Attacks on Rawls' theory have come from a multitude of directions. Rawls is said not to
give sufficient attention to class conflict. Richard W. Miller, Rawls and Marxism, in READING
RAWLS 206. Also his "analysis is insufficiently political as well as egregiously ahistorical." Bar-
ber, supra, at 309. Others point out that Rawls' extremely risk-averse "maximin" is not the only,
or even best, response to decisionmaking in the face of uncertainty. See Barber, supra, at 296-
98; Hare, supra, at 106; Miller, supra, at 220. From the utilitarian point of view, Rawls has
completely stacked the deck to ensure that the contractors will not choose utilitarianism. Rawls
denies his contractors the pool and proportion of general lottery outcomes in the society, as
opposed to denying them only their own position, and will not let them resort to the rule of
Insufficient Reasons (when you don't know the odds of various outcomes, assume all are equal).
See Hare, supra, at 101-03. Finally, because the. contractors are not permitted to know their own
conception of the "good," Rawls has skewed the entire enterprise with a strong individualist
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In fact, it is all far more messy.116 Deconstructive possibilities
abound. Egalitarianism may be a utilitarian choice if it is most effi-
cient.1 7  In other words, egalitarianism may be instrumental. The
egalitarian construct of "need" is routinely modified by the utilitarian
notion of "conservation""' 8 (that is, don't let one needy person use up
bias, and thus excluded a variety of other types of social arrangements. See, e.g., Milton Fisk,
History and Reason in Rawls' Moral Theory, in READING RAWLS 53, 67 (Rawls' self-interested
individualism does not lead to community); Nagel, supra, at 9.
TWo other ethical theories for distribution appear to proceed from the concept of "entitle-
ment" and, according to at least one author, do not fit neatly into the utilitarianism-egalitarian-
ism split. WINsLow, supra note 14, at 155, 159. These are "merit" and the "right to use one's
own resources."
The former concept, merit, has certain definitional problems: Are we to consider accom-
plishments or just plain hard effort regardless of result? Do we give credit for natural talent?
How do we compare moral (Mother Theresa) with non-moral (George Steinbrenner) merit?
The latter, the right to use one's own resources, is concerned with the right to take advan-
tage of our "natural assets." See ROBERT NozicK, ANACHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 225-26
(1974); see also infra note 202 and accompanying text for further explication and critique of this
theory. With all respect to Winslow's view, both of these offshoots of entitlement would appear
to also find philosophical support under rule-utilitarianism in that they tend to reward, and
therefore encourage, behavior that particular societies may find desirable.
116. "[L]ocal justice is above all a very messy business." EtSTR, supra note 103, at 15.
117. The boundaries between utilitarianism and egalitarianism can quickly become murky in
spite of the superficial clarity of the two categorizations. Egalitarianism can be sustained by
utilitarianism. If the recipients have equal utility functions with respect to the good (and it has
decreasing marginal utility), total utility is maximized by dividing it equally. Id. at 70.
Conversely, an egalitarian foundation can be posited for what would otherwise have been
assumed to be based in utility.
But, as has already been seen, a difference principle, such as the principle of imme-
diate usefulness, need not be justified simply in terms of a utilitarian calculus. Favoring
the "doctor or nurse" may be viewed as a way of improving the prospects for the worst
off. The difference principle, thus, represents an attempt to come as close as possible to
equality of treatment in the long run, and not just a means of maximizing utility.
Although in practice the difference principle and an unembeliished utilitarian approach
may produce identical strategies, they clearly exemplify different perspectives.
WINSLOW, supra note 14, at 153 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Robert Baker &
Martin Strosberg, Triage and Equality: An Historical Assessment of Utilitarian Analyses of
Triage, 2 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 103, 104 (1992) ("challeng[ing] the standard utilitarian inter-
pretation of triage, and attempt[ing] to demonstrate that in actual wartime and peacetime prac-
tice triage is an egalitarian mode of allocation").
118. Winslow describes conservation as a principle giving priority to "those who require
proportionately smaller amounts of the resources." WINSLOW, supra note 14, at 73. As such, it
"suggests maximizing strategies which could be better applied in military and disaster medicine."
Id. Recognizing that this utilitarian principle may limit the egalitarian principle of "need," Wins-
low notes, "if greater medical need refers to need for larger amounts of the medical resources,
then giving priority to those with greater needs could run counter to the principle of conserva-
tion." Id. at 95. In fact, focusing on need can result in inequality: "But distribution according to
need can be used also to support highly inegalitarian social arrangements. The Australian
courts, for example, have used need arguments to justify lower wages for women (their needs are
not as great as men's)." Karol E. Soltan, Survey Article: Empirical Studies of Distributive Justice,
92 ETHICS 673, 682 (1982) (citation omitted).
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all of a scarce resource). Rationing programs mix and match.119
Therefore, likelihood of medical success (utilitarian) may put one in
the pool eligible for an organ transplant, but a lottery (egalitarian) will
determine who from the pool gets the first organ available.120
Overall, however, in this volume of work from bioethics and
related fields there exists a highly developed set of principles for
evolving a practical ethic. As such, this Article considers four central,
recurring principles for making rationing decisions as potential tools
for developing a rationing regime for defenders in the lower courts. It
then analyzes each to determine what guidance each can provide for
allocating our scarce resource of focus in the lower criminal courts.
The four principles are as follows:
1. Greatest good for the greatest number (utilitarianism)
2. Help those with the greatest need (egalitarianism)
3. Queues, randomness (egalitarianism)
4. Let the market decide (merit)
A. GREATEST GOOD FOR GREATEST NuMBER: 12 1 WHO GETS
THE "GOOD"?
1. Whose "Good"?
a. Criminal defendant versus the wider society: If this funda-
mental utilitarian principle is to have any use in assisting triage in
lower court criminal representation, it must first be determined what
119. Actual rationing programs are generally created from a mix of ethical principles.
"Convergence among positions appears at certain points. Even those positions that select a
single concept such as utility, desert, or equality as the essence of distributive justice do not
ignore the importance of the others." Branson, supra note 115, at 636; see also WINSLOw, supra
note 14, at 110 (most theories of distributive justice see utilitarianism and egalitarianism as "first
principles" and differ in how they prescribe the balance between the two). The various weighing
of first principles has been termed "intuitionism." While, in addition to utilitarianism, Rawls
perceived intuitionism as a rival to his theory, see Feinberg, supra note 115, it 108, in fact, Rawls
himself cannot escape intuitionism in developing many of his supporting arguments, see Hare,
supra note 115, at 83-84, nor in applying his own theory to a specific ethical situation, civil
disobedience. See Feinberg, supra note 115, at 108, 119-20.
120. Thus Katz and Capron suggest rationing be conducted in a two-phase process: first,
narrow the field by relevant medical criteria; second, conduct a lottery within that pool. JAY
KArZ & ALEXANDER M. CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES WHAT? 194 (1975).
A similar view can be found in WINSLOW, supra note 14, at 32-33; cf. Childress, Rationing of
Medical Treatment, supra note 113, at 1415 ("Two different sets of criteria appear to be necessary
... one set establishes the pool [rules of exclusion] from which the final selections are made
according to another set of criteria [rules of final selection].").
121. A good discussion of the utilitarian principle of "greatest good for greatest number"
can be found in WINSLOW, supra note 14, at 6-21. "
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population will define the "good" that is to be distributed.1" As will
be seen, that choice may well influence how one distributes the scarce
resource of focus.
On the battlefield, the context for the "greatest number" is cul-
turally obvious. We are interested in the wounded as a group.123 Of
course, our interest in these unfortunates is tied to the interests of the
greater number of those citizens for whom the wounded fight. But
that is the point. In the battlefield or disaster situation, the interests
of the injured and those of the wider citizenry are congruent. They
are part of us. We are part of them. This, however, is not the case
when the group who is to receive our scarce resource, focus, is accused
criminal defendants. Since most, but far from all, criminally accused
did something illegal, the interests of this pool of individuals seem to
differ from those of the broader society on whom they prey.124 One
might even suspect that members of this latter group might vote to
withhold focus altogether.
An initial response could be "so what." The Sixth Amendment
has already decided the issue. That amendment equates the interests
of the wider society with the zealous representation of the criminally
122. As in many areas of life, what is considered "good" in the criminal justice system will
often be a function of where the evaluating constituency is situated:
Finally, we acknowledge that there was one problem that we simply cannot
resolve. Evaluation is not possible unless there are agreed upon objectives and goals,
yet such an agreement does not exist within the criminal justice system, nor within
society. The objectives and goals of indigent defense depend upon whether one is the
defendant, the prosecutor, the victim, a member of the county board, or a relatively
uninvolved citizen. Defendants will think that a desirable indigent defense is acquittal
or the least possible sentence. Victims will likely think otherwise. Prosecutors may
think a positive indigent defense system involves speedy disposition. The county board
will be concerned mainly with lowering costs.
Holden & Balkin, supra note 57, at 553 (citation omitted).
123. Starting with the position that every criminal defendant cannot be given the scarce
resource of focus, one could advance the argument that if all can't have it, none should. Such an
argument has been advanced in the classic lifeboat situation on the theory that this situation puts
those involved into the "last day," when they are no longer individuals but part of a species. See
PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATmNT As PERSON 261 (1974). Facing a misdemeanor of course does not
place one at the steps of the judgment day. Further, as Winslow noted, it is an intuitively ethical
idea that "it is more just to provide a limited good to some people who have rights to it than it is
to waste the good for fear that it cannot be provided to all who may have rights to it." WnqsLow,
supra note 14, at 58.
124. In other words, the general citizenry may have little interest in seeing accused criminals
helped out of their difficulties. Cf. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Shattuck Lecture-Allocating
Scarce Medical Resources and the Availability of Organ Transplantation, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED.
66, 68 (1984) ("In providing a particular set of protections against losses at the social and natural
lotteries, societies draw one of the most important societal distinctions-namely, between out-
comes that will be socially recognized as unfortunate and unfair and those that will not be
socially recognized as unfair, no matter how unfortunate they may beY).
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accused. While this response may be correct, it does not resolve our
dilemma. We do not guarantee that the poorest citizen will be pro-
vided with as skilled an attorney as the wealthiest who has the ability
to retain private counsel."z We certainly do not guarantee represen-
tation by an attorney with the same caseload as the highest priced
private counsel. In short, the Sixth Amendment does not require
focus. If it did, literally every lower court criminal system in the coun-
try would be constitutionally wanting. In practice, the Sixth Amend-
ment stands as a symbol for the vague notion that representing
accused criminals is not a bad thing,126 and serves as a check at the
most extreme boundaries of attorney competence."2 7 In this latter
regard, the core of the Supreme Court's current conception of the
Sixth Amendment is to provide an advocate for the indigent defend-
ant to help assure procedural fairness." But ensuring procedural
fairness, and putting forth the extra effort (focus) to get the factually
guilty off, are two different things.
On the other hand, one could argue for a piggy-back theory. The
Sixth Amendment requires representation. Although this does not
require focus, one could argue that the only recipient of "good" that
one should consider once this representation has begun is one's client.
A defender's allocation of focus to a particular client thus piggybacks
on the initial duty of representation. Yet this argument goes too far.
It is not true that one is to consider exclusively the good of one's cli-
ent. The interests of the court and the adversary system preclude a
whole range of actions that might inure to the client's benefit. 2 9 The
125. Cf Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages,
nor does it require the state to equalize economic disadvantages).
126. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoiNoucr Rule 3.1 (1983) (Meritorious Claims
and Contentions) ("A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding... may nevertheless so
defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.").
127. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), provides a wide playing ground for
attorney competence. To be found incompetent under Strickland, counsel must have fallen
below "prevailing professional norms"-with a "presumption that counsel's conduct falls within
a wide range of reasonable professional assistance," id. at 688-89-and this inadequacy must
have resulted in prejudice against the defendant such that there is a "reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Id. at 694. That is a nearly impossible standard to meet. Clearly, the Supreme Court has left
ensuring attorney competence to the profession-state bars, lawyer groups, and the law schools.
128. See id. at 686-87. For example, counsel's role is described by the Strickland court as
ensuring "that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under the standards
governing decision." Id. at 687.
129. See, eg., MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNquer Rule 3.3, Rule 3.4 (counsel can-
not lie to the court, put in false information, or fail to provide relevant authority; counsel cannot
hinder discovery, suborn perjury, or destroy evidence).
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"good" of a potential future victim may even transcend the otherwise
sacrosanct attorney-client privilege.130
Perhaps a different perspective might assist the analysis. The ten-
sion between defendants and the wider society can be narrowed some-
what by establishing that, even if the good is to be that of the wider
society, the use of focus is nevertheless desirable. This can be estab-
lished in the true utilitarian spirit by balancing the goods and harms to
the wider society, beginning with the harms. What are the harms from
focus? The factually guilty may get off altogether or may receive a
lower penalty than would otherwise be the case. What is the harm
from that? People in general, and this person in particular, will think
they can get away with crimes. This person will be free to commit
more crimes, and may even feel encouraged to do so. From a purely
rhetorical perspective, this analysis of harm might resonate. From a
reality-based one it does not.
First, focus does not guarantee exoneration. It is merely a com-
mitment of mind, a commitment to planning and preparation. The
result may only be a somewhat lowered sentence, or even one that is
no different than could have been obtained with a less intense
defense. After all, there are some cases that are just losers. Second,
because most criminal cases involve misdemeanors, the possible fate
avoided by a focused defense will not likely be one that would have
kept the defendant off the streets for an extended period of time. As
will be discussed later, jail time in the lower courts, if given at all, is
generally of short duration. Third, though some of those who cycle
through the lower criminal courts may believe that they can get away
with crimes, this is not because they or a friend happened to receive a
good defense their last time through the system. Basically two types
of defendants go through the lower court system: street criminals who
regularly live outside the law and those who are like most of us at
some stage of our lives. The former conduct their lives accumulating
long records of car prowls, thefts, possession of drugs, and assaults.
The latter group, novices in the criminal system, punched a neighbor,
drove while intoxicated, shoplifted a comb, or were hanging around
with the wrong bunch.''
130. Counsel may even report information obtained from a client if done to prevent certain
criminal acts. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 1.6(b)(1); see also Curtis J.
Sitomer, 'My Client Right or Wrong'--Lawyers May Revise Tradition, THE CHRISTIAN SCL MON-
rrOR, Feb. 1, 1983, at 6 (discussing the proposed limits to attorney-client confidentiality).
131. Arguably there is a third group-indigent individuals, marginally heeding society's
laws, who are tempted towards crime but are kept away by their perception of the risk, even with
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Those familiar with the system already believe they can usually
get away with crimes. Their belief is well-founded. Most crimes are
either unreported or undetected. 132 Arrests rarely follow.1 33 Cases
are often dismissed."M Defendants fail to show up altogether 13 and
are only found if they have the bad fortune to be stopped for some-
thing else and have their bench warrant discovered. If they do show
up in court, complaining witnesses often do not.136 Even if convicted,
knowledge of the limited risk involved. See infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text. One may
suggest that some indigents, knowing that others have been provided a good defense and thus
that they may receive a similar defense should they commit a crime and get caught, will be
incrementally encouraged by this knowledge just enough to cross the line. Though this is theo-
retically possible, it seems highly unrealistic or, at best, likely to push only a very few across the
line. This may be different, however, in the hypothetical situation where members of this group
know that they would always get focus. In that case, they would be like some of those currently
in more organized criminal endeavors who have top quality private attorneys on retainer.
132. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN C-isis, supra note 7, at 4 ("[O]f the approximately 34
million serious crimes committed against persons or property in the United States in 1986,
approximately 31 million never were exposed to arrest, because either they were not reported to
the police or if reported, they were not solved by arrests."); Mitchell, supra note 17, at 325 &
n.110. The reason most given for not reporting a crime was that "[t]he crime was not important
enough to report to the police." BJS DATA REPORT, supra note 17, at 54. "The matter was
private or personal" was the principal reason for not reporting violent crimes. Id.
133. The rate of solution of reported crimes in New York gives a sense of the relatively small
likelihood of getting caught for a single crime: "The police claim to have solved just 24 percent
of the 86,000 (ten an hour) reported robberies in New York last year; 10 percent of the 128,000
(15 an hour) burglaries; and 7 percent of the 110,000 (12 an hour) larcenies." Brill, supra note
91, at 124; see also Mitchell, supra note 17, at 325 & n.10; cf. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUsTIcE, supra note 1, at 159 ("First, most assume that for any given job they will not get caught,
though in the long run they will."). Interestingly, the arrest rate for those misdemeanors actually
reported may be somewhat higher than the felony statistics given above. Many misdemeanors
result from direct intervention by the police (driving offenses, substance abuse, prostitution),
cases where the defendant and victim know each other (domestic assaults, bar fights), and cases
where the defendant has been caught red-handed (shoplifting).
134. Dismissal of cases in the lower courts on the day of trial is quite common from my
experience, at least once it is made clear to the prosecutor that the defense will go to trial rather
than giving the government "a little something" on a plea. This parallels Feeley's observations:
"If the state's case is weak, the prosecutor is quite likely to drop the charges-contrary to
myth-and in many jurisdictions about as many arrests are disposed of in this manner as are
handled through guilty pleas." Feeley, supra note 3, at 461.
135. See supra note 97.
136. Whether through forgetfulness, an unwillingness to face the defendant, or a concern
about losing a day's pay, from my experience, prosecution witnesses often do not appear the day
of trial. In fact, it is not uncommon for police witnesses to fail to come to court. Some judges in
our jurisdiction have g "half hour" rule; if the witnesses the prosecution needs to proceed are not
in court within a half hour of the time trial commences, the case will be dismissed. Cf. Don J.
DeBenedictis, ABA Offers Help to Victims of Court Delay, L.A. DAILY J., July 18, 1986, at 3
(quoting Louisiana District Court Judge Frank Marullo) ("It 'puts undue strain on people to
keep going back to court and being continued' .... That in turn 'really puts a strain on justice
and may cause injustice' if the victims and witnesses finally give up."). Part of the problem stems
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sentences rarely involve extensive jail time, if any.137 Thus, even if
unlucky enough to get caught, street criminals will quickly be back on
the streets. Again, that they received a good defense in a particular
case (by being allocated focus) will hardly affect their or their friends'
attitudes toward crime. The novices, on the other hand, are horrified
with finding themselves in the criminal process, realize that they were
lucky to get good representation, and are unlikely to come into that
process again. In other words, the harm is minimal.
What, then, is the "good"? As the following sections reveal,
there are a number of significant "goods" to balance against these
minimal harms. Here, however, the tension between the individual
defendant and the wider society reappears. Depending on whether it
is the defendant or the wider society that is to be the recipient of the
good, what counts as "good" in the balance may vary. For example,
the society may see the type of system-protection discussed in Part
III.A.l.b. and protection of the innocent discussed in Part
III.A.2.b.ii.c. as goods, but not the use of focus to help those facing
serious sentences discussed in Part III.A.2.b.ii.b. Those accused of
crimes, on the other hand, may find assistance in this latter category a
great good. As the discussion in the following sections reveals, the
choice of subjects for focus as a result of triage really incorporates the
from witnesses having to give up a day's pay each time they come to court, hire baby-sitters, and
other financial constraints.
137. In reality, those defendants who are convicted in the lower courts will serve little, if
any, jail time. "Of those convicted on original misdemeanor charges, few end up serving time in
jail. The typical outcome is a suspended jail sentence together with probation or a fine." Feeley,
supra note 3, at 461; see also -EumANN, supra note 25, at 42 ("time" in circuit court is a rarity;
"time" in superior court is what the system is about). This was confirmed in interviews with the
defenders. "It isn't common [to spend more than a weekend, if that] for an offense, until you get
a track record of having two or maybe three of that particular type of offense." Public Defender
Interview, supra note 8.
In discussing punishment in the New York City lower courts, Professor Subin observes:
In 1990 there were some 4,000 jail spaces available for the 119,000 convicted mis-
demeanants. If all of them had been sentenced to jail, each space would have to have
been occupied by thirty different prisoners in a year. This in turn would mean that the
average length of incarceration could only have been twelve days. That possible aver-
age term was increased in two ways: first, by not sentencing half of the convicted popu-
lation to jail at all; and second, by sentencing only a small fraction to long terms-.7%
to six to nine months, for example. But the increase was slight, as the data reveal: the
actual average stay possible in 1990 was thirty days.
It would appear, therefore, that the deterrence function of the Court has suffered
the same fate as its due process function: by trying to provide some due process in a
caseload far beyond its capacity to handle, it ends up providing no process in most.
Similarly, by trying to impose some punishment on a convicted population far beyond
its capacity to punish, it ended up imposing a significant punishment on very few.
Subin, supra note 4, at 12.
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concerns of both constituencies, individual defendants and the wider
society.
b. Current clients versus future interests of subsequent clients and
the wider society: The public defender's client pool is never static. A
constant stream of new clients or old clients with new cases pours in
daily. Most of these cases will only be of interest to the particular
defendants and their circle of friends and intimates. Some, however,
have broader, systematic significance. These cases are of two types.
The first type raises a recurring issue that affects a significant number
of clients. Thus, the case may provide the right vehicle to put on a full
evidentiary hearing challenging, for example, the admissibility of the
portable breath test under Frye,3 ' or the legality of speedy trial waiv-
ers that are not to a date certain. The second type of case does not
raise such obvious system-wide issues, but instead is characterized by
one or more of three factors: insufficient evidence, significant
overcharging,139 or determinative evidentiary or procedural issues. 40
Fighting hard by the defense counsel in such cases carries the system-
wide benefit of what this author has in past writings termed "making
the screens work.'' The criminal justice system is not so much a
truth-finding system as a screening system' 42 that protects the public
138. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (articulating the standard
for admissibility of novel scientific evidence).
139. Prosecutors commonly overcharge as a bargaining tactic. See Gifford, supra note 25, at
43 ("Where there is doubt as to whether the defendant can be convicted on the original charge, it
is often because the prosecutor has 'overcharged' to gain additional leverage to induce the
defendant to plead to the 'real offense.' ").
140. There are cases that the defense attorney can use as a vehicle to educate judges, jurors,
and prosecutors about discrimination and difference. I do not choose such cases as a separate
category of cases for providing focus because, ironically, such bias and blindness is so widespread
in our society and our judicial system that the category would swallow up all the others and
make any notion of triage all but meaningless. Rather, I would consider such factors in the
category of "concrete injustice." See, eg., Melissa Evangelos, Bias in Washington Courts: A Call
for Reform, 16 U. PUGET SoUND L. REv. 741 (1993); Elizabeth A. Gaynes, The Urban Criminal
Justice System: Where Young + Black + Male = Probable Cause, XX FORDHAM URBAN LJ. 621,
625 (1993) ("Institutional racism in the criminal justice system is not just a California problem.
The United States Sentencing Commission's report on mandatory sentencing found racial dis-
parity in the means by which the sentencing statutes were implemented.").
141. See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 298-313; John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where
You Find Them: A Response to Professor Subin's Position on the Criminal Lawyer's "Different
Mission", 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETics 339, 347 (1987) [hereinafter Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts].
142. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 300-301 (footnotes omitted):
In performing this screening process, however, the criminal justice system does not
operate primarily as a truth-seeking process in the scientific sense. It is weighted at
trial in favor of protecting the innocent, even at the cost of acquitting the guilty. It is
weighted on the streets in favor of protecting the individual from intrusion by the state,
at the cost of the more efficient methods of crime control that would result if police
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from the abuse of executive power by promoting the dual goals of
protecting the innocent and keeping government out of people's lives.
At each "screen," from the initiation of detention and arrest through
trial, the system is geared to sift out the innocent and get government
out of people's lives at the earliest possible juncture.14 3 Fighting hard
on cases in the above three categories helps make the screens work144
by holding prosecutors and police accountable for their decisions, and
thus benefitting us all.
The problem with all this from the perspective of triage is that
whatever focus is brought to one person's case for institutional good
will not be available for another current, or soon to be current, client.
In fact, some cases concentrating upon systematic change may take
more resources than would likely be seen as economically rational by
a client facing similar charges who is represented by private counsel.
In some ways this parallels the tension between making the
choice whether to use medical resources to serve existing patients, or
to enable medical research that will prevent future illnesses.145 Unlike
could stop, question, and search anyone they desired. In so doing, our process protects
two interrelated and overlapping values (or perhaps, more accurately, two aspects of
the same value, human freedom)-dignity and autonomy.
The "weighing" of the system to avoid conviction of the innocent reflects the para-
mount value this society places upon the dignity of the individual, as well as our con-
cern for the value of human autonomy, a concern which makes us reticent to allow
government to enter our daily lives either to restrict our freedom or to intrude into our
privacy. The "weighting" against police intrusion similarly reflects these two interre-
lated values.
143. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts, supra note 141, at 347:
The ultimate objective of this screening system is to determine who are the proper
subjects of criminal sanction. The process goes on continually. Someone notices a win-
dow which looks pried open or a suspicious-looking stranger. Neighbor talks to neigh-
bor, and information filters to the police. The police comb the streets gathering
information, focusing upon those whose behavior warrants special attention. Those
selected by the police for special attention are then placed in the hands of prosecutors,
courts, and juries who constantly sift through this "residue" to make final determina-
tions about who is to be subjected to criminal sanction.
The criminal justice system is itself composed of a series of "screens," of which trial
is but one. These screens help keep innocents out of the process and, at the same time,
limit the intrusion of the state into people's lives. Each of these screens functions to
protect the values of human dignity and autonomy, while enforcing our criminal laws.
Further, to ensure that the intrusion of the state into the individual's life will be halted
at the soonest possible juncture, our system provides a separate screen at each of the
several stages of the criminal process. At any screen, the individual may be taken out
of the criminal process and returned to society with as little disruption as possible.
144. See generally Mitchell, supra note 17, at 303-13 (discussing screening by the police,
prosecutor, courts, and jury); Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts, supra note 141, at 347 (discussing the
functioning of the screening system).
145. This problem is analogous to the one faced by those in health care: research vs. imme-
diate care; preventive medicine vs. rescue medicine. See, e.g., BLANK, supra note 14, at 121-22
(noting the paradox of liberals frequently supporting preventive medicine, a plainly utilitarian
notion, over individual care, an egalitarian one); KA-z & CAPRON, supra note 120, at 180 (noting
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much medical research, however, the individual criminal client here
gets a benefit on his or her current case.146 Thus, I am not talking
about making the system better at the defendant's expense (for exam-
ple, taking all prostitution cases to trial because the prosecution is ask-
ing too much time on its standard plea offer, even though the first
wave of defendants will be heavily sentenced).1 47 Is that enough to
justify this use of focus? After all, while the results may benefit future
clients, as well as current clients who will be recidivists, the immediate
benefit is to an actual client and flows naturally out of the course of
representation. That, however, does not answer the question. Why
should this individual's case be given scarce resources, and a dispro-
portionate amount of resources in violation of the utilitarian principle
of "conservation," as opposed to giving resources to some other cli-
ents' cases?148
the difficulty in deciding how many present lives we are willing to forgo to save more people in
future generations because "we are not particularly adept at weighing future versus present costs
and benefits"); Norman Daniels, Health-Care Needs and Distributive Justice, 10 PHIL. & PUn.
AFF. 146, 177 (1981) ("There has been much debate about whether the United States' health-
care system overemphasizes acute therapeutic services as opposed to preventive and public
health measures .... Efficacy aside, preventive measures have distinct distributive implications
from acute measures. The opportunity approach requires we attend to both.").
Professor Tremblay has taken this debate into the legal aid sector and found that to the
extent a legal seivice office chooses future, yet unspecified, clients over existing ones, "that
rebelliousness may need to be imposed upon, rather than chosen by, individual lawyers and
clients." Tremblay, supra note 14, at 968. Tremblay gives weight to choosing the long-term as
part and parcel of what he calls "the rebellious view": "To the extent that the rebellious view
privileges the empowerment of clients over their chances of success in the immediate contro-
versy, that stance must also be viewed as one which favors long-term power development over
short-term instrumental gain." Id. at 959.
146. It should be noted that there does exist a format for medical research in which at least
some current patients receive treatment benefits. This format is known as randomized clinical
trials ("RCM"). In RCrs, prospective treatments are tested in a blind study in which patients are
chosen at random to receive the experimental treatment, or a placebo, or an alternative treat-
ment. See BAuCHuAm & Cmwnzss, supra note 113, at 349-50; ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHmICS
AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 185-212 (2d ed. 1986).
147. Contrary to some tactics institutional defenders have employed, I do not propose mak-
ing the system better by using current defendants to their detriment. See, eg., Alschuler, supra
note 12, at 1237, 1250-51 (reporting systematic efforts aimed at changing a judge's sentencing
policy or the prosecution's charging policy where the defender took masses of cases or particular
categories of cases to trial even though "[t]he relatively few defendants convicted at trial are, of
course, likely to receive harsher sentences than they could have secured by pleading guilty").
On the other hand, a defense attorney must always be aware that by bringing focus, and
thus fighting hard, the prosecutor may become more personally involved to the detriment of the
defendant. See supra text accompanying note 109.
148. Cf Ogletree, supra note 9, at 1279 ("To beat the system when the odds are stacked
against her, the attorney must pour an inordinate amount of scarce resources into each case.
Again, this is time that she could spend representing others." (footnote omitted)).
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This Article suggests an answer. The literature castigating the
public defender for its institutional posture has already been
reviewed. Like it or not, however, the public defender is an institu-
tion, an institution interacting with the other institutions that comprise
the major components of the criminal justice system, as well as an
association of individual defense counsels. It is out of this reality that
any usable ethics must sprout.149 The tendency to place the smooth,
administrative functioning of the system above the rights of those put
into that system is worthy of our concern. That is the dark side of the
public defender's status as an institutional player. The other side is
one of enhanced responsibility. As an institutional player, the public
defender has a heightened responsibility to maintain the principles of
that institution as a legal institution. This means ensuring that the
system continues to work to protect all, and taking on issues of
systematic concern, though it means taking resources from some in
order to benefit the system and the wider society.150 This is an
entirely permissible choice for an institutional advocate.' 51 Therefore,
the system should allocate the scarce resource of focus to this category
of case. 52
2. Allocating the "Good" Among Individual Cases
a. Those cases corresponding to the profile of certain institutional
outcomes: 3 The previous sections considered allocating the "good"
from the perspective of determining the population that would define
that good. Moving to the level of the individual defendant, how are
149. See supra notes 23, 27.
150. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1253:
Nevertheless, a lawyer may have a long-range obligation to help build a just legal sys-
tem .... This obligation may conflict with the lawyer's duty to serve the immediate
interests of his client, and terrifying though it is to betray these interests, perhaps
extreme abuses of governmental power sometimes require this action-through such
mechanisms as the public defender strike.
151. The area in which the defenders I interviewed felt a particular obligation towards sys-
tem-protection was in cases where they perceived "police misconduct," generally in resisting
arrest or obstruction of justice cases. They were very clear that they were prepared to fight very
hard in these cases.
Because I feel like the police are harassing people and I don't think it's right and I
don't think they should have any benefit out of it at all. But the irony of it is they
probably don't know the case was dismissed. They really don't care. All they wanted
to do anyway was arrest the person, throw them in jail and search their car ....
Public Defender Interview, supra note 8.
152. I explain how I would allocate focus among and within the selected categories of cases
in Part III.E.
153. For an example of an analysis that used such institutional outcomes to determine the
efficacy of creating a public defender's office, see Benjamin & Pedeliski, supra note 28.
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we to describe those who will be candidates for our various triage cat-
egories from among the pool of defendants being prosecuted in the
lower criminal courts? The natural starting point would be to define
those who will receive our scarce resource of focus in terms of institu-
tional outcomes. After all, that's how we talk about our performance
on a case. "Got an acquittal on all counts." "I couldn't believe it, I
got him to go down to the lesser." "They acquitted on the gross mis-
demeanor and only convicted on the infraction." "We got probation."
"I convinced the judge to O.R. her." The criteria for focus would be
to provide it in those cases most likely to maximize positive institu-
tional outcomes.
One can imagine a ten-year computer project correlating case
factors to attorney time and outcomes along various dimensions of the
process (bail, jail time, motions calendared). This correlation would
produce a profile of which cases respond, and how they respond, to
different levels of effort (with effort assumed to correlate to time
spent). It is debatable how useful that document would be. Any
skepticism, however, does not have to face the test because no such
analysis exists. At present, even an intuitive notion of what would be
good overall institutional outcomes in the above sense is not likely to
be very helpful when making the constant, case-by-case decisions that
triage requires.
Of course, one might suggest that we link individual cases to
likely institutional outcomes, choose as our institutional outcomes
"acquittal, dismissal, or the lowest sentence possible," and then select
those cases for application of focus that are most likely to achieve this
outcome. This surely provides a clear guide. Although superficially
this method has some appeal, it becomes problematic in reality. With
the high volume of cases, triage decisions must be made quickly, with
relatively minimal information.154 For reasons discussed later in this
Article, once one selects a case for focus, one must continue to use
that resource until the particular case is resolved.' 55 Thus, once a
defender has put a case in the triage category of focus, the defender
154. Although I believe that as a rule triage decisions must be made quickly at an early stage
of the process, I also recognize that we are discussing very mushy, fluid concepts. Thus, if later
in the course of representation information should arise that would justify allocating focus had it
been known initially, the accompanying resource-shift in light of the new information should be
feasible. However, the initial decision not to allocate focus will make it less likely that such
information will arise. 'The converse carries different problems. Once choosing to allocate focus,
I would not later abandon it and leave the client to pattern representation. See infra notes 197-
99 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
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has made the commitment. The cases that appear at the initial
stages156 as most likely to end in acquittal, dismissal, or the lowest
sentence will almost always be "easy" cases. As discussed later, these
cases rarely require focus and can be brought to successful conclusion
with pattern representation. Thus, applying the above definition of
institutional outcomes would waste a great deal of focus.
Another guide must be sought.'57 And traditional utilitarian the-
ories of triage are probably not a bad place to start.
b. Traditional triage theories and the two alternative senses of
"good": maintain manpower or heal the greatest number possible:
i. Maintain manpower. One view of classic battlefield
triage is that primary attention should be given to those who can
quickly be put back into battle. 58 The overall good for the society is
met by making its fighting force as effective as possible. In wars and
disasters this view of triage is comprehensible because there are
clearly identifiable roles that correlate to the success of the societal
venture. In war, there are soldiers. In disasters, such as floods and
156. The timing of this initial quick triage decision may not correspond chronologically to
when the client first comes into court. Many lower-court public defenders use a so-called "zone"
defense. In this system a different public defender will appear for the client at different stages of
the proceeding. Thus, in many defender offices a client will see a different attorney at arraign-
ment, at pretrial, and, if he or she has not pled yet, at trial. At each stage the case will likely be
"new" to the attorney. Therefore the significant triage decision may not take place until the case
is given to the trial attorney, although this is obviously problematic. From my experience, most
cases will plead out at an earlier stage. Accordingly, the initial triage decision should take place
at the earliest point reasonably possible, for example, as soon as a defender has met the client
and reviewed the police report.
157. Some sense of such desired institutional outcomes could of course be used to assess
how a particular approach to triage is working over time; but it does not provide the basis for
day-to-day, moment-to-moment decisionmaking unless the outcomes are defined tautologically
so as to correspond to the chosen triage categories.
158. In wartime and during natural catastrophes such as earthquakes the utilitarian notion
of the greatest good referring to "the preservation of military manpower [and] the maximization
of fighting strength" or "priority... to those with medical competence, so that their skills could
be put to use aiding the others in need" competes with the alternative notion of "saving the lives
and limbs of as many casualties as possible." WINSLOw, supra note 14, at 6, 27-28; see also
RAMSEY, supra note 123, at 257 (the exception for random choice for scarce medical resources
takes place where there is a clearly focused social goal such as war); Parsons & Lock, supra note
113, at 173 (describing triage as "[c]asualties are sorted according to the severity of their injuries
and their fitness to return to battle, maximum effort being expended on those likely to be able to
fight again"). Interestingly, when Napoleon's surgeon, Larrey, conceived of triage he apparently
never considered military usefulness as a criteria for setting priorities. WiNsLow, supra note 14,
at 4; cf. id. at 153 (suggesting that saving the "doctor or nurse" first in disaster triage may have
an egalitarian basis); Baker & Strosberg, supra note 117, at 104 (contending that battlefield
triage and the primacy given those most able to quickly return to battle is based on egalitarian,
not utilitarian, principles).
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earthquakes, there are medical and rescue personnel. But what does
this conception of triage mean when we are talking about those
accused of crimes in the lower criminal courts?
One could posit that America is in global economic warfare and
that we therefore want to allocate our scarce resource of focus in such
a way as to return those to the economic battlefield who will make the
citizenry strong. Perhaps we can choose those people who currently
are most economically productive. This, however, is obviously rife
with problems. The pool of indigents accused in the lower courts do
not usually include high-tech wizards or business owners. Most are
unemployed or only employed part-time. They are indigent. That is
why they are being represented by a public defender and not a private
attorney of their choice. Even as to the employed, do we choose those
currently most productive or those with the most potential? How do
we weigh a sixty-year-old at minimum wage against an unemployed
nineteen-year-old? Do we look only at income or what the person
does to earn income? Also, value to the citizenry cannot be measured
in only those roles that directly produce income. Many people are
part- or full-time family caretakers. This role frees others to earn
direct income and raises the standard of living for future generations.
Will we allocate dollar value to this caretaking role in calculating who
is to get priority in triage? If not, such caretakers, the majority of
whom are women, will often be excluded in triage. Also, if we are
focusing on income, will we adjust for the disparity between men's
and women's wages for comparable work?
Perhaps we could instead make rough subjective judgments about
the relative social worth of the pool of clients and fight for those rank-
ing highest on our scale.15 9 Again we will have to decide whether to
focus on potential social contribution or past social contribution
(although the past may afford a rough measure of future worth).
Although this is not a particularly easy task in any case, there will be
added difficulties here. The attorney will have very little information
about the client and likely only a few minutes of personal contact. 60
159. Whether perceived as past contribution or future potential, social worth has played in
the balance of both triage theory and practice. For an extensive discussion and critique of this
basis for distributive justice, see WiNsLow, supra note 14, at 81-86; Mehlman, supra note 20, at
256-66.
160. See, eg., Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer?, supra note 7, at 6:
Most of the men spent very little time with their Public Defender. In the court in which
they eventually pled guilty, they typically reported spending on the order of five to ten
minutes with their Public Defender. These conversations usually took place in the bull-
pen of the courthouse or in the hallway.
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To the extent such information becomes significant to the type of rep-
resentation a client will receive, and to the extent clients become
aware of this, they will have an incentive to provide inaccurate infor-
mation that casts them as good candidates for focused representa-
tion.161 Also, the situation is a bit skewed. The client is accused of a
crime and is being processed through the criminal justice system. This
is not a context that places a member of society in her best light.
Before discounting making allocation decisions based on assess-
ments of social worth as an intellectual straw man, one should know
that in the recent past, life-and-death decisions have been made in just
this way. Whether openly referring to individual worth or masking
the assessment under criteria such as "suitability" or "likelihood of
success,"1 62 decisions about who would or would not obtain kidney
dialysis were regularly made by medical boards using this standard.163
Shumate, supra note 96, at 11 (" 'I was assigned 45 cases for one arraignment calendar ....
When I figured it out, it wound up being 10 minutes per defendant. I had 10 minutes to devote
to each one.' ") (quoting a public defender); cf. Glen Wilkerson, Public Defenders As Their
Clients See Them, 1 AM. J. CRmr. L. 141, 142 (1972) ("According to the interviews, the most
widely shared grievance among defender clients is that defenders do not visit or contact them
often enough.").
161. Cf. ELSTER, supra note 103, at 127-28 (using exemptions from the draft in the 1960s as
an example of how individuals will distort their behavior to comport with a rationing scheme).
162. Social worth may, of course, be masked under the seemingly-neutral criterion of "medi-
cal suitability." See, &g., RENEE C. Fox & JuDrH P. SwAZEY, Tim COURAGE TO FAIL: A
SOCIAL VIEW OF ORGAN TRANsPLANrs Am DALYsms 236-37 (2d ed. 1978) (suitability criteria
included such interpretively-loaded social factors such as whether the patient would take an
active role in self-care, his or her potential for rehabilitation, and his or her ability to deal with
stress); TAsK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV-
ICEs, ORGAN TRANsPLATION 90 (April 1986) [hereinafter ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION]
("Another controversial criterion for selecting organ transplant recipients is whether the patient
has a social network of support"); Mehlman, supra note 20, at 267-68. Perhaps James Childress
best articulated the situation:
Thus, in general, selection for dialysis and transplantation has not so much been preju-
dicial against the socially disadvantaged as prejudiced in favor of those persons who
have, in the eyes of those responsible for triage, certain attributes of "survival value"
and who coincidentally exhibit the "social values" which lead to controversy.
Childress, Who Shall Live?, supra note 113, at 155.
163. "Social worth" was a central criterion for decisions about who would be given access to
kidney dialysis in some programs. 29% of the centers definitely excluded patients with "poor
family environment, 21% indigency, 20% poor employment record." See Fox & SwAZEY, supra
note 162, at 230 tbl. 5. Further, "'marital status', 'net worth', 'occupation', and 'past perform-
ance and future potential' were the types of social worth criteria that the committee member
avowedly considered." Id. at 232.
An even more vivid sense of the role of social worth criteria in these life and death decisions
comes from the recollections of one board member who made such decisions.
"The choices were hard," Mr. N, a lay member of the committee told us, "and I wasn't
happy about some of the decisions I made. For example, I remember voting against a
young woman who was a known prostitute. I found I couldn't vote for her, rather than
another candidate, a young wife and mother who had proved her responsibility and
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That attacking any such criteria is easy should hardly be surpris-
ing. It is not the subjectivity alone, because rationing decisions under
triage-like conditions of near chaos will invariably involve subjectivity.
Rather, the problem is the topic that is the object of this subjectivity.
Human worth is as central to our lives as it is personal. Most of our
lives are constant struggles for assurance of that worth. Not surpris-
ingly, then, we tend to find worth in those who appear to value what
we do. It validates us. We are fascinated with the lifestyles of the rich
and famous, but we do not approve. When deciding who would
receive dialysig, medical boards tend to choose people like them.
16 4
Perhaps it is even more than the validation factor. The boards under-
stand these people and share their stories. They could empathize with
them, feeling their fear and need.
Similarly, public defenders tend to find worth in those sharing the
values of their own ethnicity, class, or gender. 161 It is not that the
clients must be from the same gender, ethnic group, or class. That
might happen, but it is less important than the congruence of their
(superficial) value structure. Neatly dressed, articulate, intelligent,
humorous clients will be given priority. Sullen, withdrawn, inarticu-
late ones will not. The educated, middle-class values the former, not
the latter. More importantly, they understand the story and the
worth. I also voted against a young man who had been a ne'er-do-well, a real playboy,
until he learned he had renal failure. He promised he would reform his character, go
back to school, and so on, if only he were selected for treatment. But I felt I'd lived
long enough to know that a person like that won't really do what he was promising at
the time."
IL; see also Kalb & Miller, supra note 115, at 2389 ("such social considerations as quality of life,
family preferences, and potential contribution to family and society were all important factors in
physician treatment decisions").
164. Thus in making decisions about who would be given dialysis the committee tended to
choose people like them, the upper middle class. See Fox & SWAZEY, supra note 162, at 230-31.
Tihose making microallocation decisions have a strong tendency to prefer patients
with whom they identify; if the decision-makers are well-educated and well-to-do pro-
fessionals, an allocation system in which the patient's social worth were a factor would
be likely to prefer patients with high socio-economic status. Minority groups and the
underprivileged might be underrepresented.
Mehlman, supra note 20, at 258 (footnote omitted); see also Kelli D. Back, Rationing Health
Care: Naturally Unjust?, 12 HAMLNE J PUB. L. & Pot. 245,249 (1991) (noting that those mak-
ing rationing decisions. "tend to patients with whom they can identify"); cf. PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR MEDICAL INTENSIVE CARE, SECUR-
m ACCESS To HEALTH CARE: THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILA-
BILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES 306 (1983) [hereinafter SECURiNG ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE]
(Doctors consciously or unconsciously are influenced by their affinity, or lack thereof, with a
patient, including whether the doctor and patient are of the same socio-economic class).
165. Ogletree, supra note 9, at 1284 ("Finding similarity between oneself and another cer-
tainly makes it easier to empathize.").
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humanity of the former. Under the stereotyping forces of brief
encounters in the criminal process, the authenticity of differing lives is
lost.
Again, attacking a social-worth standard is easy. It so obviously
shouts political incorrectness, plainly presenting a mechanism geared
to infuse bias and devalue difference.
The problem is that the notion of worth is so powerful. People
constantly make decisions on just such a basis. Although none of the
defenders this author recently interviewed mentioned this, it is appar-
ent, through discussions with public defenders over the past twenty
years and through this author's own observations, that the notion of
worth is among the primary bases upon which the decision to fight is
made. After all, if one likes someone and can relate to them, it is
natural to be their advocate. Furthermore, these personal qualities
become intertwined with factors seemingly relevant'to the defense:166
the person is cooperative; they can explain their story to you; they can
help in their defense (find witnesses and documents); they understand
what the attorney is telling them and can act on it. But, as the song
goes, it ain't necessarily so.
Last year this author and a team of students represented a man
accused of two assaults. He was physically powerful, minimally edu-
cated, and black. The students were slight, white, and educated. The
prosecution offered what seemed to be a good deal and things looked
bad in the police reports. The students wanted to have the client take
the deal and were annoyed at his resistance. In discussions, they
clearly thought he was a violent thug who was lucky to get the deal.
The client in turn was angry and kept telling the students that they
"weren't on his side." He was right. They had hardly even investi-
gated. When they did, the prosecution's case fell apart. More impor-
tantly, as they got to know the client, they found him to be a man of
great integrity and decency who was trying his best in the violent
166. A similar complexity arises in medicine where certain aspects of what may be seen as
"social worth" factors are also rationally related to likelihood of medical success.
In the future, decisions must be made concerning which patients will maximally
and optimally benefit from expensive health care technology, yet a watchful person
must focus on such decisions to ensure that "social worth" will not be the criterion of
final determination. The problem, however, is that, in many respects, social and medi-
cal criteria are inextricably intertwined. People of low socioeconomic status are likely
to be in poorer health with multiple disease conditions, which, in part, reflects poor
nutritional habits, detrimental lifestyle, and the historical lack of resources to obtain
proper health care.
Roger W. Evans, Health Care Technology and the Inevitability of Resource Allocation and
Rationing Decisions (Part I1), 249 JAMA 2208, 2217 (April 22, 1983).
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world in which he lived. Without an articulated set of criteria for
triage, however, the rapid, subjective takes on social worth that inevi-
tably occur in the chaos of the lower criminal courts will significantly
dictate allocation of scarce resources.
ii. "Heal" the greatest number possible:
a. Focus on those with the greatest chance for "suc-
cess" :167 The second sense of battlefield triage concentrates on those
most likely to benefit (rather than those who are worst off). 168 Again,
we encounter definitional problems. 69 What is "success" in this
cohtext? The most obvious definition in the criminal context is "win-
ning." The definition of winning, however, is less obvious. To one
outside the system, an acquittal or a successful determinative motion
is winning. The prosecution ends up with zero. To one inside this
system, however, winning a particular suppression motion may be all
but pro forma, while avoiding jail time for a certain client may be a
victory just short of a miracle. In other words, to the defender, win-
ning is contextually relative. 170 One could set up triage to give prior-
ity to those cases with the greatest chance of the prosecutor winding
167. Winslow characterizes this utilitarian standby as "the medical success principle." WIN -
LOW, supra note 14, at 63. Technically this principle is articulated as priority given to those for
whom treatment has the highest probability of medical success. Id. at 63-70.
168. Cf. Mehlman, supra note 20, at 266 ("The health care professional then must establish a
system of patient priorities, which entails a number of hard choices. It is difficult to determine,
for example, whether the potential resource should be provided first to the worst-off case, [or] to
the patient likely to benefit the most from it .. ").
169. Without intending to take the definitional problem to extreme, legitimate questions
nevertheless remain. When talking about those clients most likely to benefit, do we mean those
most likely to benefit, or those who if they do benefit, though they may be less likely than some
others, will experience the greatest increment of gain? How do you compare a client with a one
out of one hundred chance of success, but if successful it will change his or her whole life, with
someone with a one out of two chance who will only be marginally benefitted? Do we discount
the magnitude of benefit by the chance of success? Perhaps this is only a problem if "benefits"
include subjective factors about the defendant's life as opposed to just immediate case outcomes.
170. Thus, for example, the authors of the ABA Standards for the Administration of Justice
state:
Several experienced defense counsel, including those with long service in the role
of public defender, have emphasized that a defense lawyer who feels he must "win"-
Le. gain an acquittal-to secure satisfaction from his work is doomed to disappoint-
ment. Since he cannot "win" often, he must accept a set of values in which his profes-
sional satisfaction lies in mitigating the impact of the charge on his client and making
sure his case is fairly heard.
PROSECUtMN FuNCTION, supra note 22, at 144; see also worden, supra note 53, at 410 ("More
generally, these measures tend to presume that the quality of counsel rests largely in the ability
to get clients off-through acquittal or lenient sentencing-but a broader view of advocacy
embraces activities designed to preserve or establish a place for clients in their communities.").
1268
REDEFINING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
up with zero. That has a nice aesthetic ring to it, but what else recom-
mends it? Imagine two cases. In one case, the prosecution seeks a
sentence of a year in jail for communicating with a minor for immoral
purposes. In a second case, the prosecution is willing to continue
without findings for four months and then dismiss if a minor found
with a can of beer stays clean for that period of time. The first case
cannot be won at trial, but with focus the defender has a realistic
chance of keeping the client out of jail. The second can be won in a
jury trial. It is difficult to accept as an ethical system one that chooses
the second case over the first. The definition of winning of course can
be broadened to account for the contextual relativity of real practice.
This, however, does not get one out of the woods. As the previous
example indicates, there will be a variety of cases under this broad-
ened banner of winnability, and one must set priorities among them.
Clearly, one needs a different principle than winning to rank within
that group.
Also, focusing on winning may not lead to the best allocation of
focus. This is the same problem we faced when trying to use the insti-
tutional outcomes of acquittal, dismissal, or low sentence to guide
triage. 171 Many winnable cases do not require focus. A quick read of
the police reports may well reveal insufficient evidence or a dead-bang
suppression motion. In addition, the defender may know from experi-
ence that eventually, when the prosecutor has time to really review
the case, she will dismiss.1 72
Finally, if one focuses on winning, one inevitably makes social
judgments about a client's worth. How will she appear to a judge or
171. See supra part mI.A.2.a.
172. The likelihood that this may happen is in part a function of the particular office's charg-
ing policy. As Feeney and Jackson recognize, different prosecution offices have very different
charging policies and philosophies. Feeney & Jackson, supra note 25, at 379. Borrowing from
the work of JOAN JACOBY, U.S. DEPr. OF JusTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, BASIC
ISSUES IN PROSECUrION AND PUBLIC DEFENDER PERFORMANCE 24-32 (1982), the author distin-
guishes six kinds of prosecutorial policies:
(1) a transfer policy (no screening; police simply transfer cases to the prosecutor); (2) a
unit policy (highly decentralized; individual assistant prosecutors make decisions with-
out organizational guidance); (3) a legal sufficiency policy (charges are filed if the ele-
ments of a crime are present); (4) a system efficiency policy (charges are filed if the
elements of a crime are present without any obvious problems, emphasizes early dispo-
sitions and continuous docket movement); (5) trial sufficiency policy (charges are only
filed if conviction at trial is very likely); and (6) a defendant rehabilitation policy (cases
are prosecuted only if a defendant has been found unsuited for rehabilitation or
treatment).
Thus, the possibility that the prosecution would routinely dismiss cases once they have time to
review the file is significant if they employ the first or second policy, and extremely unlikely if
they use the fourth or fifth.
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jury? Will the probation officer writing the sentencing report see the
client as sincere? In other words, who the client is and how she
presents herself will have a significant impact on the outcome. There-
fore, triage based on likelihood of success, in the sense of winning,
requires up-front assessment of (at least how others perceive) a cli-
ent's social worth.
One may then wish to define "success" differently. Analogous to
success in medical triage, one could look beyond winning and concern
oneself with the "patient" not only "surviving," but leading a healthy,
fulfilling life.'73 In the legal context, this principle of triage will be
problematic as well. Is the defender to make on-the-spot decisions
about the likelihood that the client, though gaining a successful out-
come in this case, will be a recidivist and therefore not "successful"?
Additionally, the defender must be able to make social judgments
both about the individual client's capacity for a fulfilling life and a
usable concept for what constitutes such a life. Putting aside the
recurrent problems of personal, gender, race, and class bias, this does
not seem a task most of us were trained for in law school.
b. Use the three traditional triage categories: Traditional
medical triage divides patients into three categories: hopeless, seri-
ous, and minor. 74 Those who will die regardless of care are left to
their fate. Those'who can survive without medical care are left until
there is time. Those who are serious, but can survive with reasonable
care are attended to first. How to apply this three-part model in the
nonmedical world of the lower criminal courts, however, is somewhat
unclear.
Translating the concept of a "hopeless" medical case to the arena
of the criminal courts, one can imagine a case in which no matter how
great the effort of the defender, nothing about the outcome can be
changed. The problem with this approach, however, is that, although
there are certainly cases that turn out this way, the outcome is not
obvious at first view of the case, the very time when a triage decision
173. Medical rationing programs have at times considered the likelihood of the patient lead-
ing a subsequently healthy life when assessing the likely "success" of a medical procedure. See
ORGAN TRANSPLAWTATION, supra note 162, at 87 ("allocate organs to the recipient who will live
the longest with the highest quality of life"). For a good discussion considering the "quality of
life" and the importation of social bias, see WINsLow, supra note 14, at 65-67.
174. See definition of triage, supra note 38; WrNSLOW, supra note 14, at 1.
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must be made. This is the whole point of focus.175 With focus, cases
initially seeming hopeless often yield good results (especially in the
contextually relative sense of winning already discussed).
Distinguishing "minor" from "serious"176 is likewise not as obvi-
ous as one might suppose. What makes a misdemeanor charge serious
or not? To be sure, there is the criminal label of misdemeanant, but
all defendants will share this label if convicted. Perhaps, however, one
could argue that this label is less serious for a recidivist than a first-
timer, and less serious for a major than a minor recidivist. After all,
the major recidivist already carries the stigma.177 This analysis is not
without problems. The recidivist's prior record could be a function of
social inequity. She might live in a neighborhood where young people
get taken to jail for doing the same thing for which young people in
other neighborhoods receive a warning from police and a ride home
to their parents.178 Or, perhaps the defender in the prior case pushed
the defendant to take a deal. If the defendant took it, she got out of
175. Every practicing defense attorney has had the experience of thinking a case is a dead-
bang loser upon first review, but then upon further thought, and perhaps further research and
investigation, finds the case quite defensible.
Other lawyers did not rely entirely upon personal ethical sentiments but, in addi-
tion, asserted an almost mystic faith in the fairness and accuracy of the trial process.
These lawyers denied that their refusal to permit assertedly innocent clients to plead
guilty could ever be harmful. "An attorney never knows that he doesn't have a
prayer," said San Francisco defense attorney William Ferdon. "I've seen it happen too
many times. The jury says, 'There is a lot of evidence against this defendant, but we
don't believe it.' Somehow the jurors sense the truth." Added Boston's Irene Bennett,
"There may be no objective ground for optimism at the beginning, but I've won many
apparently hopeless cases. The evidence only looks open and shut."
Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1282.
176. The defense bar does seem to maintain some community-sense of what is "serious."
97% of defenders responding to a survey believed some cases were more important to win than
others. 85% rated the seriousness of the offense most important; 59% thought the defendant's
prior record was very important. Feelings about opposing counsel were a relatively unimportant
factor. See Lichtenstein, supra note 53, at 104-05.
177. On the other hand one can make a plausible argument that a long record makes the
criminal label worse because it will be seen as not representing "a single mistake-a moment of
bad judgment," but rather the essential character of the individual. This is complex because it is,
from my experience, a function of the constituency who is making the assessment. Defendants
with longer records generally respond to the label attending the new crime far less seriously than
a first-time offender ("I just can't have this on my record!"). The wider society however may
well view it differently than the recidivist defendant. Which constituency then defines "serious-
ness" in this context? I opt for the defendant's perspective for two reasons. Primarily, my con-
cerns as an advocate align with my client's interests. Second, there is something patronizing
about discounting the client's perception of seriousness under the rationale, "You don't think
this is a big deal, but I know better, I know how others-middle-class others-see this."
178. See, eg., Gaynes, supra note 140, at 624.
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jail and back onto the streets without doing more time. The defend-
ant did not have a support system telling her to fight because a convic-
tion will limit her future options. Or, maybe she would not have a
record if the defender had brought focus to the prior case. In that
instance, the defendant would be denied focus now merely because it
happened that she had not received it in the past.
Concentrating upon the precise crime initially seems more prom-
ising. For example, any sex crime convictions could have serious con-
sequences for a defendant's personal and work lives. This was a factor
for one defender in assessing the seriousness of a particular case:
He's charged with indecent exposure and communication with a
minor for immoral purposes, the allegation being that he was mas-
turbating in front of a young child and then asked the child if she
wanted to touch it. So... the allegation comes close to being a
felony allegation. The prosecutor, no doubt, will be asking for a
year in jail on each of the counts. 7 9
But beyond this most socially unpopular of charges, things get
complex. Is it worse for a person in this society to be convicted of
theft, driving while intoxicated ("DWI"), or misdemeanor possession
of marijuana? This question is difficult to answer in the abstract. It
probably depends on where one lives, what one's family is like, and
what job one seeks. If one wants a job as a retail cashier, theft will kill
you, marijuana hurts, and DWI is probably not a problem unless the
employer infers you have an alcohol problem. On the other hand, if
you seek a job as a bulldozer operator, DWI will kill you, marijuana
hurts, and theft is less of a problem.
As another approach for assessing "seriousness" as a criterion for
triage, one could look beyond the crime and the penalty, and concen-
trate upon the effect conviction will have on the defendant's life. This
is certainly a normal way for one to think about the seriousness of a
conviction. While little doubt exists that in actual practice this factor
affects everyone, it is obviously extremely problematic. Again,
problems stem from identifying with clients whose stories reflect val-
ues similar to ours. For a white, middle-class defender, the plight of a
white male (or any race, really) college senior who has been accepted
to medical school and who was caught shoplifting as part of a frater-
nity scavenger hunt will likely seem far more poignant than an unem-
ployed man of color with a modest criminal record who left high
179. Public Defender Interview, supra note 8. Although as one can tell from the quote, it is
clear the defender's concern was not only with the criminal label but the possible penalty as well.
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school as a junior and now faces the same charge. It is all but impossi-
ble for that attorney to unpack the amalgamation of cultural assump-
tions-each "true" from his own cultural perspective' 80-that
circumscribe his perception of the two defendants: The college
defendant is facing a true crisis; all his hard work is in jeopardy; he
may not get to be a doctor; he won't get to do important work; he's
not a criminal; this was a case of bad judgment, not criminality; this
was a prank, not a crime. The young man of color does not face much;
he'll only get a few days (probably time served at that); he's not going
to lose his job; he's not "going to med school" so this conviction will
not affect his future; he got caught stealing; he was not going to do
anything particularly significant with his life anyway; all he wants is to
get it over with and not do much time; he's already got a record, so
another minor charge adds nothing. Once we permit our inquiry to go
beyond the case to the individual defendant in order to decide serious-
ness, how else could it be?
Looking at punishment offers an alternative for distinguishing
"serious" from "minor" that does not require inquiry into the individ-
ual. Realistically, the punishment a defendant actually faces (as
opposed to maximum exposure in the statute) reflects something that
corresponds to our common notion of a serious case. Not surprisingly,
the defenders I interviewed felt similarly.
One characteristic would be, how much jail time they want. Obvi-
ously if the prosecutor is offering a slap on the wrist and a dismissal
at the end of a year, and your client feels he can comply with the
conditions to obtain that dismissal, there is going to be less incentive
to fight like crazy on that case than there is on a case where they
want significant jail time, or a significant amount of restitution.1 81
180. Seemingly-neutral events or circumstances can be interpreted from multiple and differ-
ing perspectives, each "true" from the basis of the perceiver's cultural assumptions. See, ag.,
Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword Telling Stories, 87 MHic. L. REv. 2073, 2082 (1989):
Stories may diverge, then, not because one is true and another false, but rather
because they are both self-believed descriptions coming from different points of view
informed by different background assumptions about how to make sense of events. In
law, the adoption of some stories rather than others, the acceptance of some accounts
as fact and others as falsehood, cannot ever be the result of matching evidence against
the real world to figure out which story is true.
See also Patricia Williams, The Obliging ShelL An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity,
87 MIcH. L. REv. 2128 (1989) (describing the world as complex and filled with multi-variant
voices).
181. Public Defender Interview, supra note 8.
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Punishment in the lower courts is generally very light with little
jail time."s Infrequently will a first time offender spend even one
night in jail. Still, judges have been known to hand out sentences
between six months and one year. Also, some crimes carry mandatory
minimum jail sentences, and for some defendants collateral conse-
quences, such as deportation,"s can follow. The conceptual problems
arise when one thinks about how to factor in recidivism. Naturally the
risk of a stiff sentence in a misdemeanor case is greatest for recidivists.
But are these the people to whom we want to allocate our scarce
resource of focus? After all, the dilemma they face is their "fault," so
why should they get first crack at scarce resources? 1"
One response to this is that, as we've already seen, recidivism
may not always be the defendant's "fault" in the sense that we feel
justified in denying her a crack at the scarce resource of focus. Analo-
gous arguments have been raised opposing those who would deny
scarce medical resources to those who smoke and get cancer or drink
and destroy their lives.s However, I would find it problematic if
recidivism was directly equated with the "serious punishment" basis
for triage so that the longer one's record, the higher one's priority for
182. See supra note 137.
183. Aliens who commit crimes of moral turpitude or are convicted of a crime relating to a
controlled substance (other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of thirty
grams or less of marijuana) are deportable. See U.S.C. § 1251 (1988). Likewise, an asylum claim
can be denied if the alien has been convicted of a "particularly serious crime" while in the
United States. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1); Arauz v. Rivkind, 845 F.2d 271 (11th Cir. 1988)
(stating possession with intent to distribute marijuana is a "particularly serious crime")..
184. Other commentators have raised positions in favor of denying scarce medical resources
to those thought responsible for their health problems (principally smokers, drinkers, and drug
users). See, eg., Branson, supra note 115, at 635 ("Nevertheless, those who develop health needs
because they voluntarily engage in activities clearly detrimental to health, such as heavy drinking
or smoking or recreational stunt flying, ought to contribute more than others to the cost of their
restoration to an equal level of health."); Alvin H. Moss, M.D. & Mark Siegler, M.D., Should
Alcoholics Compete Equally for Liver Transplantation?, 265 JAMA 1295 (Mar. 13, 1991).
185. See e.g., Norman Daniels, Health Care Needs and Distributive Justice, 10 PHILt & Pun.
Aio. J. 146, 174 (1981):
Should smokers be forced to pay higher insurance premiums or special health-care
taxes? I do not believe my account forces us to ignore the source of health-care risks in
assigning such burdens. But at this point little more can be said because much here
depends on very specific details of social history. In the United States, government
subsidies of the tobacco industry, the legality of cigarette advertising, the legality of
smoking in public places, and special subculture pressures on key groups (for example,
teenagers) all undermine the view that we have clear-cut cases of informed, individual
decision-making for which individuals must be held fully accountable.
See also ELSaR, supra note 103, at 126-27 (explaining why "moral hazard" theory does not
apply to health care situation); cf. id. at 240 (explaining unfairness of holding certain large
groups responsible for their actions).
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the scarce resource. First, to argue, as I did when discussing the seri-
ousness of the criminal label, that recidivism should not preclude
someone from this resource (on the ground that the label is not that
serious for the recidivist) is different from putting prior wrongdoers
(many of whom are at "fault") at the head of the line for the scarce
resource.1 86 Second, while this Article previously rejected the notion
that a good defense does societal harm by making criminals think they
can get away with a crime, a case can be made that the result might be
different if focus was provided in direct proportion to recidivism. It is
hard to believe that alcoholics will feel free to continue their bodily
abuse just because they know someday they can get a liver trans-
plant. 87 Street criminals may, however, behave differently. If they
knew that their very criminality insured top quality and, quite likely,
successful representation if they were caught, I believe they would be
somewhat encouraged.
In fact, all this concern is somewhat hypothetical. Recidivism,
though surely relevant in some cases, does not bear a one-to-one rela-
tionship with sentencing seriousness. The issue is far more complex.
A long traffic record will not have much effect on a shoplifting convic-
tion, while a single prior assault will weigh heavily in a current assault
case. A domestic violence case leading to hospitalization of the vic-
tim, in which the offender has no prior criminal record, will confront
the defendant with far stiffer penalties than a defendant with a signifi-
cant criminal record who has violated some criminal noise ordinance
with his boombox. In the balance, because punishment comports with
our intuitive sense of seriousness and because it avoids the social-
186. An analogous concern has been raised in the medical field. See supra notes 184, 185.
In Medicare Program; Criteria for Medicare Coverage of Adult Liver Transplants, 55 Fed. Reg.
8545, 8547 (1990), this issue is confronted:
The decision to include Medicare coverage of transplants for individuals with alcoholic
cirrhosis may be considered controversial by some, and we invite public comment on
it.... [W]e would require that the patient meet the hospital's requirement for absti-
nence and have documented evidence of sufficient social support important to assure
both recovery from alcoholism and compliance with immunosuppressive therapy.
In other words, the alcoholic may have sinned in the past but must now go cold turkey.
187. ELSTER, supra note 103, at 126:
It is not clear, however, that these are true cases of moral hazard. The probability that
a heavy smoker will one day need and get a heart transplant is so small even under the
present, nondiscriminating system that a further reduction based on discrimination
against smokers would hardly have much motivating power. The incentives may be so
weak that even rational individuals would not be swayed by them. Even if I knew that
I would not be treated for cancer of the pancreas if the cause could be shown to be
excessive intakes of coffee, the chances of getting the illness and being successfully
treated for it are so small, and the importance of coffee in my life so large, that I would
be willing (rationally, I believe) to take the risk. If one wants to modify behavior, a
higher tax on cigarettes is probably vastly more efficient.
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worth dilemma, sentence-seriousness must be added to systems-pro-
tection as categories of cases for focus.
c. The problem of innocence: One might suggest that
innocence constitutes a particular category of "seriousness" that
should be given priority for our scarce resource. In doing so, one must
examine both legal and factual innocence" and consider whether
they compel different moral claims to our scarce resource. Factual
innocence comports with the public sense of what it means to be inno-
cent. 189 Legal innocence refers to the procedural inability of the pros-
ecution to carry its burden of proving factual guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Of the two, factual innocence has the strongest
moral claim for our scarce resource. While the factually innocent
accused may not be totally pure and blameless in a broader frame (we
all have been blamed for getting ourselves in the situation),"9 within
the framework of the criminal process, she is. Legal innocence's claim
to focus, on the other hand, really rests not on seriousness, but on the
system-protecting grounds discussed in Part III.A.L.b. Such a person
may well be at fault and, in fact, factually guilty.
Deciding to put the factually innocent among the priority triage
categories, however, is far from simple. Even if one places the situa-
tion of one who is guilty of a lesser included offense but innocent of
the greater offense into the categories of "system-protecting" or
"charge/sentence seriousness," and not factual innocence, one still has
problems with the concept of factual innocence. It is clear what fac-
tual innocence means when discussing a theft crime. The defendant
did not take the item, took it by accident, or thought it was hers. Mis-
identification as a defense to an assault or DWI is the same. But what
about a self-defense claim to assault, or a defense that even though
defendant had four beers she was not under the influence? In other
words, verdicts turning on the "reasonableness" of behavior are not
188. For an exposition on the difference between "legal" and "factual" guilt, see Mitchell,
supra note 17, at 296 n.12; see also PROSECUTIoN FUNctiON, supra note 22, at 227 ("The lawyer's
duty is to determine, from knowledge of all the facts and applicable law, whether the prosecution
can establish guilt in law, not in some moral sense.").
189. Even though a defendant who claims innocence may nevertheless plead guilty through
what is known as an Alford plea, some public defense offices and private attorneys would not let
their clients enter such a plea if they maintained their (factual) innocence. North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); see Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1299-1300.
190. For example, under the criminal law, it is "generally recognized that a defendant can
lose [the defense of duress] by his own fault in getting into the difficulty." WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
Austin W. Scorr, J., CRUMNAL LAw § 5.3, at 437 (2d ed. 1986).
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really deciding questions of fact 91 (assuming the jury believes the
defendant's story). Nevertheless, these variations may all be lumped
under factual innocence. Our system treats them this way and it
would be intuitively strange to treat a defendant accused of assault
who acted in self-defense differently than-a factually innocent defend-
ant charged with theft.
That settled, there are still epistemological and practical difficul-
ties. How, realistically, in the short encounters with the minimal
information provided, do defenders determine innocence? The
answer may be that a defender sees so many cases that the "pattern"
of a factually innocent defendant will quickly emerge. Also, acknowl-
edging all the risks of bias already discussed, one does get a sense of
people and their credibility when one sees so many witnesses and
defendants. Of course, this mass experience may have the opposite
effect of creating powerful stereotyping that interferes with the attor-
ney's ability to see the true person.
The practical problem, in turn, is analogous to the one criminal
defense attorneys would face if they did not have ethical rules permit-
ting them to represent the factually guilty. Without such rules,
defendants might avoid candor-even if they are factually innocent-
for fear the attorney would adjudge them guilty and refuse represen-
tation.1' In our case, the attorney would represent the factually
guilty but perhaps-depending on other facts such as "seriousness"
and system-protecting issues involved-not fight as hard, or in other
words, not use focus. Thus, a concern about client candor would like-
wise arise since almost every client would want her attorney to fight
hard and might hesitate to provide any information that would indi-
cate other than factual innocence.
On the other hand, we are not talking about the guarantee of
universal representation under the Sixth Amendment. Instead, we are
talking about a scarce resource that cannot be made available to all
defendants. Given that, why not at least provide it to the factually
innocent, the very population who represent the primary concern of
the criminal justice system?193 Even as a strictly utilitarian principle,
191. See, eg., Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1281 (distinguishing "legal" defenses such as self-
defense from others in terms of "defenses that turn[ ] upon the application of vague legal stan-
dards to undisputed facts and those that turn[ ] upon clear-cut factual disputes").
192. For a discussion of this concept, see Mitchell, supra note 17, at 299 n.14(4).
193. Concern for the factually innocent lies at the center of our criminal justice system.
"[G]uilt beyond a reasonable doubt represents... a standard that seeks to come as close to
certainty as human knowledge allows-one that refuses to take a deliberate risk of punishing
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it is important to the credibility and support of our system that citizens
believe innocents will not be convicted. Moreover, even given the
clear risk of bias in the selection process, it intuitively seems wrong to
deny priority to those one believes are factually innocent. Thus, pro-
tection of the factually innocent must be added to sentence-serious-
ness and system-protection as categories of cases to receive focus.
B. THOSE WITH THE GREATEST "NEED2 1 9 4
In contrast to concentrating on those who have the best chance of
a favorable outcome ("success") with access to the scarce resources,
this section applies egalitarian concerns and concentrates on those
who are worse off. In context, "worse off" seems most equatable with
those in the most "serious" predicament. Alternative definitions of
"worse off" are certainly possible, but upon examination none are
equally satisfactory to equating magnitude of need to "seriousness."
For example, we could allocate our scarce resource of focus to those
lowest on the social-economic ladder or even below reach of its first
rung. Because we start with an indigent population, however, our
pool is likely to be too large to be useful. Also, it is not clear why such
misfortune should constitute a moral basis for a priority claim in
triage, unless perhaps where the client's situation is the result of some
social injustice. In such a case, priority in allocation constitutes some
rough form of compensation. However, how one is to make this pred-
icate determination in the brief initial attorney-client interactions in
lower court is unclear.
Moreover, depending on the political framework employed for
this analysis, attorneys must view most of their impoverished clients as
victims of an exploitive society, thus again providing too large a pool.
Narrowing the inquiry to those whose current predicament in the
criminal system is significantly traceable to such social injustice does
not aid the analysis. Poverty and crime strongly correlate. Because
one can employ a political framework that views much poverty in
any innocent man." Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World
of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371, 388 (1970). "Since some error is inevitable, the common
law adversary system deliberately chooses to err on the side of risking acquittal of some who are
guilty in order to make near certain that no innocent person will suffer conviction." PROSECU-
TION FuNCnON, supra note 22, at 3; see also In re W'mship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1972) (proof
beyond reasonable doubt applies to both criminal and juvenile delinquency proceedings). But
see Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) (implying that proof of actual innocence may not be
sufficient to obtain habeas corpus relief from the death penalty).
194. For a discussion of the egalitarian principle that "priority be given to the medically
neediest," see WiNsLow, supra note 14, at 92-95.
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industrial society as the product of social injustice, we once more are
left with a pool encompassing nearly all the potential recipients of
focus. To be sure, there are those who would not accept such a polit-
ical framework or only accept a significantly-diluted or far less encom-
passing embodiment of such ideas. Consequently, however, a fatal
problem remains, even putting aside the all but insurmountable prob-
lem of both obtaining information and then making this complex
assessment in the course of a brief interview conducted in the chaos of
lower court practice. This basis for rationing would permit a system of
triage where decisions would vary depending on the particular attor-
ney's political philosophy. That is a system no one could accept.
Finally, though superficially appealing, if one defines "neediest"
or "worse off" in terms of the consequences a criminal charge and its
aftermath may have on a particular person's whole life (for example,
destruction of a career opportunity, or leaving small children without
their primary caretaker for months), one confronts the same problems
that we've already discussed when similarly defining "success" in
terms of the defendant's whole life.195 This leaves us with "serious-
ness" as our guide. The previous analysis of "seriousness" thus covers
most of the definitional, policy, and practical dimensions involved in
using need as a guidepost.
A focus on those worse off, however, demands some discussion of
the utilitarian principle of "conservation." The principle of conserva-
tion requires that society allocate scarce resources to those who need
proportionately less of the resource. This principle is more of a modi-
fier of other principles than one of independent justifying power. In
other words, not allowing a few people to use up all the resources will
always be a limiting principle in any system allocating scarce
resources. As Professor Tremblay recognized in the civil legal-aid
context, legal resources are such that a few or even a single client
could tie up the resources of a small office if every imaginable step
were taken to the most complete and complex level. 96 My experience
in practice and clinical supervision confirms this. It seems almost a
principle of legal physics that a case takes up exactly as much time as
195. See supra part HI.A.2.b.ii.a.
196. See Tremblay, supra note 15, at 1115; see also Ogletree, supra note 9, at 1279 & n.164
("the character of the demand for legal services creates a situation in which the demand always
rises to meet the supply"); cf Scarce Resources in Health Care, supra note 38, at 266 ("All that is
known for certain is that an advanced form of Parkinson's law operates. It appears that to
whatever extent health care facilities are expanded they will generally still all be used; and at the
same time there will remain a steady pool of 'unmet' demands.").
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you have available to devote to it plus one extra day that you wish you
had.
However, applying the principle of conservation to the scarce
resource of focus is a bit complex. Focus at the moment one allocates
in triage is really just a commitment to use mental resources. It is
therefore not like the decision to dole out some scarce medication or a
kidney transplant. Though committed at the moment of triage, the
resource may never be used. Much will depend on the prosecutor's
response. The very commitmentto focus on a case, communicated on
whatever level transpires between those who regularly work together,
may in fact lead to a decision not to prosecute. On the other hand, the
prosecution may be determined to go to trial in which case our judicial
system could require large quantities of focus. This leads to an ethical
and institutional modifier on the principle of conservation-that is,
the duty not to abandon a client. Once you start representing some-
one with focus, you do not drop back to a lesser, but still Sixth
Amendment comporting level of representation, either because the
client's case is taking too much focus, or because a better client, in the
sense of conservation, walks in the door. The medical ethic preclud-
ing abandonment would seem to apply equally to lawyers. 197  An
197. Under the doctrine of abandonment, "once a physician has begun to treat a patient, the
physician cannot terminate the relationship without the patient's consent and without being cer-
tain that the patient has a reasonable opportunity to continue being adequately cared for by
another physician .... [This doctrine] reveals a moral concern for the preservation of trust
relationships." WiNsLOW, supra note 14, at 75; cf. Childress, Rationing of Medical Treatment,
supra note 113, at 1418 ("Furthermore, practically all institutions used one form of the 'first
come, first treated' rule, for they did not drop patients from dialysis or refuse a second or third
transplant merely because a superior patient in terms of social worth appeared."). For further
discussion on the ethical/legal principle of abandonment, see NEIL CHAET, LEGAL IMPLICA.
1IONS OF EMERGENCY CARE (1969); Charles Fried, Rights and Health Care-Beyond Equity and
Efficiency, 243 NEw ENG. J. MED. 241, 244 (1975).
Professor Tremblay struggles with the notion of abandonment in the course of performing
triage in the legal services context. Tremblay, supra note 15, at 1153-55. He analyzes the prob-
lem in a factual context similar to our criminal defense situation: existing clients will not sud-
denly be sent away, implicating a variety of ethical and legal liability issues, but rather "a
selected neglect or limitation of service for cases which are less urgent." Id. at 1153 & n.179,
1154; see MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 1.1, 13,1.16(d). Professor lemblay
then justifies possible abandonment on the grounds both that clients can be told from the start
that resources will need to be rationed and priorities may need to be arranged, and that an ABA
formal opinion exists indicating that in "extreme cases" it may be permissible for a legal aid
office to reprioritize resources. Tremblay, supra note 15, at 1154-55 (quoting ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 347 (1981)). Assuming "selected neglect or
limitation of services" still somehow comports with the Sixth Amendment, for the reasons
articulated in the text accompanying this footnote. I nevertheless take issue with Professor
'Temblay's position on abandonment, at least in the criminal arena with which I am most
familiar.
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attorney-client relationship, even between an institutional lawyer and
a state-subsidized client, is based on trust. Abandonment betrays this
fundamental bond.
Even if this concept of trust appears to be grounded on a narra-
tive of the mythical attorney with a single client, and thus has no
resonance with the realities of indigent defense where attorneys often
see their clients for less than ten minutes, the initial decision to allo-
cate focus changes this in a number of respects. Once attorneys bring
focus they have changed not only their approach to the case but as a
natural byproduct their relationship to the client and even the bound-
aries of their role. They much more assume the form of the cultural
archetype of the defense attorney. Further, once bringing focus, the
attorney changes the entire way the case is handled. Attorneys bring
motions with written points and authorities, judges set evidentiary
hearings, and both sides aggressively pursue creative discovery. The
entire case strategy is based upon the existence of continuing focus. If
an attorney decides to withdraw focus mid-representation, the client is
not put back to where he or she would have been had the initial triage
decision been made otherwise. The client may in fact be worse off
since she is now caught in limbo where the attorney has set in motion
a case strategy dependent on focus, possibly even raising the stakes as
the prosecution also becomes centered on the case. But the client is
suddenly without the very resource necessary for protection in this
intensified adversarial scenario. 98 Institutionally, moreover, aban-.
doning effort midway in the enterprise sends a message to the prose-
cution and courts that they are not to take seriously the attorney's
nonroutine, representationally-aggressive moves because the attorney
may not follow through. 199 This is not a message that an institutional
advocate wants to send and certainly does not benefit future clients
and system-protecting advocacy.
198. I am therefore rejecting the possibility of abandonment once one allocates focus
because of resulting harm to the client, not because of some notion of "breach of promise." In
this latter regard I do not imagine the need or desire to tell a client that she will be benefitted by
allocation of the scarce (and vague) resource of focus.
199. As should be clear, from my experience I believe "that a prosecutor will notice plainly
that you have abandoned focus, which will make this case even worse off than had you done
pattern from the beginning, and/or your future focus threats will be devalued." Correspondence
from Professor Paul Tremblay (Oct. 12, 1993) [hereinafter Tremblay Correspondence] (on file
with the author).
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C. THE QuEuE AND RANDOM SELECTION
One might wonder why we don't avoid all of the previous defini-
tional complexities and find refuge in the favorite of many egalitarian
philosophers, the queue or the lottery.2 °° Superficially, if one decides
who gets some scarce resources based on their place in line or the
number they draw in some lottery, one avoids the social bias inherent
in selections based upon the individual's value. First-come, first-
served also has other positive attributes. It shows intensity of interest
and the importance an individual attaches to receiving a certain
resource.20 1 One only need conjure images of young people camping
overnight on the sidewalks beside a ticket window to ensure that they
will get tickets for their favorite band's upcoming concert. Moreover,
we accept as fair that those ahead of us in line get their tickets before
us. Of course it may not really be so neutral and fair. Being first in
line may also show superior information, knowledge, and access. As
such, it may mask a process that is biased in favor of the more edu-
cated, connected, or mobile. 2  For that reason, some favor lotteries
over lines when allocating scarce resources.
However, this problem does not seem a serious one when allocat-
ing defender resources in the lower criminal courts. The judicial sys-
tem informs criminal defendants about their right to a public
defender. It is true that recidivists and the more knowledgeable about
the system may go to the defender's office prior to arraignment, but
this will not give them any real advantage. Waiting for focus is not
like waiting in line for the first available kidney. Rather, focus will
become available randomly in the form of "openings" in an individual
attorney's work cycle when the attorney has sufficient time resources
to allocate focus to a case. Clients on the other hand are involuntary
participants in the criminal process. That process has its own time
200. Queues or lotteries have been widely considered as mechanisms for equitable rationing
of scarce resources. See, eg., WINSLOW, supra note 14, at 98-101 ("[p]riority given to those who
arrive first"); id. at 101-05 ("[p]riority given to those selected by chance"); Childress, Rationing
of Medical Treatment, supra note 113, at 1417 ("If, on the other hand, 'hard' cases are the model
for the system, random choice, a lottery, or 'first come, first treated' may be preferred.").
201. See generally ELSTMR, supra note 103, at 74 (discussing advantages of queuing).
202. An analogous problem arises with the notion of attempting to distribute scarce medical
resources by a queuing system. "Those with sufficient means-wealth, power, information, con-
tacts, confidence to enter the system, and so forth-would clearly have the competitive advan-
tages." WINSLOW, supra note 14, at 146; cf Mechanic, supra note 104, at 66 (discussing "implicit
rationing" in medicine-the more knowledgeable, more aggressive, and more demanding
patients get more service; and these patients are usually the more educated, the more sophisti-
cated, and less needy).
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frames that it imposes on the client's case. In other words, the client
cannot say, "Oh, there's no focus available at this point; that's all
right, I'll just wait until some is available." Like a field hospital, one
must make the triage decision on the spot.
Therefore, if one is to use chance as the means for allocating
focus it will have to be through the mechanism of randomness. Ran-
domness, however, brings some real difficulties with it. Professor
Luban has addressed how society can allocate attorney resources in
the civil legal-aid context. Assessing queuing or random systems for
allocation of effort, he understandably finds it irrational that such a
system could give priority to scarce resources; for example, a dispute
about the repair of a dryer over a threatened sterilization. 2 3 Misde-
meanor cases do not generally offer such a moral chasm separating
the consequences of two cases. The statutory penalties and actual
consequences generally differ within only a relatively small range, yet
there are cases which realistically carry more or less serious punitive
consequences. Thus, although we have had assault cases in the clinic
where the prosecution was willing to agree to deferred findings with
eventual dismissal if the defendant enrolled in anger-management
counseling, we have also had assault cases where the prosecutor was
prepared to seek consecutive one-year terms if the defendant was con-
victed. Similarly, there are cases that reflect systematic inequities and
those in which the defendant is factually innocent. All of these are
cases which rationally deserve more attention than those not incorpo-
rating such features. However, a randomness system of triage would
only give them focus by chance.
More significantly, allocation by lottery does not really seem to fit
the type of resource that our concept of focus embodies. Focus is not
some tangible medical procedure or commodity; rather, it is a commit-
ment of mind and as such it is not always clear how much one has or
how much one will be using. Without concrete, case-specific criteria it
would be extremely difficult to know when a sufficient supply of focus
has emerged so as to be able to choose the winners of this lottery.
203. Professor Luban dramatically articulates this concept:
The effect of a lottery, or first-come-first-serve too, for that matter, is precisely to
break the link of legal aid with human projects and values. A woman faced with court-
sanctioned sterilization needs a lawyer fast, and more desperately than does her neigh-
bor who wants to make Montgomery Ward honor the warranty on her dryer, the lot-
tery, however, simply puts both their names in the hat. It disconnects their demands
for legal aid from their needs for legal aid, and thus abdicates the very judgment on
which the importance of legal aid rests.
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JusTIcE 309 (1988).
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D. THE MARKET PLACE
In an economic sense, each defense is a lost opportunity cost.
Whenever the system gives to one defendant, less is available for
another. Thus, the total pool of defender resources is a fixed com-
modity. Why not let individual defendants bid for focus?
The ethical basis for this is not without controversy, at least when
applied to lifesaving medical technologies. 2' Put simply, the argu-
ment is that if you acquire your wealth legitimately and don't spend it
to hurt anyone, you are ethically entitled to do with it as you please.2 5
The bidding alternative is interesting, setting aside "source" of wealth
problems2°6 with some defendants and the fact that one could say that
taking vital resources from another "hurts" them.2°7 Bidding certainly
avoids definitional problems or perhaps provides a metadefinition:
paying equals entitlement. Moreover, unlike with kidneys, we have
no problem with permitting the wealthiest to bid for focus. We call it
hiring the best private defense attorney money can buy. However, the
challenge is how to apply this in a public-defender Sixth-Amendment-
regime context.
Right at the start there is an obvious problem: those who go to
the public defender are indigent. They have no money; that's why
they haven't hired private attorneys. Of course, that's not strictly
true, because in order to qualify for defender services you don't need
to be literally penniless. Most indigent defendants have some money
204. Robert Nozick's book reposes as a statement of libertarian thought, including the right
to sell one's body parts. NozicK, supra note 115. He is not, however, without his critics. See,
e.g., ELSTER, supra note 103, at 230-36; Branson, supra note 115, at 632-33; G. A. Cohen, Are
Freedom and Equality Incompatible?, in ALTERNATIVES TO CAPrrAuSM 113, 117 (Jon Elster &
Karl Moene eds., 1989) (attacking Nozick by demonstrating the possibility, on Nozick's terms, of
uniting self-ownership of one's personal capacities with equality of worldly resources and corre-
sponding equality of conditions; in this regard, the author specifically questions Nozick's
assumption that at some point, far distant in time, all resources were ownerless, positing instead
mutual ownership).
205. Elster essentially characterizes Nozick's philosophy of distributive justice as a sophisti-
cated form of "finders-keepers.". ELSTmR, supra note 103, at 230. For Nozick, resources
obtained through a just original appropriation (justice in appropriation), distributed through a
chain of just (uncoerced) transfers (justice in transfer) may be used as the possessor wishes. If
the journey of this resource is not just, the offending links must be replaced and the distribution
that results (justice in rectification) is the legitimate one. See NozicK, supra note 115.
206. The "source" of wealth being that they stole their money.
207. For an attack on each of Nozick's premises, see citations supra note 204.
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if only public assistance. So why not hold a weekly auction for soci-
ety's scarce resource?2 "8
Of course, by definition the indigent cannot pay what focused
representation would cost in the private market and thus cannot pay
what the resource is "worth." However, their bidding might show an
intensity of preference, revealing those to whom focused representa-
tion is most important, and inferentially, those to whom the situation
is most "serious." Society thus could define the most important cases
by evaluating the importance to the individuals as evidenced by their
bids. However, one wonders if there is a sufficient dollar spread (that
is, spectrum of wealth) to make this coherent. Also, this may only
demonstrate who has friends or relatives with a few spare dollars and
not truly those individuals who are most invested in their cases.
One could avoid these problems by creating a market not depen-
dent on dollar wealth.209 Defendants could bid in the form of willing-
ness to do public service tasks (presumably tasks could be found for
those in jail who can't make bail). Not wishing to be cynical, enforce-
ment of the bid nevertheless may become an issue.
More broadly, a number of problems appear if society permits
bidding for focus regardless of the nature of the market.210 Systemati-
cally important cases present an initial difficulty because these cases
can absorb more resources than an individual case would be "worth"
in the private market. If the defender office "subsidizes" these cases it
208. If we were to permit such an auction, what, in economic terms, would the defendants
be bidding for? Likely, it would be the value of incrementally reducing the risk of conviction or
serious sentence. Cf. J. Steven Landefeld, Ph.D. & Eugene P. Seskin, Ph.D., The Economic
Value of Lif4 Linking Theory to Practice, 72 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 555,555 (1972) (the measure
of value of risk to human life is the willingness to pay for small changes in probability of
survival).
209. In fact, the creation of a separate market has been proposed for the distribution of
scarce health resources. See KA-z & CAPRON, supra note 120, at 185:
Rather than having individuals bid for the limited number of treatment slots available,
an alternative market system would extend the right to each person for a portion of the
treatment, the size of the portion calculated so that the number of options would use
up, but not exceed, treatment capacity.
210. One question that might arise is whether the defendants will bid for focus from some
public defender, or will also bid for the particular attorney from among those who have a supply
of focus available. While the latter is plainly rational-we all know some attorneys are better
than others, although there is some question about the accuracy and source of consumer infor-
mation on this point that will be available to the bidders-it may be a source of divisiveness in
the defender office and undermines the myth of "presumed competency," McINTYRE, supra
note 8, at 115-17, and its close relation, what I call the myth of "unitary service" (that all defend-
ers are interchangeable). This latter myth is important. It rationalizes the common form of
organizational staffing known as "zone defense"; each defender has a station, but a defendant
may move through many stations and therefore have a series of brief interactions with several
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can alleviate this problem, but more serious problems remain. What a
defendant would bid for is focus, not time. Focus may result in more
time being spent, although the marginal increase is likely indetermin-
able. In a sense the bid would be similar to providing an unrefundable
retainer. The fact one buys focus does not mean it will be brought to
bear because a judge may dismiss the case at the arraignment.
Further, bidding involves some serious legal and practical institu-
tional problems. Although this Article has maintained throughout
that the Sixth Amendment does not provide guidance to a system of
triage, lower criminal courts still operate within the boundaries of the
Sixth Amendment, and if we permit bidding, some people within that
regime will be getting attorneys willing to "try harder" simply because
these defendants have slipped the defender office a few extra bucks.
This is different than sliding-scale payments or seeking recoupment
211 isfor services. Those instances maintain the myth of unitary service;
that all representation is equivalent 212 In fact the system has a great
investment in this myth; for instance, the Supreme Court's over-
wheliming presumption in Strickland that all attorneys do a reasonably
good job. 13 It seems unlikely that the Court would permit the institu-
tion to acknowledge differing tiers of legal representation for indi-
gents, let alone state that they are for sale.214
defenders. See Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1242-43. It diminishes the likelihood that defend-
ants, who already likely feel a bit unlucky and mistrustful of their attorney will further feel
dissatisfaction because of the particular attorney they did or didn't draw.
211. For a discussion of partial payments by the "marginally indigent," see Indigent Defense
Costs Can Be Cut, NIJ Report Says, 18 CruM. JusT. NEwsL. 5 (1987); ROBERT SPANGENBERo ET
AL, CONTAINING THE CoSrS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE PROGRAMS: ELIGIBILITY SCREENING AND
COST RECOVERY PROCEDURES (1986).
212. See MCINTYRE, supra note 8, at 115-17.
213. "Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge in a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance .... Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
214. One can imagine an equal protection argument based on a claim of impediment to
equal access to the system due to disparity in wealth (that is, the contrasting plights of those who
can pay for focus and those who cannot). See generally Griffen v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(equal protection and due process require that the indigent be afforded transcripts for appeal);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (the Griffen principle requires appointment of appel-
late counsel for the indigent). This principle, however, is not unlimited. The Fourteenth
Amendment does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages nor does it require
the state to equalize economic conditions: "A man of means may be able to afford the retention
of an expensive, able counsel not within reach-of a poor man's purse." Griffen, 351 U.S. at 23
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 617 (1974) (finding no right
under equal protection or due process for appointed counsel to aid the indigent in obtaining
discretionary review to the state supreme court). Plainly, no court is prepared to hold that indi-
gent defendants are constitutionally entitled to representation comparable to what private
money can buy. But this situation is somewhat different. Here all indigent defendants are
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There is also a practical-institutional side to this. Studies have
shown that defendants have more confidence in private lawyers than
public defenders because they pay the former.1 5 This appears to
result from a combination of our general market orientation that you
get what you pay for and the sense that the attorney is "yours" and
not the system's. To allow bidding would create two tiers of represen-
tation within the defender office. Although those paying would likely
feel better about their attorney,216 those not-who may even be rep-
resented by the same attorney, because the office is not likely to have
a separate "focus division"-will likely really mistrust their attorney.
Surely under any triage system there will be different tiers of repre-
sentation. That is the whole point of triage. However, the process will
be more fluid and subtle so as to not define the tiers publicly from the
inception as bidding would.
Lest the reader look at this section as frolic through intellectual
wonderland, there is an irony. Clients "bid" a commodity that can be
characterized as "personal interest." In some real sense, the strength
of this "interest" provides defenders with a mechanism for guiding
their triage decisions that is as significant to the allocation process as
affinity with the client, seriousness of likely punishment, and existence
of serious police misconduct.
To tell the truth, I'm going to tend to give the most attention to the
clients who demand it... call me, keep coming by....
Those who keep pushing on their cases get the most attention. I
don't know if that's right, but they're also the ones who you can
count on coming up with witnesses.2 17
placed in a single representational system functioning outside of the market. It is not clear then
how a court would view allowing some within that system to use the economic disparity that
exists even within the indigent world to "buy" a substantially better defense.
215. Interviews with criminal defendants consistently reveal that they have more confidence
in private defense counsel than public defenders because, in large part, the former are paid by
the client. Encapsulated within this feeling appears to be the dual notions that you get what you
pay for in a market economy, and a private attorney is "yours," while a defender is "theirs"
(loyal to the system that pays her). See supra note 10; CASPER, CRIMINAL COURTS, supra note 1,
at 18; CASPER, AmRIcAN CRIMINAL Jus-cE, supra note 1, at 113; Wheeler & Wheeler, supra
note 57, at 329.
216. As has already been discussed, defendants often do not show up for court. See supra
note 97 and accompanying text. It is the author's belief, however, supported by observations in
practice and experience in a law clinic, that this is far less likely to occur with representation
characterized by focus. A relationship in which the client knows the attorney is committed to
fighting will tend to involve the client and the client's cooperation.
217. Public Defender Interview, supra note 8.
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This is the ethics of the squeaky wheel. Those who most bug their
attorneys by calling constantly, or writing messages about their cases,
get the most attention. This is completely rational from a representa-
tional as well as a personal perspective ("If I don't deal with this case,
this client will drive me crazy"). This client effort demonstrates the
importance of the case to the defendant and therefore provides cir-
cumstantial evidence of the "seriousness." It also enhances the likeli-
hood that the defender's efforts will lead to "success," because as I've
discussed in another context it indicates that the defendant will proba-
bly show up (again, not as common an occurrence in the lower courts
as one would imagine), cooperate, locate necessary documents, and
witnesses.
Yet this client-initiated effort system of triage may only reflect the
client's personality, including mental disturbance, and education. It
may merely identify those clients confident in pushing the people
"working for" them and those most sophisticated in the system rather
than reflecting the importance of this case relative to others. It will
not give any account to systematic issues. Most importantly, it will
again leave behind those our governmental institution has
subordinated so much that they expect nothing and would therefore
not take the trouble to ask.
E. MAKING THE CHOICE WHERE TO ALLOCATE Focus
I propose two specific categories and a third catch-all category to
guide triage in the allocation of focus. The rationales that justify this
system will be evident from the previous discussions. Priority would
go to "seriousness": first to the factually innocent and then to those
facing extreme sentences or collateral legal consequences. These
comport with areas that most would believe merit primary attention
and do not require making judgments about individual social worth.
Although I recognize that particular labels can by themselves have
devastating consequences (for example, any sex crime in today's soci-
ety), the contextually-dependent nature of each label's impact is so
significant that I propose to leave such possibilities to the catch-all
category.
Next would be those cases implicating system protection: "socie-
tal good," systematic injustice, and "making the screens work" (legally
insufficient evidence, determinative evidentiary or procedural issues,
clear overcharging). This comports with the institutional advocate's
1288
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responsibility for maintaining the system and remedying systematic
problems.218
Defenders could realistically apply these categories within the
chaos in which they regularly function.219 As discussed in Part IV, this
is because they get very good at making quick assessments of cases,
seeing general patterns, and evaluating how a particular prosecutor,
judge, and jury will likely treat a particular case in their particular
legal community. Also, although I recognize that the categories are
not scientifically precise, I do not find that a serious deficiency. Pro-
fessor Tremblay stated the position well in recent correspondence:
218. Like those focusing on rationing scarce medical resources, I have developed a "hierar-
chy" within which to conduct triage. Cf. Pellegrino, supra note 106, at 39-40 (placing highest
priority on broader functions). One might fairly question the ranking. Why, for example, did I
put those situations in category one before those I placed in category two? Placing individual
case situations ahead of broader, system-protecting functions was based on my belief that,
though the defender bears responsibility for the system, see supra note 150, ultimately the
defense system is about individual representation under the Sixth Amendment. Once establish-
ing this hierarchy, the defender may not even be able to deal with all of category one with the
available resources. How then does one rank among a pool of clients that fall within a particular
category? I imagine a mix of factors: principally "first come, first served" with a touch of third
category factors like "concrete injustice." Fimally, the literature indicating that felony defenders
determine whether or not to take a case to trial based on the two-variable matrix of "dead-bang"
vs. "reasonable doubt" cases and "light consequences" vs. "serious" ones does not affect my
hierarchy. See Lynn Mather, Some Determinants of the Method of Case Disposition: Decision-
making by Public Defenders in Los Angeles, 8 LAW & Soc'y Rv. 187 (1973). My concern is
where to bring focus, not whether that focus should be directed at trial or sentencing.
219. How would my hierarchy fare under RAwLS, supra note 115? Again, while Rawls'
theory was meant to apply to macro-, not micro-allocation decisions, see supra note 115, at least
one author has attempted to apply it to triage. See WNsLow, supra note 14, at 124. I will,
therefore, make a similar attempt. Focusing on the possibility that they may find themselves in
the worse-off position (facing criminal charges in the lower courts without resources to hire
private counsel), the contractors behind the Veil of Ignorance would likely concur with the first
level of my proposed hierarchy and want the scarce resource of focus if they were either factu-
ally innocent or facing serious legal consequences. The issue would arise as to the second level,
system-protecting cases. While some see Rawls as underlain by the "ideal of social coopera-
tion," Rawls' individualist philosophy, like the libertarian Nozick, does not involve a conception
of community. See Scanlon, supra note 115, at 171, 198; see also Callahan, supra note 113, at 18
("most prominent theories of justice in medical ethics and elsewhere. .. are themselves rooted
in individual self-interest"); Fisk, supra note 115, at 67 ("institutions are 'good in themselves'
because they interfere least with the realization of self interest"). The contractors will not
choose to put scarce resources into this area unless it benefits their individual self-interest. Such
a conception is possible, however, if the contractors perceive system-protection as potentially
benefiting them either by keeping them out of the system in the first place (making the screens
work) or leading to substantive/procedural changes of which they will be beneficiaries should
they have the misfortune to be defendants in the system. Cf. WmisLow, supra note 14, at 140-42
(examining how, under Rawis, contractors would accept utilitarian-like principles of disaster
triage).
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[Ajil of these judgment calls (and, importantly, all of the de facto
allocations which by necessity happen every day in court now) can
only be made by humans trying their best to be correct. There is
never a test to see whether one is right; it is a pure honor system;
and it is (almost) entirely and (almost) irrevocably unreviewable.
But it is important to inform the decisionmaking of the PD on the
front line .... If the categories are at bottom unknowable, that is
critical to consider. But if the categories are mushy and subject to
misinterpretation, that is not necessarily a serious objection. 2 0
The third category could move a case's priority for access to focus
anywhere among the first two categories, except never above those
who are factually innocent. This is an undefined category that I will
call "concrete injustice." It gives the attorney the opportunity to bring
focus to cases that touch the heart and gut. The circumstances of life
are complex, and somewhere along the way we've all encountered
cases that just should be fought. Perhaps it is someone with a past
record who is trying hard to clean up her life and now finds she has a
baby coming. Plainly this category is hugely bound to the values and
culture of the individual attorney. However, that is acceptable so long
as two conditions are fulfilled. First, use of this category is rare and
does not become so frequent as to take its place with the other two.
Second, the attorney continues to sincerely examine and question her
cultural biases. The point is that somewhere along the line we each
must act on our values, even at the risk of bias.221 We have an ethical
duty to use our skills and our legal monopoly for the good. 2 We
have an ethical right to use our skills and abilities to fulfill ourselves as
220. Tremblay Correspondence, supra note 199.
221. Clearly, the notion of individual bias has been perceived in present society as a buzz
word for a failure of character. While that may be so in certain instances, it is not always so
when we view some of these "biases" as mechanisms for making personal judgments about our
experience. As Richard Shweder put it,
My friend, the literary critic, Anatole Broyard used to tell his writing students,
"Hang on to your prejudices, they are the only taste you have got." Almost everyone
in the academy these days has heard of the continental dictum that it is our prejudices
that makes it possible for us to see, which means that in thinking, as in life, if you do
not fix a starting point you'll never get started. Broyard, who sensed our postmodern
predicament and knew how to express it with grace and wit, formulated the aphorism
this way: "Paranoids are the only ones who notice things anymore." Nietzsche-like he
understood that any prejudice is better than no prejudice at all, and that in a
postmodern world of cable television and metaphysical jet lag, the best one can do is
stay on the move, keeping your options for prejudice open while developing some sen-
sibility or at least some good sense.
Richard Shweder, The Authority of Voice, 37 N.Y.L. Sci. L. REv. 251, 257 (1992) (footnotes
omitted).
222. See generally MODEL RuLEs OF PROFEsSIONAL CoNDUCr pmbl. Cf. id at Rule 6.1
(Pro Bono Public Service).
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good people3 Also, there is a moral power to the plight of specific
as opposed to statistical lives that cannot be ignored.'2 4 Why else will
we spend unlimited human and material resources to save a child who
has fallen in a well, but balk at spending a fraction of that on some
program of preventive medicine that could save dozens of unidenti-
fied lives?
Over time, use of this system will likely result in some alteration
of the landscape in which the system operates. Legal-insufficiency
cases and most factual-innocence ones will drop out as prosecutors
begin to respond to defenders' willingness to push those cases and
their general success when they do. This in turn may well lead the
prosecutor to more carefully screen cases at the inception and not
even charge such cases in the first place, as well as not overcharge.225
Aside from the occasional concrete injustice case, that will leave only
"system-protection" and sentence "seriousness," which is just where
the advocates should fight.
IV. THE NATURE AND APPLICATION OF PATTERN
REPRESENTATION AND FOCUS
Within a Sixth Amendment regime, the legitimacy and efficacy of
the proposed system of triage is dependent upon two conditions.
First, the full range of triage choices must comport with the Sixth
223. Cf. Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. Rv. 233,236,268 (1977)
(core concept of privacy composed of autonomy, intimacy, identity); Note, Towards a Constitu-
tional Theory of Individuality: The Privacy Opinions of Justice Douglass, 87 YALE LJ. 1579
(1978) (finding that the right to privacy is one manifestation of the "principle of individuality").
In grasping for some notion of "personhood" in the constitutional design Lawrence Tribe
observes:
But the Constitution's is not a totalitarian design, depending for its success upon the
homogenization or depersonalization of humanity. The judiciary has thus reached into
the Constitution's spirit and structure, and has elaborated from the spare text an idea of
the 'human' and a conception of 'being' not merely contemplated but required.
LAWRENCE TRIBE, AmERICAN CON TrrutnoNAL LAW § 15-3, at 1308 (1988); see also Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (recognizing the "ability independently to define
one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty"); cf. RAwLs, supra note 115, at 84 (con-
tractors would insist on equality of opportunity to favored positions in part because they would
desire opportunity for self-realization that such positions offer).
224. This powerful appeal of identifiable versus statistical lives that we have all felt when
clinging to a newscast describing a dramatic rescue of some young child is, not surprisingly,
acknowledged throughout the ethical literature on rationing. See, eg., SECURING Accmss To
HEALTH CARE, supra note 164, at 356; Evans, supra note 166, at 2216; Mehiman, supra note 20,
at 352-55; Tremblay, supra note 14. at 964.
225. For an extensive discussion of how focus can alter the prosecution's screening behavior,
see Mitchell, supra note 17, at 308-10. In this regard, note the variety of screening practice
options available to prosecutors. Feeney & Jackson, supra note 25, at 379.
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Amendment, regardless of whether it is pattern representation, focus,
or something else. Second, focus must be given sufficient content and
direction as to make it a coherent, meaningful, and usable construct.
Throughout this Article, triage in the lower courts has been con-
ceived in terms of ethically dividing defendants into categories for
purposes of providing differential effort. In my scheme, there are four
possible levels of effort. Going from least to greatest they are:
" Messenger
* Pattern Representation
" Focus
* System-Protection
"Messenger '  merely conveys deals from the prosecution with-
out any real analysis or counseling. This embodies the worst possible
conception of the public defender as conceived in the most negative
law and sociology literature22 7 Here the defender is middleman in
the process, an agent for the prosecution. This level of effort com-
ports with neither constitutional nor ethical standards. In no sense of
the word is the client being given "representation."
"System-protection" rests on the opposite side of the spectrum
from the messenger. Although this level of effort has been lumped
together with focus throughout the Article, in fact, it potentially rep-
resents an even greater magnitude of effort because case strategies
that involve systematic-institutional goals may require more effort
than would be economically feasible for a comparable case in a pri-
vate-representation setting. However, the construct of "system-pro-
tection" does not differ from that of focus except that it may utilize
more of that scarce resource. As such, it will not be the subject of a
226. Some sense of the "messenger" seems to be communicated in Casper, Did You Have a
Lawyer?, supra note 7, at 6-7 ("The brief conversations usually did not involve much discussion
of the details surrounding the alleged crime, mitigating circumstances or the defendants' motives
or backgrounds. Instead, they focused on the deal, the offer the prosecution was likely to make
or had made in return for a cop-out."); and Eckart & Stover, supra note 8, at 675:
At the misdemeanor level, the public defender normally sees his clients for the first
time shortly before arraignment. After talking to the client, the public defender will
confer with a deputy district attorney about a possible disposition. He usually does not
get a chance to relay the offered deal to the defendant until a few minutes before the
case is called. As one attorney expressed the problem, "I generally tell my clients,
'Here's what the D.A. will give you. You've got about three minutes to think about it
and make a decision.'" In some cases the public defender is so rushed for time that he
does not communicate the proposed deal to the client until the two of them are
approaching the bench after the case has been called. Thus, the defendant must decide
whether to take the deal or plead not guilty in the time span of a few minutes or less.
227. See supra note 7.
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separate analysis. In contrast to this quantitative difference between
regular focus and system-protection, the distinction between focus
(which includes use of patterns) and pattern representation involves a
qualitatively different type of effort.
"Pattern representation" means quickly categorizing cases
legally, factually, strategically, and predictively by corresponding cer-
tain salient features of a case to recurring patterns the defender has
abstracted from the masses of cases in which all fellow defenders have
been involved.
"Focus" roughly approximates the effort one would expect from a
good attorney with a reasonable caseload.
A. TH NATURE OF "PATrERN REPRESENTATION"
Initially, it is important to recognize that there is nothing wrong
with utilizing patterns to develop and carry-out a defense strategy. In
fact, one attribute shared by most experts is their ability to recognize
the patterns that arise from concrete data. This pattern recognition
allows experts to work quickly and efficiently without having to
reinvent the proverbial wheel.3 Utilizing patterns is in fact
228. For a discussion of how experts use cognitive models/structures in developing problem
representations and solutions, see Marilyn Berger & John Mitchell, Rethinking Advocacy Train-
ing, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADV. 821, 822-28 (1993); James Voss et al., Problem-solving Skill in the
Social Sciences, 17 PsYcHOL. LEARNING & MOTIVATON 165, 191-212 (1983).
Further elaboration of the basic cognitive processes of making meaning through interpretive
frameworks, generally referred to as "schema theory," can be found in Richard C. Anderson,
The Notion of Schemata and the Educational Enterprise: General Discussion of the Conference, in
SCHOOLING AND THE AcQuisrrioN OF KNOWLEDGE 415, 419 (Richard C. Anderson et al. eds.,
1977); Robert Glaser, Education and Thinking the Role of Knowledge, 39 AM. PsYcHOL. 93
(1984); John B. Mitchell, Current Theories on Expert and Novice Thinking: A Full Faculty Con-
siders the Implications for Legal Education, 39 J. LEGAL EDU. 275, 277-83 (1989); David E.
Rumelhart, Schemata: The Building Blocks of Cognition, in THEORETICAL ISSUES IN READING
COMPREHENSION 33 (Rand J. Spiro et al. eds., 1980); see also JEAN PiAGET, THE LANGUAGE
AND THOUGHT OF THE CHnL (1932) (Piaget presents cognitive, as opposed to behavioral, the-
ory regarding child development).
This concept of schema theory has begun to appear in the legal literature in discussions
ranging from juror decisionmaking processes to the role of metaphor in legal reasoning. See
Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REv. 273
(1989); Richard K. Sherwin, Lawyering Theory: An Overview, What We Talk About When We
Talk About Law, 37 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 9,38 (1992); Richard K. Sherwin, Preface to Lawyering
Theory Symposium: Thinking Through the Legal Culture, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1, 1 (1992);
Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for
Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105 (1989); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon
Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MIcH. L. RPdv. 2225, 2234-44 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Winter, The Cognitive Dimension].
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subsumed within the effort of focus. 2 9 The issue is not the propriety
of patterns but whether they can exclusively define the full scope of
representational effort without offending Sixth Amendment norms.
In other words, can you rely only on pattern representation and be
competent? I believe so.
A defender who is in the office for more than a month or so will
see an extremely large number of cases and police reports and listen
to colleagues230 discuss and analyze many more. For a number of rea-
sons a fairly complete repertoire of usable patterns will emerge. In
the first place, other than the infrequent oddball charge, defenders in
the lower courts will be exposed to the same, relatively finite set of
case types: assault (bars, domestic violence), vehicular crimes (DWI,
reckless and negligent driving, driving while license suspended or
without a valid license), shoplifting, car burglaries and car prowls,
prostitution, and possession of controlled substances (including
minors in possession of alcohol). In the second, this finite list of con-
stantly-recurring crimes in turn raises an equally finite set of legal and
strategic issues for each such crime. Thus, knowing no more than that
a client has been charged with possession of a small amount of mari-
juana found in a car, the defender will almost instantly begin to struc-
ture a rather broad defense analysis: Did the police have reasonable
229. Eckart and Stover believe that the public defender has set the representational stan-
dard as that of achieving an "adequate" or "satisfactory" as opposed to an "optimal" outcome.
Eckart & Stover, supra note 8, at 668, 670, 682. To accomplish this, the defenders employ what
the authors term a model of "routinized choice," which sounds similar to my notion of pattern
representation. Id. at 676; cf. Sudnow, supra note 1, at 274 ("The P.D. learns with experience
what to expect as the 'facts of the case.' These facts, in their general structure, portray social
circumstances that he can anticipate by virtue of his knowledge of the normal features of offense
categories and types of offenders.").
The problem, as Eckart and Stover point out, is that the very efficiency of this methodology
tends eventually to limit the ability of the defender to consider creative options: "Those search
methods that are successful in producing a satisfactory solution to a problem are likely to be
used again in future situations of similar type. Thus, the order of alternatives is very important
because initial options tend to dominate the outcome of routine choice situations." Eckart &
Stover, supra note 8, at 679.
230. Much of the learning process of the young public defender comes from exposure to oral
storytelling in hearing case experiences and the lore of the profession recounted, and in discuss-
ing cases with colleague. See, e.g., Laura Gardner Webster, Telling Stories: The Spoken Narra-
tive Tradition in Criminal Defense Discourse, 42 MERCER L. REv. 553, 560 (1991) ("The
peculiarities of the appellate casebook method combined with the peculiarities of American
criminal jurisprudence suggest why a special need exists for the spoken tradition of telling 'war
stories' that pass along vital knowledge among criminal defense lawyers .... "); see also McIN.
TYRE, supra note 8, at 113-15 ("most public defenders do not seem to be as self-taught as they
might have one believe"). To some extent this mitigates the sharp criticism for lack of training in
public defender offices. See, eg., U.S. DmT. OF JUsncE, BUREAU OF STATISTICS, NATIONAL
CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTmMS STUDY 36 (1986).
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suspicion to initially detain the car? What justified entering the car to
seize the drugs? What was defendant's relationship to the car-
driver, registered owner, or backseat passenger? What connects
defendant to the drugs for purposes of constructive possession? What
was the proximity of defendant to the drugs? Were the drugs visible
to defendant? Did defendant possess any paraphernalia or show any
signs of intoxication?
Even relatively inexperienced defenders with some supervision,
and perhaps with the help of manuals' 31 and such, begin quickly to
catch-on and are able with a mere one-sentence description of a case
to draw upon an appropriate stock of recurring issues and strategies.
The process is really interactive. Facts in the case trigger patterns, and
patterns lead the defender to seek out particular facts. This ability
allows the defender with minimal information to rather efficiently
conduct an "insta-screen." Thus, a police report alone can tell a
defender how the case will likely play in the system, 2 pinpoint legal
issues, provide the bargaining range, and even guide the defender to
rapidly develop competent cross-examination for adversary hearings
and trial.
Because they spend day after day with the other players in the
system, defenders get a fairly good idea of how particular judges and
prosecutors will perceive each case. This will be even more so if, as is
the case in many jurisdictions, the same defender works in the same
courtroom with the same prosecutor for a set period of time. The
defender will also know the institutional attitudes of the prosecutor's
office and the collective bench as well as the attitudes of local jurors
who decide trials. From all this, the defender is capable of quickly
coming to a sense of how this defendant and case is likely to play
before the court, prosecution, and jury. The defender will generally
know whether the prosecutor, police (to whom the prosecutor may
have to justify any decision made as to disposition), and judge will
view the case as unusually serious. The defender will also know
whether it is triable. From a slightly different perspective, anything
that is likely to distinguish this case or defendant in the eyes of any of
these players will also quickly pop out of the police report.
231. While, from our experience in the clinic good manuals seem to be useful, in a 1988
survey of public defenders regarding the variables most crucial in determining the number of
cases a public defender office can represent, the "availability of trial manual" ranked 42 on a list
of 52. See INorENTr DEFENSE, supra note 19, at B-3, B-5.
232. "An attorney's feel for the case breeds a certain sense of efficacy, a sense that he knows
what can be accomplished in a given case." HEUMANN, supra note 25, at 76.
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[We do this] ... every day, day in and day out. We know the prose-
cutors. We know the judge so we can take care of the straight for-
ward ones very efficiently....
It's that we know exactly what the judge is going to order, we
know what the prosecutor is going to ask for, and we know what the
standard offers are, so we can see if the offer is good or bad. We
negotiate pretty efficiently. Whereas you can see a private attorney
can take an hour and maybe not even get the thing resolved.3 3
Defenders commonly are also lightning fast at legal-issue spot-
ting, at least as to the recurrent ones. Though hardly lacking the abil-
ity, in a practical sense, they are less able to creatively apply existing
legal principles or develop cutting-edge theories. This is purely a
function of time. The defender cannot do this in the fast-moving
world of pattern representation. However, this does not render their
representation below Sixth Amendment standards. In reality, in the
vast majority of these misdemeanor cases a basic set of recurring legal
issues are associated with specific cases and fact patterns. The
defender knows these by heart and quickly develops mental checklists
(or may even have written checklists and canned briefs).? Thus, if a
charge arose more than a few months before the state arraigns the
defendant, the defender immediately thinks "speedy trial." If the
charge was driving with a suspended license, the defender will imme-
diately seek to find if the state sent the required notice of a revocation
hearing. If a prosecutor is going to bring breathalyzer results into a
DWI case the defender will look for the necessary predicate warnings
the police are required to give the defendant.
Also during this "insta-screen" the defender will get a sense of
how the prosecution will value the case in a plea bargain, quickly judg-
ing the likely range or the "ballpark."" 5 In a moment the defender
will be able to correspond the facts to some standard deal" 6 or arrive
233. Public Defender Interview, supra note 8.
234. My own experience with brief and motion banks has been good. But see INDIOENT
DEFENSE, supra note 19, at B-5 ("motions bank" and "brief bank" ranked 50 and 51 out of 52 in
the survey); Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1257 ("Most of those who did [examine the brief and
motion files] reported that they had not found the process worth the effort.").
235. See CASPER, Amc.AN CumiNAL JusTIcE, supra note 1, at 108 ("He knows what is in
the ballpark' for a particular offense given a man's record.").
236. See, eg., Champion, supra note 7, at 256 ("there is an informal 'going rate' for virtually
every kind of criminal offense"); Sudnow, supra note 1, at 258 ("the P.D. and D.A. have institu-
tionalized a common orientation to allowable reductions").
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at a sense of what the case is "worth"' 7 in the particular institutional
community. The defender will at the same time begin to assess the
possibilities of narrative reconstruction,3 8 though she may need more
information about the client and the client's involvement to actually
carry out the strategy; for example, "This was not really a burglary,
this was a trespass. This was about some bad feelings over the defend-
ant and victim both seeing the same person."
Moving to the motion hearing and trial level the defender is able
to quickly access patterns of cross-examination from very limited
information and with little or no preparation time. Let me provide a
few illustrations.
The defendant is charged with Driving While Intoxicated. Part of
the evidence against him is his unsatisfactory performance on the
Field Sobriety Tests ("FSTs"). These are various balancing and coor-
dination tests given on the scene, such as standing on one leg, walking
heel to toe, and touching nose with fingers from outstretched arms.
The defender must cross-examine the officer who conducted the tests.
With no more information than that the defendant did not pass the
FSTs, the defender could immediately develop the following cross-
examination, later adding aspects of the particular case that are obvi-
ously relevant:
237. See eg., Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1269 (" 'Anyone who can try a civil case can try a
criminal case, but a civil lawyer is not qualified to evaluate a criminal case. He has no way of
knowing what a criminal case is worth.' ") (quoting an Assistant District Attorney); Feeley,
supra note 3, at 462-63 ("[Plea bargains] are more akin to modem supermarkets, in which prices
for various commodities have been clearly established and labeled in advance .... the occasional
'real' plea bargain or sentence after trial may reaffirm or revalue the 'worth' of a certain type of
case"); Penn, supra note 108, at 2 ("Verchick, however, views plea bargaining pragmatically, 'It's
an understanding by all parties as to what a case is worth'....").
238. As Mather noticed, "the P.D. refers to offenses in terms of their social reality rather
than their legal definitions. 'That is, legally the case may be a burglary, but really it is just a petty
theft." Mather, supra note 218, at 200. Sudnow elaborates on this process of narrative
reconstruction:
In the course of routinely encountering persons charged with "petty theft," "bur-
glary," "assault with a deadly weapon," "rape," "possession of marijuana," etc., the
P.D. gains knowledge of the typical manner in which offenses of given classes are com-
mitted, the social characteristics of the persons who regularly commit them, the fea-
tures of the settings in which they occur, the types of victims often involved, and the
like. He learns to speak knowledgeably of "burglars," "petty thieves," "drunks," "rap-
ists," "narcos," etc., and to attribute to them personal biographies, modes of usual crim-
inal activity, criminal histories, psychological characteristics, and social backgrounds.
Sudnow, supra note 1, at 259-60.
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You'd never seen my client before you stopped
him, had you?
So you'd never seen him do any part of the test
before you gave it to him?
You'd never seen him try to stand on one leg?
Never seen him walk heel to toe?
In fact, you'd never seen him do anything athletic
before?
Now my client is 52 years old, isn't he?
And you're 26?
You work out, stay in condition?
And you were trained to do these tests?
You practiced doing them?
And you've demonstrated them for every
defendant you gave the FSTs to?
And you've demonstrated them to juries, as you
did today?
Now on the night you gave my client these tests,
he was by himself?
You were with your partner?
So there were two of you, and just him?
And it was night?
And the three of you were standing alone by the
side of the road?
You intended to arrest him if he failed these
tests?
Now, none of us in court today get to watch my
client take these tests, do we?
I mean, you don't have a video or anything like
that?
Inference for jurors:
The officer does .not
know defendant's
ability to do these
tests and thus does
not have a baseline to
draw conclusions
from defendant's
performance.
Inference for jurors:
These tests are not
necessarily easy to
perform; the fact this
officer can do them
with such ease is
misleading. The
officer is young,
trained, practiced, and
an athlete.
Inference for jurors:
The defendant would
be nervous; it's more
difficult to perform
feats of balance and
coordination if you're
tight and unrelaxed.
Inference for jurors:
The jury is totally at
the mercy of the
officer's subjective
conclusion.
Similarly, in a car prowl charge where the issue is identification
and there has been a one-on-one on the scene show-up, the pattern
cross-examination of the victim regarding the show-up would quickly
emerge as something like:
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Mr. Smith, you had never seen my client before
that evening, had you?
You described the person you saw around the cars
as "medium height, bluejean jacket, baseball hat"
to Officer McCall when she first came on the
scene, didn't you?
You didn't give an estimate as to weight?
You didn't describe any facial features-eye color,
hair?
Approximately 15 minutes later, Officer McCall
brought a man back to your store?
You knew that this man was a suspect the officer
had arrested?
And that man was my client?
You noticed he was wearing a blue jean jacket
and ball cap?
He was the only man brought back?
An officer stood by his side?
He was handcuffed?
You know what a line-up is?
That's where the police show you several people
who have similar appearances?
You did not attend a line-up, did you?
You weren't shown a photo display, were you?
Inference for jurors:
The victim would be
susceptible to
suggestion.
Inference for jurors:
Suggestibility is
reasonably possible in
this situation.
Inference for jurors:
There exist fairer,
more accurate
methods to identify
the perpetrator.
Finally, imagine the defendant is charged with possession of drug
paraphernalia, like a syringe. The police found the syringe in a pat-
search of the defendant who was a passenger in a car stopped for reck-
less driving. The pattern cross-examination at a motion to suppress
probing the reasonableness of the officer's fear that defendant had a
weapon so as to justify the pat-search" 9 might be something like:
You'd never seen my client before that evening,
had you?
You had no prior information about him?
When you stopped the car, you didn't see any
weapons?
And you had no report of weapons?
Inference for judge:
The officer could not
reasonably believe
that the defendant
was armed.
239. "A reasonable safety concern exists, and a protective frisk for weapons is justified,
when an officer can point to 'specific and articulable facts' which create an objectively reason-
able belief that a suspect is 'armed and presently dangerous.'" State v. Collins, 847 P.2d 919, 922
(Wash. 1993) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-24 (1968)).
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My client didn't reach in his coat or pocket, did
he?
By the way, the driver pulled right over when you
turned on your siren?
All the young men were cooperative when you did
pull the car over?
And specifically my client was cooperative?
He gave you his license?
He complied with all your orders?
He was always polite?
When he got out of the car, he did not make any
threatening movements?
There were three young men, including the driver,
in the car?
And there were two police cars-four officers?
It was the middle of the day?
The reason you stopped the car was for the way
the driver was driving?
You had no informationthat any other crime was
involved?
This section has hopefully demonstrated that defenders can rely
on "patterns" and still provide competent representation. This partly
assumes some review of discovery and discussions with witnesses, 40 if
only in the court corridor.2 41 In fact, experienced defenders can do
much of their preparation once trial has begun.
240. The process of discovery and investigation is far more limited in misdemeanor than
felony cases and so can usually be completed and assimilated rather quickly. On the other hand,
misdemeanors are often surprisingly legally complex, rife with hastily drafted local ordinances
that smack of vagueness and overbreadth, and statutes without guidance of common law inter-
pretation. Discovery generally consists of only a few pages of police reports, an occasional wit-
ness statement, and the client's rap sheet or driving record. Investigation involves a visit to the
scene where appropriate and, in general, two to four witnesses. Experts are rare except in drunk
driving cases where a blood or breathalyzer test has been done or in drug cases where an analysis
is needed, though often in these latter cases the lab report is entered by stipulation without the
expert's presence. See, eg., WASH. Cr. J. CR. R. 6.13(b) (1993).
Many of the cases at the District Court level don't have a lot of extra witnesses....
You're going to need the client's story and to talk to officers. There may be very few
witnesses, maybe a 2 or 3 witness trial. So it won't take near the preparation [of a more
complex case]. Also, they may not have a lot of motions. So there are not a lot of
written motions that need to be done. Not a lot of particular points. There's basically
presenting the story in a light most favorable to your client. [This is done] [t]hrough
cross-examination of the State's witnesses and direct examination of your client, and
my experience is that it doesn't take a lot of preparation time to be able to do that.
Public Defender Interview, supra note 8.
241. In fact, while defenders often have an absurd number of cases set for trial in a single
day, they know that very few are likely to "go." In reality, then, they can concentrate on these
few.
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I have on occasion gotten in trials, where, because the case was
handed to me, or whatever, and been calling a jury and still not
really had any time to figure out what the client would like to say,
but because of the nature of the jury trial process, that client
becomes available through voir dire. [Y]ou are going to have
recesses, you are going to basically get up to speed.., enough to do
the voir dire process, and if it's going to go over several days ...
you've got evenings and... can do some intense preparation during
the trial. That has on occasion occurred. I've called down before
and said, "Get somebody up here, I've got subpoenas that need to
be served." We do have the capabilities of doing that, and we can
call into action a lot of people that are now on the team to go out
and get some of these things done, so that we can present a good
front. That is not ideal, but sometimes time constraints such as you
have seven trials one day and another four or five the next day, it
may be that you haven't spent the time in advance, but now we
know which case is going to trial. Now we can devote all resources
to the case to get it ready and present it.242
No doubt this will not be the best representation available, but it
will be competent.243 In fact, it will likely be far better than that pro-
vided by many private attorneys who only infrequently enter the crim-
inal justice system, and even some that are frequent participants.2 4
Again, even though clients may not respect public defenders overall,
these attorneys get good results for their clients.245
I don't think you're going to be 100% ready to do all of them, but you can look at the
file... and [name omitted] and I have trials in a week or so where there are five on one
day and six on another. Of those, four already say on the file is that the only reason
these are going to trial is because the defendant isn't ready to suffer the consequence
today. It will not be a trial. 95% of the time that note is on there. The other 5% of the
time the defendant shows up on the trial day and says, "I'm ready for my trial." [Tihen
we'll get a continuance and say, "This is a real trial." Or if we can, we get ready to go
ahead and do it right then.
Public Defender Interview, supra note 8.
242. Public Defender Interview, supra note 8.
243. This level of defense certainly satisfies the first prong of Strickland ("reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms"). Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). To
put this in perspective, Strickland seemed to find the Sixth Amendment satisfied by an even
lower level of performance than pattern representation, and that was in a death penalty case, not,
for example, driving without a valid license (for which a defendant will agree to a six-month
deferred finding and then dismissal if she stays clean). I believe that pattern representation,
though hardly the optimum, see Eckart & Stover, supra note 8, at 682, does more than just assure
a procedurally fair trial, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; it can encompass rather decent lawyer-
ing. Not great, not like one obtains with focus, but decent.
244. In fact, as already discussed supra note 54, a significant number of private criminal
defense attorneys practice at the very margin.
245. Part of this is a function of their knowledge and experience already discussed; part is
because the other players in the system are as overwhelmed as the defender, and the defender
has an acute appreciation of this knowledge. In fact, defenders frequently take their cases to the
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B. THE NATUm OF "Focus"
As previously stated, focus is principally a commitment of mind.
Although this commitment may at times also manifest itself in such
efforts as trying to find one more case citation or talking to one more
witness, and in expending additional monies on experts or demonstra-
tive evidence, the principal ingredient of this resource is still thought
and concentration.246
More specifically, focus is comprised of three mental elements:
* Pushing the rules
* Creating deeper narratives
• Persistence-in the face of opportunities (that is, taking advan-
tage through hard work of what chance offers)
Although these three elements are frequently interactive in practice,
for the sake of clarity I will discuss each separately.
1. Pushing the Rules
Under the concept of pushing the rules I include thorough
presentations of accepted principles, novel use of existing principles,
and development and assertion of cutting-edge doctrine. Pushing the
rules is important because to a surprising extent courts will follow the
day of trial, trying to get leverage on plea bargains from the strain of an impossible trial calendar
on court and prosecution. See, e.g., Penn, supra note 108, at 2:
Most prosecutors are eager to dispose of misdemeanors with plea bargains in order
to concentrate on felonies such as homicides, assaults and armed robberies. "We just
don't have the resources to bring these misdemeanor cases to trial," a New York prose-
cutor says. The Legal Aid attorney thus knows he has the upper hand in such cases. "If
he holds out long enough, our office will reach some kind of accommodation," the
prosecutor says.
246. One might ask whether giving more focus means diminishing resources available for
pattern representation. After all, there are only finite resources. While I take this point to be a
serious one, I do not believe such a result would follow. First, focus is currently being applied to
some cases. It is just done haphazardly. The approach in this Article would provide an ethical
system for this existing allocation. Second, I do not think of these mental resources as akin to
"matter" in the sense of 1950s physics classes, that is, being capable of neither creation nor
destruction. These resources are far more fluid. Under such circumstances, because there exists
no articulated system of triage, mental resources in excess of that required for pattern represen-
tation which otherwise could be recombined into focus, drift in the ether and are lost. With an
effective triage system, these lost resources can be used to provide focus without diminishing
those resources available for pattern representation. Third, as I've indicated, effective use of
focus generally will affect the prosecution's charging policies, supra note 225, in a manner that
will tend to free additional defense resources.
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rules, the assortment of literature on legal indeterminacy notwith-
standing.24 7 The catch is that it's a great deal of work to lead the court
to this result. Careful planning of strategy and factual records, briefs,
and the like are well out of the range of resources available in pattern
representation (although the level of effort in pattern representation
certainly leads to some successful motion practice). It requires focus.
The creation of a novel mens rea defense as part of an overall
sentencing strategy in the Driving with a Revoked License case dis-
cussed previously in Part I.A is one such example of focus as pushing
the rules. A Possession of Marijuana case defended by another team
of students provides another.
In that case, defendant was the driver in a car where police found
marijuana. The sequence leading up to that search is as follows: The
police received an anonymous tip that three young black men were
smoking crack in a particular car parked in the lot of an apartment
complex. The police arrived at the apartment, saw a car matching the
description with two young white men inside, and approached the car.
Our client was in the driver's seat and a friend was in the back seat.
The police found no evidence of drug use. However, they did discover
that the car was registered to our client and that neither our client nor
his passenger had a valid driver's license. The officers then told the
young men that they were trespassing and warned them that if they
were still there when the officers returned in a few minutes they would
be arrested. The officers left and the client drove away to go home.
Within two minutes the same officers pulled the client over, arrested
the client for driving without a valid license, and searched his car inci-
dent to arrest. The marijuana was found as a result of this search.
The students thoroughly researched, briefed, and carefully
planned their cross-examination on basic principles such as the right
of the police to initially detain the client under Terry,24 and whether
247. For a good assessment of the academic profession's confrontation with the apparent
indeterminacy of law, see Steven L. Winters, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L.
Ra-v. 639 (1990). All is not lost, however. Even those acknowledging such indeterminacy do not
believe "anything goes." See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Rethinking Legal Education, 74 MARQ. L.
REv. 1,12 (1990). There are, if not absolute determinants, at least some constraints. See, eg., id.
at 25-27 (judges are limited by a culturally-shared sense of justice); Winter, The Cognitive
Dimension, supra note 228, at 2444-2555 (judges possess idealized cognitive models generally
shared by others in society).
248. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147
(1972) (an informant's tip is reliable enough for a Terry stop).
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the subsequent full search of the car was lawful when conducted inci-
dent to an arrest for a minor offense2 49 for which the officers generally
could not make a custodial arrest.?50 Additionally, the students cre-
ated an estoppel theory grounded in the case of Cox v. Louisiana,5 1
to the effect that under all the circumstances any reasonable person
would have thought that the police had told them it was permissible to
drive away, even without a valid license. 5 2 The judge suppressed on
all three grounds.
249. Driving without a valid operator's license is a "minor" traffic offense which, except in
rare circumstances, cannot provide the basis for a custodial arrest. See State v. Barajas, 789 P.2d
231 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990), rev. denied, 795 P.2d 1157 (Wash. 1990).
250. In Washington State, police generally may not take a defendant into custody for a
"minor" traffic offense, and may not search a vehicle incident to a non-custodial arrest. See
State v. Hehman, 578 P.2d 527, 529 (Wash. 1978).
251. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
252. The students developed their due process estoppel theory using Cox, 379 U.S. at 571
(prosecution for demonstrating too "near" a courthouse dismissed because police had guided
demonstrators to that spot), and Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959) (defendant can't be penal-
ized for refusing to answer questions at a state hearing when the commissioner at the hearing
mistakenly told the defendant that he had a privilege to refuse).
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2. Creating Deeper Narratives
Defense attorneys constantly tell stories. 53 They tell them to
jurors at trial, 54 who in turn decide the case by placing the data at
trial into narratives and then judging the credibility of those con-
structed narratives. 2 5 They tell them to judges at sentencing. They
253. As Professor Abrams states:
For the trial attorney, "law" is inevitably about presenting concrete and nonlinear sto-
ries, about sensing the features of a narrative that will engage a judge's or juror's atten-
tion or expose the tension in a legal rule. Using and telling clients' stories requires trial
lawyers to make constant assessments of what they mean, of what elements unite them,
of which features are most important.
Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. R.Ev. 971, 1043 (1991); see also Thomas
Shaffer & James Elkins, Solving Problems and Telling Stories, in NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL
DisCOURSE-A READER IN STORYrELLING AND THE LAW 90, 98-99 (David Papke ed., 1989)
[hereinafter LEGAL DiscouRsE] (examining Gerald Lopez' conception of a lawyer's job as story-
teller); Kathryn Holmes Snedaker, Storytelling in Opening Statements: Framing the Argumenta-
tion at Trial, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADV. 15 (1986) (examining the communicative features of the
opening statement); Gerry Spence, How to Make a Complex Case Come Alive for the Jury,
A.B.A. J., Apr. 1986, at 62 (comparing laws' use of narrative to storytelling); Jeffrey S. Wolfe,
Courtroom Choreography: Systematic Use of the Courtroom, TRIAL DIpLomAc J., Spring 1985,
at 28 (discussing how to enhance persuasive presentation through effective use of the court-
room). But see Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language,
87 MicH. L. REv. 2459 (1989) (wrestling with the issue of whether the stories we tell when our
clients' positions are translated into the vocabulary of the legal arena are really the stories the
clients want told). Taking a broader sweep to the lawyer's narrative discourse, Dennis Patterson
posits,
that law is an interpretive enterprise whose participants engage in the production of,
and debate about, explanatory narratives-narratives that account for the history of
the practice and are produced in the service of argumentation about how to resolve
legal problems. In short, law is an activity and not a thing. Its "being" is in the "doing"
of the participants within the practice.
Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative, 76 VA. L. REv. 937, 940
(1990); see also Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and The-
ory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HAs'N as LJ. 861, 865-66 (1992) ("a critical
storytelling approach... conceptionalizes law as both: a social institution through which people
tell stories about their relationships with others and with the state; and an authoritative lan-
guage, or discourse, with the power to suppress stories and experiences not articulated in
accepted forms") (footnote omitted).
254. See Abrams, supra note 253, at 1043; Shaffer & Elkins, supra note 253, at 96 ("The
presence of a jury requires that the entire story, on both sides, be told in ordinary language and
made intelligible to the ordinary person.").
255. In their groundbreaking work, Lance Bennett and Martha Feldman conducted what is
probably the most systematic study ever done of why and how jurors make the decisions they do.
LANCE BENNETr & MARTHA FELDmAN, RECONSTRUCrrNG REALTY N THE COURTROOM
(1981). What they found is that jurors place the scattered information presented at trials into
narratives. The credibility of these presented narratives is then judged based upon whether they
make sense when compared with the jurors' private "stories" (constructed from experience,
logic, knowledge, bias, myth, social convention; in other words, in the context of their personal
"schema," see supra note 228) concerning what they would expect to take place in the particular
situation on which the trial is focused. See also Berger & Mitchell, supra note 228, at 835 (dis-
cussing training students to develop and control the trial "story"); John A. Call, The Trial as
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tell them to prosecutors256 when trying to arrive at a plea negotia-
tion. 7 Throughout, these stories are composites of circumstantial
evidence: information, lack of information, and the inferences that
one can draw. That's all there is.25 8 The court considers an eyewitness
direct evidence, and psychologically, the distinction between direct
and circumstantial evidence is probably important to jurors ("It's not
just circumstantial, this witness really saw the thief"). However, it's
really all circumstantial when you're creating narratives. All an eye-
witness means is that a particular person with particular perceptual
Story: How Jurors Perceive What They See and Hear During Trial, 22 TRIAL, Nov. 1986, at 84
(discussing strategies for influencing juries); Moore, supra note 228 (discussing the role of jurors
and their cognitive process); Michael Tigar, Voices Heard in Jury Argument: Litigation and the
Law School Curriculum, 9 REv. LrG. 177 (1990) (discussing how law schools do not teach
litigation skills).
This narrative concept further explains why, when talking to jurors after a trial, some will
ask questions about proof that seems "off the wall" to the litigator (for example, "I was waiting
to hear something about whether your client had hooks near the door to place her keys on.").
These jurors' private stories (for example, about what people do with their car keys after
returning home) were sufficiently idiosyncratic that you did not anticipate it, and the jurors
became focused during trial on listening for evidence that would comport with their stories. See
Moore, supra note 228, at 309-10.
256. These stories and associated strategies, particularly during negotiation, may be very
simple, relying on shared community understanding, or rather complex, see Maynard, supra note
64, at 86, 94, or really no story at all. See id. at 95; see also Penn, supra note 108, at 2:
In trying to get a charge against a client reduced, Verchick always seeks a bargain-
ing advantage. "If I find the prosecutor's complainant'is a dope dealer-and the prose-
cutor doesn't know it-he may give his case another look and offer a reduced plea," he
says. "If [the defendant] is a retard, I may argue that he doesn't deserve to go to jail
because he's not in complete control of himself. If he's accused of illegal gun posses-
sion, I'll show that he was carrying a gun because he was mugged several times."
257. These negotiations, in turn, are bound by narrative structures that offer four basic paths
for storytelling:
In routine processing, participants depend on stories that are textually constructed in
police and other documents; in deciding charge and sentence, they may claim particular
understandings of cases on the basis of synoptic results. In cases of character assess-
ment, participants similarly rely on police reports, and an attorney may introduce back-
ground information to justify a bargaining position. Rather than disputing the
assessment, the other negotiator simply accepts or rejects the dispositional proposal it
supports. When attorneys deploy a narrative component that denies the offensiveness of
an act, it sets up a negotiational dispute over what happened. This may mean discussing
alternative versions of the facts and reconsidering the defendant's identity and charac-
ter. Fimally, if a defense attorney uses an excusing defense as part of the narrative, this
regularly results in arguments over the subjective state of the defendant during com-
mission of the offense.
Douglas Maynard, Narratives and Narrative Structure in Plea Bargaining, in LEoAL DISCOURSE,
supra note 253, at 125 (emphasis added); cf. Peggy C. Davis, Law and Lawyering: Legal Studies
With an Interactive Focus, 37 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 185,193 (1992) (in bargaining with an agency,
an attorney tries to develop a story that presents the agency helping the client as being consistent
with the agency's mission).
258. See Berger & Mitchell, supra note 228, at 831-32.
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abilities takes the stand and in particular words relates how at a par-
ticular time in her life under particular physical and emotional circum-
stances she had particular perceptions. This might include perhaps a
subsequent identification procedure which itself will have taken place
under particular circumstances. From this mass of information within
applicable legal burdens, the parties will ask the jury to draw the infer-
ences supporting their respective case theories.259 With focus the
attorney is always working with such circumstantial evidence within
the framework of an ever-evolving case theory.,260 constantly working
to reconceptualize the central story and sub-stories as she obtains new
information and perceives new combinations of inferences from the
information already possessed. This strategic narrative-building
comes in at least three forms: telling richer stories, changing belief
systems, and recognizing underlying harmful stories with which the
attorney must deal.
a. Telling richer stories: What is meant by telling "richer" sto-
ries? Anyone who has teenagers has had the experience of asking
them about school, a movie they saw, or a party they attended. Par-
ents usually get something like, "It was O.K. Nothing special. You
know, pretty much like you'd expect." Now that is not a very rich
story. It lacks details and texture. It doesn't provide a visual image or
resonate emotionally. It does not even offer a structure for intellec-
tual reflection. Richer stories, in the context of criminal defense,
embody most or even all of those characteristics. They dig deep into
human reality and experience and as such make sense in some
fundamental way.261 In this process they honestly look at competing
259. To be effective in this task, the lawyer must be deeply attuned to people, their similari-
ties, differences, and diversity. The lawyer must possess "humanity" that encompasses an under-
standing of victims, defendants, jurors, judges and such in order to tell meaningful stories. See
Smith, supra note 62, at 49-50. The lawyer must possess "empathy" in order to understand and
project his or her client's story. Ogletree, supra note 9, at 1243, 1272, 1274; see also infra notes
261, 272-74.
260. For an extensive discussion of the process of developing case theories and representa-
tional strategies (the overall strategy for achieving a client's objectives) see MARILYN BERGER
ET AL., PRETRIAL ADVoCACY: PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND STRATEGY 17-35 (1988); MARILYN
BERGER ET AL., TRIAL ADvocAcY TRAINING: PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND STRATEGY 17-33
(1989); see also Richard K. Neumann, Jr., On Strategy, 59 FoRDHIAM L. REv. 299 (1990) (explor-
ing the process of creating strategy, the effect of temperament on strategy, and the ways in which
strategy is learned and most effectively taught).
261. Professor Webster captures some sense of this ability. "Finally, creativity in prepara-
tion always seemed to show. The goals of enhanced empathy and instinct, in seeking to drama-
tize the humanity of the client and organize the case around a core concept, set good defense
attorneys apart form those simply forced into duty." Webster, supra note 230, at 567; see also
Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L.
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inferences and justify one of the inferential paths.262 The more infor-
mation you have-from discovery, investigation, your client, or expert
testing-the more you have to work with; but ultimately, developing
richer narratives is principally a function of thought and concentra-
tion. That also takes time-thinking and rethinking, quickly scrib-
bling notes as an idea comes in the middle of a family outing, musings
during quiet walks-time that is the brother and sister of focus.
In pattern representation, you can and must tell coherent, legally-
relevant stories. However, they will not be what I call rich, and to that
extent will be less persuasive because they cannot control the human,
emotional, and logical turf as can a rich one.2 63 Here is an example
from a theft case that students handled.
The client was a salesperson in a mall department store. Because
several registers he had worked on had been short, security personnel
set up a sting. A security guard from another store played a customer.
He took a $60 pair of jeans, removed the price tags (and the plastic
security tag that would trigger alarms if someone left the store without
paying), and put on the pants. He approached the register where the
client was waiting on a customer, threw down the price tags, threw
down a wad of cash and change covering the exact cost of the jeans
with tax, said something about being in a hurry, and left the store.
The client finished waiting on the customer, put the money left on the
counter in his pocket and, because it was the end of his shift, he took
his cash drawer to the office. As soon as he handed in the drawer he
was arrested by store security. When questioned he claimed that he
had intended to go next to the lost-and-found with the money before
he went home. For some reason there had been a mix-up and security
had neither taped nor recorded the sting.
ScH. L. REv. 55,117 (1992) (analyzing the archetypal linguistic structure of defense and prosecu-
tion closing arguments by considering how lawyers produce "thickly textured tales in which the
lawyer's explicit logical reasoning is backed by the implicit sending of additional messages, strik-
ingly harmonious, mediated by the multiple devices of narration, allusion, and linguistic
coding").
262. Central to the credibility of a particular story is the nature of its construction, including
"internal consistency, narrative coherence, reliance on 'hard' or physical evidence, and perhaps
most importantly, the stability of the storytelling over time." See Kim Lane Scheppele, Just tile
Facts, Ma'am Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 123, 162 (1992) (considering the credibility of stories in the context of witness
testimony).
263. For examples of some "rich" closing arguments, see Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note
261, at 75, 83, 105.
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With pattern representation (talking to the client for a half hour
in the hallway prior to trial about his testimony) the essence of the
defense argument would likely have been something like:
Ladies and gentlemen. You have heard from my clienti2 64 and
he told you how he had intended all along to turn the money into
the lost-and-found. That's what he told security when they arrested
him; that's what he always said. You heard that the lost-and-found
is outside the store and that it is an absolute rule that a salesperson
may not take their cash drawer out of the store ever. So he had to
take the cash drawer first. But he never got a chance to get to take
the money back, because they arrested him first. And think about
this when you go into the jury room-he never left the mall with the
money; he didn't try to hide or destroy the price tags-they were
right on the counter where the security guard threw them. And all
in all this must have been pretty confusing with this guy throwing
money and tags at you.
This isn't bad. It may well have convinced a jury to find reasonable
doubt.
With focus, on the other hand, what was said in the pattern argu-
ment might have been augmented by something like:
Let's take a careful look at this sting. Because if you do, I think
you'll agree with me that this was so messed up in both plan and
execution that we can't infer anything from my client's reaction, cer-
tainly not beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the whole idea of the
sting was strange. In a sting, you take the way you think someone is
committing a crime and replicate that. So, if you think someone in
the post office is taking checks out of the mail, you send through a
dummy letter with a check and watch. Now obviously the store did
not believe that anyone was taking money by pocketing cash that
customers throw at them while running out of the store. You've
heard testimony that that only happens once in a blue moon. So
this was some kind of strange general honesty test, like leaving a $5
bill on the sidewalk. More importantly, this was a totally aberra-
tional event in the life of a salesperson.
264. In this case, the students spent a great deal of time discussing whether the defendant
should testify, or whether to raise reasonable doubts without him. They went back and forth, but
by trial were leaning towards putting him on; partly because it seemed he would make a good
appearance on the stand, partly because he had pocketed the money and never called store
security, which seemed to require some explanation.
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You heard salespeople with twenty years experience say that
this kind of thing-a customer throwing down money on an expen-
sive item, not something costing a buck or so but $60, and then leav-
ing the store-happens once every few years if that. And there's
nothing in their training or manuals dealing with it. So who is to say
what reaction makes sense or what someone's reaction means when
confronted with the totally idiosyncratic.
And what's more, the very conception of the sting ensured its
own confusion. The "customer" had to rush up to the counter and
get away before my client could interact with him, or my client
might have talked to him and started ringing up the sale. That
would be the end of the sting. So the very concept of this sting all
but assured that the interaction would be carried out with such
speed and frenzy-fearing contact with my client that might have
led to ringing up the sale-that the reality of the communication
would likely have been incoherent from my client's perspective.
Think what this must have looked like to my client. Here he is near
the end of the day, waiting on his last customer. Suddenly, a man
rushes to the counter, mumbles something as he throws down a wad
of money, and rushes away. Now you're being asked by the prose-
cution in the calm of the courtroom to assess my client's behavior as
if he had been faced with a normal, rational situation to which we
would all agree how someone would have acted if he were honest.
But this is no such thing.
Because the security so botched this sting that, though they tes-
tified that they routinely tape shoplifters, this "carefully-planned"
sting provided neither video nor audio demonstration, we are left
with our common sense. Again, what must the situation have
seemed to my client, especially when his concentration was on
another client at the moment this chaos erupted? Finally, as if all
that wasn't enough, the sting ensured that my client would be given
miscues about what was going on. They took the security tag off the
pants so the alarm would not go off when the "customer" left the
store. All salespeople knew these jeans have tags on them. So
when the guy rushes out and no alarm goes off, what is my client's
brain going to register, especially when the situation was so confus-
ing to begin with? "I guess these weren't our jeans." But now he
looks at this pile of money ....
The court dismissed the actual case prior to trial because the store did
not want to pursue it.
b. Changing belief systems: All of us carry socially-constructed
conceptions of the world composed of an array of cognitive structures
1310
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that guide the constant process of interpretation that we call giving
meaning to our experience.265 The influences that create these struc-
tures are both a function of our concrete experiences and our cultural
knowledge base. Both of those components of course will likely differ
with class, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation.266
All involved in trial work know the Rashoman effect267 that dif-
ferent individuals will perceive the same event differently. Less obvi-
ous is that each of the multiple descriptions may be "true" if situated
in the particular individual's cultural context.2 68 Good advocates
understand the significance of this. Juror, judges, and prosecutors all
come to the process with an interplay of personal and culturally
embedded cognitive structures with which they must make meaning
out of the particular case. Sometimes the interpretation we desire will
naturally be supported by the cognitive structures of the particular
individuals who are the audience for our persuasive efforts.26 9 Other
265. See supra note 228, for authorities regarding the cognitive processes of interpretation.
266. See, e.g., DONALD BLACic, SOCiOLOGICAL JusTICE 10 (1989) (arguing that justice in
lawsuits is a function of the relationship of the opposing parties' class status, for example, "all
known legal systems tend to be relatively lenient when people of low status victimize their
peers"). On a more sweeping, institutional level,
It is the implicit contrast between those whose self-believed stories are officially
approved, accepted, transformed into fact, and those whose self-believed stories are
officially distrusted, rejected, found to be untrue, or perhaps not heard at all. Those
whose stories are believed have the power to create fact; those whose stories are not
believed live in a legally sanctioned "reality" that does not match their perceptions.
"We," the insiders, are those whose versions count as facts; "they," the outsiders, are
those whose versions are discredited ....
Scheppele, supra note 180, at 2079; Scheppele, supra note 262, at 125-27 (socially constructed
gender differences affect how women's stories of victimization are heard).
267. This 1951 Aldra Kurosawa film (Japanese with English subtitles), which portrayed the
"same" violent event from the perception of several actors, was based on the Japanese novel
Rosho-mon (Kyoto Gate) by Ryunosuke Akutagaouu.
268. See, eg., Scheppele, supra note 180, at 2086 (victim claimed she was "lightly choked";
defendant could characterize this same act as a "heavy caress").
Stories may diverge, then, not because one is true and another false, but rather because they
are both self-believed descriptions coming from different points of view informed by different
background assumptions about how to make sense out of real events. Id. at 2082; see also Schep-
pele, supra note 262, at 168 ("The difference in accounts that the battered woman and the femi-
nist lawyer would give of this event is not the difference between truth and falsehood. Instead, it
is the difference in the interpretive framework through which the events are seen in the first
place.").
269. "Postmodern thinkers have revealed that the strength of legal argument depends as
much on the consciousness of the listener as it does on the skill of the advocate." Gary Minda,
Jurisprudence at the Century's End, 43 J. LEG. EDUC. 27, 57 (1993); see also Jeremy Paul, The
Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 Tax. L. REv. 1779, 1801 (1991) (discussing the controversy over
rules and standards).
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times those cognitive structures are an impediment. Effectively con-
fronting these latter situations is what is meant by changing belief
systems.
There are a number of narrative strategies for accomplishing this.
You can tie the client's experience to one of the listeners cultural
"stock stories."270 A young person of color struggling on the streets to
make a living may be reconceptualized to a white sentencing judge so
as to fall within the tradition of the turn-of-the-century immigrants
who likewise struggled to make it in America.271 The attorney can
project the audience into the client's world through imagination2 72
facilitated by concrete facts that challenge existing cognitive struc-
tures.2 73 Alternatively, the attorney can show the client and audience
270. In his article, Gerald Lopez, who appears to have coined the phrase "stock story,"
explains "[tlhe knowledge structures I have labeled 'stock stories' have been variously described
as 'scripts,' 'schemas,' 'frames,' and 'nuclear scenes.' I make no effort in this essay to distinguish
between the various usages." Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1, 3 n.1. See
supra note 228 for a discussion of schema. Applying this concept as a tool of persuasion, Lopez
states:
Human beings think about social interaction in story form. We see and understand the
world through "stock stories." These stories help us interpret the everyday world with
limited information and help us make choices about asserting our own needs and
responding to other people. These stock stories embody our deepest human, social and
political values. At the same time, they help us carry out the routine activities of life
without constantly having to analyze or question what we are doing. When we face
choices in life, stock stories help us understand and decide; they also may disguise and
distort. To solve a problem through persuasion of another, we therefore must under-
stand and manipulate the stock stories the other person uses in order to tell a plausible
and compelling story-one that moves that person to grant the remedy we want.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra
note 228, at 2272 (explaining that one way in which narrative can persuade is by "invok[ing] an
existing storyline ... familiar to the audience"). Sometimes, of course, it is in your client's
interest to have her situation distinguished from the stock story. See, e.g., Amsterdam & Hertz,
supra note 261, at 105 ("The effectiveness of devices like the rhetorical questions with which
defense counsel develops his theme of the cold-blooded murderer commonly depends upon pre-
dicting accurately and playing to the stereotypical assumptions of one's audience.").
271. This example is analogous to one offered by Professor "Winter regarding the cultural
model of the "Horatio Alger" story. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 228, at 2272.
272. This approach to changing belief systems by projecting the decisionmaker into the cli-
ent's world through imagination has also been put forth in Abrams, supra note 253, at 1002; Toni
M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2099,2105 (1989) ("[A] concrete story comes closest to actual experience and so
may evoke our empathic distress response more readily than abstract theory."); Winter, supra
note 228, at 2272, 2277.
273. See, eg., Abrams, supra note 253, at 988-89 (concrete narratives of battered women
reveal them, not as "pathologically weak" as projected by common understandings of battered
woman syndrome, but rather as competent people who are "but one partner in a relational
contest for power and control"); David Friedrichs, Narrative Jurisprudence and Other Heresies:
Legal Education at the Margin, in LEGAL DiscouRSE, supra note 253, at 43, 45; Massaro, supra
note 272, at 2105; Winter, supra note 228, at 2274 ("IThe advocate can offer concrete facts and
experiences that make the court's ICM [Idealized Cognitive Model] inapplicable and another
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to be functioning on the same value structure though in different
worlds.274 Thus in a successful diminished-capacity defense to a bank
robbery charge, an excellent attorney argued that the defendant had a
mental breakdown precisely because he had tried so hard to provide
for his family and give them the American Dream; then suddenly
faced failure when laid-off from a job on which he had performed
well. Again, let me give an example from a case defended by a stu-
dent team in a clinic.
The client was charged with Driving While Intoxicated ("DWI").
His wife was his main witness. She testified that she met him in her
own car at a hardware store and although he had a few beers he was
completely sober. She then took the lead with him following. She
noticed him start to slow down, but did not know why (it turns out the
police were pulling him over). She did not wait or go back because
she was running out of gas and wanted to make sure she made it to the
nearby station. She then went home. However, she did not hear from
him. Finally, hours later, he called to be picked up at the police sta-
tion. Both the client and his wife were Native Americans in their
sixties.
In preparing, the students realized that to the all middle-class
white jury this story would not make sense.2 75 Why wouldn't she go
ICM more obviously so.... The sheer force of detail can be used to press the tribunal to rethink
the situation, to recategorize a case as an exception to its dominant paradigm and an instance of
another ICM.").
274. Professor Singer put his students in a class situation analogous to the plight of workers
in a plant closing whose situation they were studying in class. This experience gave them a sense
of the real power of the workers' position, a power which had previously escaped them. See
Joseph W. Singer, Persuasion, 87 MNch . L. REv. 2442,2447-56 (1989). Prior to this exercise, the
students "failed to understand that many courts would understand plant closings as hard cases."
Id. at 2447. In reflecting on this exercise and its success, Singer notes that "[p]ersuasion nor-
mally works, not by convincing others to change their values, but by making them aware of
values they already have which they simply had not initially thought were relevant to this situa-
tion." Id. at 2456 (emphasis omitted); cf. Ogletree, supra note 9, at 1284 ("Those who are more
prone to see similarities, rather than differences, between themselves and others can empathize
with those whose experiences or characteristics differ in significant respects."); Patterson, supra
note 253, at 989 ("The power of narrative is a direct function of its ability to conceptualize the
subject matter in a way previously unseen by the participants, yet in a form most agree still
captures the point of the practice.").
275. See supra note 255 for the cognitive underpinnings of jury decisionmaking. In fact,
underlying the relatively recent acceptance of various trauma syndromes in evidence is the rec-
ognized need to admit information in order to counter otherwise negative inferences based on
inaccurate or incomplete historical conceptions (for example, if he was really beating her, she
would have left or called the police). See eg., Esteile v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1992) (admis-
sion of battered child syndrome evidence does not violate due process); Ibn-Tamas v. United
States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979) (battered woman syndrome); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d
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back once she got gas? Why didn't she call police or hospitals when
her 65-year-old husband did not reappear as the hours went by?
These jurors would have gone back or called the police. Therefore,
this story does not work as a narrative to be interpreted by the jurors'
existing cognitive structures.2 76 What she is saying couldn't have hap-
pened the way she says and so she can't be believed.
The students' strategic response to this was to bring out concrete
details that would make her narrative make sense on direct examina-
tion: the particular nature of her relationship with her husband
explained why she didn't drive back, and her experience with police
and other institutional authorities as a Native American explained
why she didn't call. The jury convicted him, but when discussing the
case with the students afterwards they indicated that they believed the
wife and even believed the defendant was not drunk. However, they
did believe that his driving was "affected" and that's all the statute
required.
c. Recognizing underlying harmful stories with which the attor-
ney must deal: Embedded in the fabric of many cases are stories that
are not explicitly raised by a strict analysis of the elements of the
offense, but if ignored can be devastating to a case strategy. In the
DWI case just discussed, the mainstream cultural stories about
"drunken Indians" had to be extensively probed and challenged on
voir dire-not the easiest task in a region where alcoholism among
Native Americans is as visible as it is tragic.
In another case the client was charged with an assault on his wife.
The following was the story told by both parties from the beginning.
The defendant husband had come home very late after closing
the bars with friends. Not finding this terribly admirable, his wife
tossed his coat outside. When he went to get it she locked him out
knowing he didn't have his keys. He kicked the door in just as she
312, 316 (Wash. 1984) (battered woman syndrome); Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741 (Wyo. 1993)
(child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome). Professor Scheppele, supra note 262, at 126-28,
explains how, women who are victims of sexual violence are still put at a disadvantage by the
stock cultural inferences drawn from delayed reporting of the offense. Similarly, in our Immi-
gration Clinic, students must be prepared to present information to the Immigration Judge
explaining cross-cultural behavior in order to prevent the judge from drawing incorrect infer-
ences (for example, the fact a Guatemalan highland Indian does not have a particular date in
mind correlating to each significant event in his case does not mean he is not telling the truth).
See VERONIKA KorT, THE IMPACT OF CULTURAL FACTORS ON CREDIBILITY IN ASYLUM CON-
TESrS (1988).
276. See supra note 255.
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was going to open it and the door hit her. She then became furious
and struck him repeatedly. The extent of his response was to try to
hold her arms back in order to keep her from hitting him by putting
his own arms around her. She then hit him with a vase, causing a cut
that required the police later to take him to the hospital. He called
the emergency operator to have the police sent. When they arrived he
was imprudent in how he talked to the police and he was arrested.
Now, looking at this case you might think (and rightly so) that this
client did not commit an assault. You may not like how he behaves as
a partner in his relationship and may even cheer a bit for the wife, but
he didn't commit a crime. In fact if anyone committed a crime it was
her. Yet this case was not dismissed until the day of trial, shortly
before a motion to dismiss was set to be argued. This was also not a
case where the prosecutor had not had time to review the file until
trial. The students had reviewed the facts and legal authorities with
the prosecutor on several occasions. Why did it take so long? It took
so long because there was a powerful cultural narrative that eclipsed
the actual facts of the case, making it all but impossible for the prose-
cutor to "see" the parties, until this story was finally worn away
through great effort. The belief was that men are the abusers; they
physically abuse women and the law must stop it. The fact that he was
black and she was white, he was large and she was small, added fur-
ther narrative elements to an already powerful story.
An institutional story limited the possible outcomes of a 180-day
mental commitment hearing277 in which a team of students repre-
sented the patient. The client had stabbed her husband five times
with a butcher knife, had been charged with attempted murder, and
placed in a mental institution when she was found incompetent to
stand trial. Her initial commitment had been extended upon finding
her "gravely disabled" and "a danger to others." By the time of the
current hearing the client had a plausible position that she no longer
fit any of the criteria for involuntary commitment.2 7 8 Yet no court
277. See WAsH. REv. CoDE § 71.05.320(2) (1988).
278. The client's case had complexities which, ironically, made release not in her best inter-
est. Specifically, the prosecutor announced his intention to file attempted murder charges again
if she was released. If he did, one of three scenarios could have taken place, none of them very
good for the client: 1) she could have been sent for another competency determination, held for
six months and then either found competent, and then set for trial, or incompetent (putting her
back to square one, with far more restrictive custody than she had worked her way up to by the
time we were representing her); 2) if sent to trial, she could be convicted and sent to state prison
for a considerable amount of time (she had no defense outside of mental ones); 3) if acquitted on
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would ever let her out at this hearing because of an institutional narra-
tive?79 that was never mentioned at any point in the case: patient
released (and prosecutor does not rearrest and recharge); kills some-
one; state sued for releasing someone who had eighteen months prior
repeatedly stabbed her husband, partly in response to the guidance of
voices; state loses millions;z °0 papers castigate judge; investigation fol-
lows. Understanding this, the students made a record for release but
pushed for transfer to a halfway program which the court granted.
3. Persistence in the Face of Opportunities
Good attorneys always have a plan, a case theory, and an overall
representational strategy.- 1 However, no one can foresee each even-
tuality that will arise. Life and litigation are far too complex with far
too many variables. In retrospect, hopefully one's strategic decisions
over the course of a case make sense, but one would be truly brilliant
if this entire course of strategy had been planned from the start. One
must repeatedly assess and reassess.' That is part of focus. There-
fore, when unexpected circumstances arise the attorney will use focus
to turn this event into an opportunity, even if it initially appears nega-
tive (though some events are so decidedly negative that attorneys
direct their attention to neutralizing or at worst minimizing the harm).
The students represented a client in another DWI case. The cli-
ent was Korean and spoke almost no English. He had given state-
ments and taken a breath test. According to the police reports, an
insanity grounds, she would be back in the hospital, but then placed in the mentally ill, violent
offender ward.
279. For an example of the power of such an underlying institutional narrative, cf. David
Luban, Difference Made Legab The Court and Dr. King, 87 MicH. L. REv. 2152, 2173 (1989):
The concept of transparent unconstitutionality, and the right to disobey transparently
unconstitutional injunctions, is thus a linchpin of the legitimacy of American govern-
ment: take it away and you must abandon the rule of law, or popular sovereignty, or the
publicity of law.
The Court cannot quite bring itself to acknowledge this point, however, for a very
good reason: an open acknowledgment that we are entitled to disobey transparently
unconstitutional injunctions would invite us to judge constitutionality for ourselves,
thereby undermining the authority of the courts. Clearly it is this possibility that the
Walker Court is most concerned to foreclose. The political narratives underlying the
authority of American courts vest ultimate power-including the ultimate power of
understanding the law-not in the courts but in the citizenry, and insists that courts'
authority is bounded. In Walker, however, the Court confronted the question of who is
to determine the bounds of judicial authority.
280. See Rolando V. Del Carmen, Civil Liabilities of Government Psychotherapists and
Agencies for Release of the Mentally Ill, 12 J. PsYcnA-RY & L. 183 (1984).
281. See supra note 260.
282. See Berger & Mitchell, supra note 228, at 832-33; supra note 260.
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interpreter gave the Miranda and implied consent warnings to the cli-
ent. The Miranda warnings were obviously a legally necessary predi-
cate for admission of his statements (not helpful) and both warnings
were necessary to admit the breathalyzer results (really not help-
ful).3 The students sought the name and qualifications of the inter-
preter through discovery. Weeks of persistent phone calls
documented by follow-up letters followed by a formal motion to com-
pel eventually led to a surprising result. A phone company service
had reached the interpreter and neither the prosecutor nor police
knew the name of the particular interpreter. In fact, the police had
been aware that the particular phone company had a policy of not
revealing the name.
In a case left to pattern representation, the defender would have
made immediate use of this information, moving to suppress both the
statements and breathalyzer. 4 Without the interpreter present, the
defender would argue that there is no way to know what the client was
told and no basis for the court to find that the client understood and
voluntarily waived his rights.2 5 With focus the students went further.
They moved for dismissal on the grounds that the state's actions had
denied the client of what reasonably might have been material evi-
dence. The state knew about the phone company's policy, yet they
chose to use that interpreter service knowing the witness would be
unavailable to the defense. Moreover, this translation service was
hardly the government's only choice because there was a large local
283. See State v. Richardson, 499 P.2d 1264 (Wash. 1972) (Miranda warnings must be given
before a breath test is admissible); Gonzales v. Dept. of Licensing, 774 P.2d 1187 (Wash. 1989)
(implied consent warnings must be given for breath test to be admissible).
284. This argument would be based on the principle that rights-warnings must be communi-
cated to a defendant in "words easily understood." State v. Prok, 727 P.2d 652, 654 (Wash.
1986).
285. Had the prosecution brought focus, they may have created a number of counter-moves,
even if the phone company would not release the name. The prosecution could have brought in
an executive from the company who could testify about the regular practice of the business in
selecting qualified interpreters, the standard procedure for giving warnings and ensuring under-
standing. See FED. R. Evm. 406 (allowing admission of evidence of the habit or routine practice
of an organization). This may have sufficed for the Miranda and implied consent warnings foun-
dations, and thereby gained admission of the breath test results. This of course would not lead to
admission of the statements themselves, since they were communicated in English from the
interpreter to the officer and would therefore be hearsay from the officer, unless the prosecution
convinced the court to follow the rule in some jurisdictions that an interpreter is considered, not
a separate person, but the alter ego of the defendant. See, eg., State v. Robles, 458 N.W.2d 818,
821 (Wis. 1990). See generally MxcHAEL GRAHAM, EVIDENcE: TEXT, RuLEs, ILLusTRATIO S
AND PROB.mis 392 (2d ed. rev. 1989) ("evidence of a routine practice (sometimes referred to as
custom) of an organization is admissible when tending to prove the practice was followed on the
occasion in question").
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Korean community. From the defendant's perspective, on the other
hand, this witness' significance went far beyond the suppression
motion. This witness was the only person who could speak to the cli-
ent in a language the client could understand, and the only person
who could understand the client. As such, the interpreter could
potentially provide exculpatory evidence in the sense of raising infer-
ences negating the supposed intoxication that formed the basis of the
substantive charge; for example, that the defendant's speech was clear
and not slurred, that his comprehension and thinking processes were
good, or that his sentence construction and articulation were good.2 86
After the judge suppressed the breathalyzer and statements, the
judge called a recess prior to considering the motion to dismiss. Dur-
ing that recess, the prosecutor made an offer the defendant couldn't
refuse.
C. A QUICK OVERVIEW OF THE EFFEcrs OF "Focus"
Focus affects both negotiation and litigation. Allocation of the
scarce resource of focus to a case will generally improve the quality of
any deal for two reasons. Bargaining narratives that either change the
retributive category ("it's really more trespass than burglary") or
meaningfully distinguish the client from others in the same category
will be both better-elaborated and supported. Focus also brings pres-
sure onto the prosecutor in terms of additional work, constant risk
from the fact that the defender is scrutinizing every action or inaction
for possible tactical advantage, and a significantly greater chance of
eventually losing. All this begets good deals.2 1 Focus also increases
286. This situation bears an analogy to the one where the government in a criminal case
releases alien witnesses, who then flee the country. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458
U.S. 858, 873 (1982). In order to gain a dismissal, a defendant must explain how the lost wit-
nesses would have been "both material and favorable." Id.
287. "A colorable defense, moreover, even when it does not lead to a dismissal or acquittal,
commonly becomes a 'pry pole' in bargaining." Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1267; see also
H-EuMANN, supra note 25, at 90-91 ("Sometimes he will have a hearing on a motion or go to trial
on a case simply to retain his credibility in the plea bargaining negotiations; the threats of
motions and trial are potent weapons in his arsenal, and it is occasionally necessary for him to
prove that he is capable of using them."). Alschuler brings an interesting perspective to this
when he suggests,
Either the attorney can be good-and win concessions because prosecutors fear defeat
at trial-or he can be nice-and win concessions because prosecutors are willing to
accommodate him in an atmosphere of reciprocity. These two approaches can be com-
bined, but only at the cost of sacrificing some of the benefits of each.
Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cn. L. Rav. 50,79 (1968).
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the likelihood of acquittal, or dismissal at trial, or a dispositive
motion.
CONCLUSION
Our Sixth Amendment lore posits a single attorney in a small
office with a single client. There they are: Gregory Peck or Jimmy
Stewart pacing back and forth in their small town offices spending
months of their lives agonizing over a single case. Presumed Innocent
and other novels that exploit the current vogue of the courtroom
drama are the same." We hold onto this story because we're unwill-
ing to face the consequences of letting go. Our ethical rules set stan-
dards that are unrealistic for institutional advocates and rarely
followed in practice. Our Supreme Court deals with this deficiency by
going into complete denial and setting up an all but rebuttable pre-
sumption that every attorney is competent,289 contending that equat-
ing constitutionally satisfactory defense performance with any
performance standards will interfere with the attorney's flexibility.2 90
In the wider culture, no one wants to read books or see movies about
attorneys who pick up dozens of new clients they've never seen before
in a single day and work in crowded, small offices for state agencies.
These people do not fit into our criminal defense attorney narra-
tives-not of our culture, our courts, or our professional associations.
Yet these attorneys do almost all of the defending.
Until we look squarely at what it means to be a public defender in
the lower courts and begin to develop and apply a coherent ethic of
resource allocation, our legal and ethical descriptions of these attor-
neys and the Sixth Amendment regime within which they work will be
as ungrounded in reality as our pop novels and electronic mass-media.
We may be able to tolerate that our mass-culture takes the form of
diversion and make-believe. However, I do not believe that we wish
to have the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution occupy the same
position. So long as it does, our lower criminal courts will never work.
288. See generally David Wescott, The Defense Attorney-Media, Culture, and Reality
(1992) (manuscript on file with author).
289. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). Strickland also brings us back full
circle to the lack of resources. By all but deleting the right to competent counsel from the
constitution, the case bears serious implications for funding. In other words, if everything
already is competent representation, there is no legal necessity to reduce caseloads (and there-
fore, by necessity, increase resources) to meet a competence standard.
290. ld. at 688-89.
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